Providence Editor James Diddams is joined by Bill Drexel, Fellow at Hudson Institute in US-India relations and geopolitical competition with China, to discuss his April 4th article “How Competing Hindu Theologies Drove India’s Nuclear Decision Making—In Opposite Directions.”

The story of India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is a compelling counterexample to the idea that foreign policy/national security decisions, and nuclear proliferation in particular, are only driven by the narrowly defined logic of economic self-interest and abstract methods of analysis like game theory. According to the “realist” security analysis of Westerners, India’s security situation in the 1960s was such that it should have been compelled to acquire nuclear weapons, and yet chose not to. Then, in 1998, when nuclear proliferation seemed far from necessary, India shocked the world by conducting tests that revealed to the world its newly developed thermonuclear capabilities. But what could explain the thought process behind India’s circuitous path to becoming a nuclear-armed state?