The ultimate conclusion of the past two years of conflict in the Middle East occurred when Hamas agreed to release the living Israeli hostages, a capitulation that could only have been reached when it became clear that the “beatings would continue until morale improved.” Following the inauguration of Donald Trump in January of this year, Israel resumed its ground offensive in March, attacked Iran directly in what’s now known as the 12-Day War, undertook a campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, finally invaded Gaza City—Hamas’s last stronghold—and struck against Hamas’s leadership in Qatar. Hamas could no longer reasonably believe that the 47th presidential administration would cut Israel off, and Doha, Hamas’s biggest patron, realized that the war was becoming a liability. Under Qatari pressure, Hamas let the hostages go. This is a win for Israel’s escalation and should guide U.S. policy in the Middle East and its relationship to Israel in the future.
After October 7, the previous administration set off its Israel policy on the wrong foot. President Joe Biden’s immediate advice to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was, “Don’t make the mistake that we Americans made after 9/11,” by which he meant that Israel should opt for caution. Over the next year and a half, forcing moderation on Israel was the U.S. policy. The Biden administration even withheld munitions and non-lethal equipment to prove that it was serious about using its pressure on Israel. It did not consent to Israel’s entry into Rafah, which Israel initiated only during the distractions of the aftermath of the Biden-Trump debate. As time went on, Hamas grew more confident that the United States would cut Israel off, a bet that might have paid off if Vice President Kamala Harris won the presidency. Hamas did not have a military strategy, mostly because it was not fighting a war at all, except for occasional ambushes. Hamas was fighting a war by other means.
Israel, on the other hand, was fighting an urbanized conflict using urban tactics. The IDF flattened residential areas, as any military would, to minimize door-to-door combat and minimize ambushes. Israel’s prosecution of the war was similar to the U.S.-Iraqi operation in Mosul, one of the few major urban battles in decades, during the campaign against the Islamic State. Israel did not enter Gaza City until this September, giving Hamas’s leadership in Gaza a safe haven. Israel first opted for a siege-like campaign, trying to bring Hamas out by cutting off its food supply. The controversies around the Gaza Humanitarian Fund turned this into an international liability. Eventually, Israel entered the city, forcing a confrontation with Hamas.
Qatar is the most fascinating case in the war. It has the distinction of having been attacked by both Israel and Iran within three months. It appears that the wealthy Arab state’s leaders realized that the war had become a liability. Reportedly, with their Egyptian counterparts, Qatar made it clear to Hamas that it must agree to a ceasefire. Besieged by Israel, pressured by Qatar, and without any hope that the United States would abandon Israel, Hamas finally gave in.
The first lesson of the war is that bombing works, and the second lesson is that ceasefires are possible only if the adversary of a U.S. ally or partner has no hope that the United States would lose its resolve to support its friend. Even if there are disagreements, they should never become public or publicly reported. This can be succinctly summarized by the acronym “BTW:” Break Their Will!
Strategically, Israel is in the best position it has been, possibly since its founding. It has defanged Iran. Hezbollah is not a threat. Gaza will not be a danger for at least a decade. Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen, and the new government has worked to expel the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Crops. The Houthis remain the only unresolved problem.
But a ceasefire is not a peace. As Gandalf advises Frodo, the enemy never dies; it only takes a new shape. Politically, the Jews remain the region’s odd one out. Normalization with some Arab states does not mean broad acceptance by the region’s people. There continues to be an anti-Zionist constituency in the Middle East upon which political opportunists will try to seize.
Israel’s campaigns in response to October 7th have had two effects: First, they have discredited Iran as the standard bearer of anti-Zionism; second, the level of anti-Zionism among Middle-Easterners is higher now than perhaps in decades.
Further problematic for Israel is that the Persian Gulf Arabs need it much less now. A major driver of the Arab–Israeli relations was the shared sense of threat from Iran. And yet, ironically, Israel’s success against the Islamic Republic have reduced this threat, making Persian Gulf monarchies less dependent on Israel.
But the biggest problem facing Israel is undoubtedly Turkey. Israeli–Turkish relations have been deteriorating for at least a decade. Ankara halted direct trade with Israel in 2024, and by August of 2025 closed its ports to Israeli ships and restricted its airspace to Israeli planes. Last week, fans of the Turkish club Galatasaray held signs during a soccer game to resemble the Palestinian flag, with the stadium’s lights showing a “STOP THE GENOCIDE” message, even though the ceasefire had taken effect for a week. In March of this year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly prayed “May Allah make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated.”
The Turkish army is the second largest in NATO. Much of its equipment is U.S.-made and its personnel train with NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, the erasure of the Soviet threat has made Turkey less reliant on U.S. support, but it continues to benefit from NATO’s security guarantee. It is increasingly adopting a revanchist posture, seeking to dominate the Middle East and the Balkans as it had during the Ottoman period. Until now, Israel had been blessed with enemies who, though vicious, were not strategically adept. Turkey will be Israel’s first truly formidable adversary since its refounding.
Meanwhile, Arab governments might come to realize that their populations have returned to Jew hatred, and relations with Israel will come at a cost for them, especially if Turkey shores up anti-Zionism.
Israel needs to preserve the gains it has made, and America must help. Over the last two decades, Erdoğan has transformed his administration into a durable regime. Israel must lean on the United States to control Erdoğan and, provided the opportunity, help to ease his transition from power.
Some Arab capitals now see Israel as out of control. Especially with the United States eager to leave the region, these Arab states, anxious about Israel and threatened by their own populations, may concede to Turkey for regional leadership. Israel should go on a diplomatic charm offensive to repair relations with Arab leaders and, to whatever extent possible, their populations.
Israel has made impressive strategic advances. The next step is to translate them into political gains. The Trump administration, as well as its successors, will serve the cause of peace well by learning the key lesson from its predecessor’s errors and its own success in bringing the release of the hostages: No daylight between Israel and the U.S. For all the pain and suffering of the last two years on both sides, the only thing that could have made things worse would have been more American dithering.
