Deputy Editor Mark Melton speaks with Niall Walsh, the Western Europe analyst at Oxford Analytica. They cover how and whether Prime Minister Boris Johnson will deliver Brexit by October 31, rising populism and nationalism in the UK, the possibility of Scotland becoming an independent country, problems with the UK Royal Navy, what a US-UK free trade deal might entail, how the UK is responding to the Iran crisis, and more.

Since recording this podcast, the UK announced it would join US-led naval security mission in the Strait of Hormuz.

Mark Melton is the deputy editor of Providence.

Niall Walsh is the Western Europe analyst at Oxford Analytica.

Kirkland An produced this episode.

Rough Transcript

Mark Melton  
Welcome back to the foreign policy ProvCast. My name is Mark Melton. I am the deputy editor here at Providence, a journal of Christianity and American foreign policy, and I am joined here today with Niall Walsh from Oxford Analytica, based in the UK. Niall is a Western Europe analyst, and he’s been with Oxford Analytica since October of 2018. First off, thank you so much for joining us here on the ProvCast and talking to us today about Boris Johnson and Iran and everything else with UK politics, and how that affects American foreign policy. So, my first question to you is, now that Boris Johnson is the prime minister after Theresa May failed to convince Parliament to support her Brexit deal, particularly because of opposition to the Irish backstop, will Johnson be able to deliver Brexit as he has promised by Halloween?

Niall Walsh  
First of all, thanks, Mark, for having me on your podcast. I think the problem with Boris and his new administration is that it wants to pursue a very hard form of Brexit, and that is essentially no-deal if they do not get their wish to completely abolish the Irish backstop from the withdrawal agreement. And because no-deal is very unpopular in Parliament—there’s a majority against it—it’s going to be very hard for Boris Johnson to achieve that. On the other hand, it’s also going to be very difficult for Boris Johnson to backtrack and, for example, pursue a softer Brexit in order to, for example, stay in power and deliver Brexit by October 31. The government partners, the Democratic Unionist Party, also opposes the backstop, so if Boris Johnson, for example, tries to rebrand the withdrawal agreement, and the Democratic Unionist Party won’t support it, essentially, this is not enough support for either pursuit. But, of course, given Johnson’s new cabinet, where 17 foreign ministers were replaced with hard Brexiteers, he will try and go for no-deal if the backstop is not abolished, and the EU are saying that that is out of question. Obviously, they want to protect the Good Friday Agreement—peace in Northern Ireland—so at the moment, we’ve got this situation where neither side are talking with each other because their essential Brexit policies are so, so far apart. What this means is that Boris Johnson and his government are ramping up no-deal and, for example, standing for no-deal, [making] preparations for no-deal. So that’s pumping more money into the National Health Service. It’s pouring more money into border security in the event of no-deal, where there’s disruption at borders, but at the same time, behind all this, of course, is an election strategy. Boris Johnson only has one MP working—in America, you call it legislators, right, for members of parliament?

Mark Melton  
Right, we can call them MPs.

Niall Walsh  
—MPs, and there’s only one working majority in government, so he’s got a razor thin majority. Given the difficulties in pursuing no-deal and also, perhaps, backtracking, even going for a softer version like the withdrawal agreement—it’s looking like a general election might be the best case, might be the best way to break, I suppose, the Brexit logjam. And if Boris can’t, and… Well, one way in which Parliament could block a no-deal Brexit, of course—and there is a parliamentary majority—is if they call a vote of no confidence in the Boris Johnson government, and a number of Conservative MPs—they’re 20 to 30—are prepared to vote against their government because they’re so hostile to a no-deal Brexit. So, at the moment, essentially, Boris Johnson is trying to build up a lot of momentum. He’s trying to create an optimistic image around no-deal Brexit, and in that event, he believes that by going to the polls, he can win the election, and perhaps go into government with the Brexit party and deliver Brexit that way. But at the moment, it’s looking very difficult that he can achieve no-deal by October—or he can achieve Brexit by October 31. But, at the same time, the legal default state is, of course, the 31st of October. So, perhaps, if there’s a vote of no confidence in the government to stop no-deal, that will trigger a general election and there could be a small extension to facilitate that general election, but without a doubt, the government’s day to day planning is very much electioneering. And that’s how it looks.

Mark Melton  
So we were just talking about the Irish backstop. Could you explain what that is for our American listeners who may not follow this on a daily basis?

Niall Walsh  
The Irish backstop is a clause in the withdrawal agreement, and it’s basically the only issue that is blocking Brexit. What it essentially is there to do is in the case of a no-deal Brexit—or in the case of a no-future-UK-EU-Free-Trade-Agreement—and where the UK leaves the EU with a clean break, and that means leaving the EU’s regulatory sphere of the Customs Union and the single market in order to keep the border of Northern Ireland open, which is essential given the Good Friday Agreement—which is a peace treaty to end almost 30 years of violence in Northern Ireland between Republican and Unionist paramilitaries in the 70s, 80s, and 90s. And the backstop would basically keep the UK within the regulatory sphere of the EU if no alternative arrangements can be found to keep the border seamless, to keep it open, to keep people moving freely, to keep goods moving freely. And why is this… There’s obviously a lot of criticism on the Brexit side because they think that they’re just using this issue, and that the EU is using Ireland in order to stop Brexit. And the main issue is not necessarily that there is currently violence in Northern Ireland, but there would be border infrastructure. For example, if this backstop wasn’t here, if there was a hard Brexit, and if there was no free trade between the UK and the EU, and this would be of course… It’s very vulnerable. It’s an easy target. You don’t need professional groups to take down border posts or to provoke tension. In Northern Ireland at the moment, there is a lot of tension under the surface. There hasn’t been a government up there for two and a half years. And then, of course, it’s also very important for the all-island economy on Ireland, in terms of the goods flowing between the UK—between Ireland and Northern Ireland. So you got those two, and they’re kind of the two main issues, but more so on the security front. And of course, after Brexit, that border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will now become an EU border, so to speak. So, this is why, of course, the Customs Union and the single market play such a critical role.

Mark Melton  
You focus a lot on nationalism and populism, and how did those forces play into Brexit?

Niall Walsh  
Well, one of the major things about the rise of national populism in Europe is that centrist parties, centrist political groups, are now adopting some populist policies in order to reclaim lost support, or in order to kind of reduce the appeal of fringe parties. And one of those, of course, is the Conservative Party. The current administration is now far more right wing, far more populist than, for example, the previous administration and administrations before that. And, of course, that is in order to stem the flow of support for the Brexit Party, which is the populist party. It used to be… Their leader used to be Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party, and Nigel Farage is probably the most effective UK politician in the last 15 years, and he was instrumental to Brexit. In terms of society in general, I think it was populist in the sense that it was anti-establishment, the Brexit vote. It wasn’t so much anti-EU, but it was really anti-establishment politics, and this was an opportunity because, of course, the majority of Conservative MPs and majority of Labour MPs were against Brexit. They voted to remain in the 2016 referendum. This is an opportunity for many voters, especially in more economically deprived constituencies, to vote against the established parties for the first time in 20 or 30 years because what we have to remember is that over the past 20, 30 years, the Conservatives and Labour have gradually become less about identity-based politics and more about consensus-based politics. They’ve come more to the center, more to the mainstream, and it’s been much harder to, say, distinguish between the two parties than it previously was. So, Brexit was an opportunity to really vote against the establishment, to vote against London, and we are seeing the consequences of that. One of those, as I just pointed out, is Conservatives’ move to the right and more identity-based politics. What will happen with Labour? Well, they’re realizing that many of their traditional voters reject their move to the center. Okay, in the 1990s, they’re still voting for them under Tony Blair, but they had nowhere else to go; they had no other alternatives. But now, traditional left wing voters—I’d say right across Europe—they’re more socially conservative than, I suppose, voters of… than say, liberal, cosmopolitan voters, students who now represent really important aspects of the Labour Party in terms of their appeal. So you’ve got these two groups of voters that seem very, very difficult to bring together and please them both at the same time, and I think we’re seeing this is now emerging as a serious issue for Labour. And now they’re losing their traditional supporters to the Brexit party. And what’s quite interesting is if the Conservatives manage to reduce the appeal of the Brexit party, what they do is they take some traditional Labour voters in leave constituencies in those more economically deprived areas, so this is the challenge facing the left. But, without a doubt, the role that populism plays [is] a really fundamental role in Brexit. And we’re seeing that more so than anything in how it’s changing both of the two largest parties.

Mark Melton  
And with that, you’re talking about the Conservatives trying to take votes away from the Brexit party. And if there is a general election like you mentioned earlier, there’s this talk about like a four-way race with the Liberal Democrats, Labour, Brexit, and the Conservatives. And in a first-past-the-post system, that’s kind of hard to have multiple parties like that. So how do you think a general election would work out in the UK with this, you know, four-way race?

Niall Walsh  
Yeah, it all depends on when the election takes place. That’s really crucial, what the circumstances are. Ideally, the Conservatives will not… At the moment, they do not want an election until Brexit is delivered, but, of course, that might not be possible if there is an issue with the October 31 deadline in terms of what I previously mentioned about the parliamentary no confidence vote. But they’re already electioneering, so the chances are that they will have some momentum in the case of an election, and how it will work out is, I think the remain parties—and that’s, I’m talking about the Liberal Democrats; the Green Party; the Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Welsh party; the new Change UK party—I think they’ll be willing to lose seats in order to maximize the vote of the largest remain party, so that’s what happened recently. Last week, last Thursday, in a Welsh by-election, Plaid Cymru, the Greens, and Change UK didn’t run so that the Social, or the Liberal Democrats could win the election. So, that’s certainly one strategy on the remain side. For Labour, it’s very difficult what they’ll do because they’re still quite ambiguous over Brexit. They want a second referendum if there’s going to be a no-deal Brexit, but they’re not saying yet what they would do if they were in government, and Brexit hadn’t been resolved, suggesting that they might try to negotiate for a soft Brexit. So, it’s very difficult to know what they would do. In terms of the Conservatives and the Brexit party, at the moment the Brexit party is trying to distance themselves from the Conservatives because they’re now losing support in the polls as a result of the rise of Boris Johnson and his administration. We’re already seeing in the polls that Brexit party support is halved. So, Nigel Farage is trying to say, look, we can’t trust Boris Johnson; he decided at the last minute to become a Brexiteer. He’s a late convert. He’s made promises before that can’t be delivered. So, at the moment, he’s trying to separate himself from the conservatives. But, certainly, in the case of an election, and if both parties had enough support—if one of the parties won the election, and collectively they had to support the former government, I think that would be far more ideal for the Conservative Party, because I think they’d be able to deliver a lot more of their policies, I think, in general, and working with the Brexit party would be a lot easier than it would be working with the Democratic Unionist Party, which has a different agenda. It’s more about Northern Ireland, it’s more about identity, it’s more about the border, rather than Brexit and UK mainland politics, per se. I think if there’s an election after no-deal—for example, in November—I think that would really finish the Brexit party because that’s basically their raison d’etre, is because Brexit hasn’t been delivered. And what you’d have is about 30 to 35 percent of the population now will support no-deal if it means Brexit gets delivered. So what you could have is the Conservatives winning as the only no-deal party, so to speak, and then the remain vote being split between maybe Labour, the Lib Dems, and maybe the Scottish Nationalist Party. So, there’s a lot of different scenarios out there at the moment. What is clear is that the population in general is becoming more polarized, you know, taken out to the extremes, and the center ground is dwindling so more and more people want no-deal and more and more people want a revocation of Article 50, which basically means canceling Brexit. So, I think in that sense, Boris Johnson and his message, his clear Brexit message, will be more appealing to voters—not by an awful lot—but will be more appealing to voters, than Theresa May’s Brexit policy. So I think going to Boris Johnson, the conservatives, their election prospects are better than they were under Theresa May, and I think that’s one of the reasons why so many people in the Conservative Party, so many MPs, got behind Boris. They know that he’s unpredictable and that he’s not always honest, but they know that he can win an election and save the party. And I think probably the big issue, I think, will be with the Labour Party, because if there is an election, they’ll have to have a manifesto and they have to clearly stipulate their Brexit intentions. The party at the moment is declining in the polls. They’ve also got all these anti-semitism allegations to deal with. There’s a lot of coverage over here in the UK about it; I’m not sure if you’re familiar about it in the US. So, I think the Conservatives also, you know, there’s an opportunity for them to capitalize on Labour’s issues and the general grown discontentment with Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership.

Mark Melton  
Yes, we’ve covered some of the anti-semitism in the Labour Party on Providence, a couple articles. It’s something we hear about occasionally over here. I don’t know about mainstream media, how often they cover it versus other issues. The other question I want to bring up here is the SNP, the Scottish Nationalist Party, and their drive for a[n] independent Scotland, and how does Brexit play into that? Or, also more specifically, what are the chances of Scotland becoming an independent country?

Niall Walsh  
I think, without a doubt, the political move for independence within the Scottish Nationalist Party has grown since [the] Brexit referendum. Of course, I think—don’t quote me—around 64 percent—could have been 65; it could have been 63, but I think around 64 percent—of Scottish people voted to remain in the EU in 2016. But strangely enough, the polls on… opinion polls on the prospect of independence haven’t actually changed that much. So there’s still a slight majority that want to remain inside of the United Kingdom. But, of course, this is also changing now because the risk of no-deal is increasing. So, up until a few months ago, people thought that no-deal wouldn’t happen, that there would be an agreement between the political moderates, and maybe that had an impact on voting intentions, but now that the risk of no-deal is increasing, political pressure within the Scottish Nationalist Party, which is the largest party, of course, in Scotland, is increasing. And I think before the next Scottish elections, which are 19/22/2022, I think that the SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon will make an announcement on independence unless there’s some radical change, say, for example, with Brexit. And, there’s a few things, even with no-deal Brexit, we don’t know what implications no-deal will have yet. Of course, everything is pointing towards the negative issues or the negative impacts. But of course, that’s on a spectrum. There’s really bad or there’s, maybe, the short term chaos or else this could be something that could last for the next 10, 15 years in terms of recession, in terms of slowing growth, in terms of slower investment in general […] so we don’t know what implications, actually, a no-deal Brexit would have. Scottish people will also be looking at the difficulties that the UK is facing negotiating withdrawal from the EU, and they might be conscious that negotiating withdrawal from the UK might also be tricky, while simultaneously trying to negotiate accession to the EU and all the different issues that involves, whether it’s around the board or whether it’s around a new currency, and then, of course, joining all the different regulatory aspects of the EU. But, without a doubt, it’s risen. Also, within a crisis—or should I say, never let a crisis go to waste. Boris Johnson is certainly very aware of the damage that no-deal could cause to the union in Northern Ireland, as well as Scotland. And I think, in the short term, you could see a lot of money being pumped into the devolved regions, which could be a good thing. I mean, in another situation, in another context, it might not get this level of attention. But now that London is so concerned that no one wants to be remembered as the last Prime Minister of the United Kingdom so, in the short term, I think Boris Johnson really tried to—he was in Northern Ireland and Scotland last week—and I think he really tried to woo a lot of people up there, and tried to, you know, with money, with maybe more devolved powers, etc. But overall, I think that, yes, Nicola Sturgeon will make a call for a referendum, but it’s by no means sure that that referendum—or that the vote—will be to leave the United Kingdom.

Mark Melton  
So pivoting from the UK politics a little bit to the American foreign policy perspective on this, in the US, we are talking a bit about free trade deal possibility with the UK, and especially this administration seems keen on that, whereas a Democrat—it seems kind of ambiguous, I think, where they stand. It might depend on particular members of the Congress for the Democrats, but what are the prospects of a US-UK free trade deal after a Brexit?

Niall Walsh  
It’s quite interesting because the prospects for a UK-US free trade agreement will rise in the political agenda in the UK if there’s no-deal, because in order to compensate for the economic chaos in other areas, a free trade deal with the US is very, very appealing to the Boris Johnson administration and all his officials and advisors, but at the same time, there’s a very strong Irish American lobby in the United States, and that has an impact on foreign affair issues. Nancy Pelosi was recently in Ireland, and she said that there’ll be no free trade agreement with the UK if Brexit poses any threat to the Good Friday Agreement, and no-deal is something that many, including Democrats, believe would pose a threat to the Good Friday Agreement because you wouldn’t have the backstop; you wouldn’t have a UK-EU free trade agreement to protect free movement of people and goods in Northern Ireland, and of course… I think also in the US, in order for a UK-US free trade deal to be ratified, it would need Congress’s approval. And over the year—well, in the 90s, there was bipartisan support for the Good Friday Agreement, and many of those congressmen are still around. So, I think that’s one issue to look out for. In terms of the mechanics of the trade, I think the US clearly has much greater leverage in this regard. A free trade deal with the UK wouldn’t do an awful lot to the US economy. It doesn’t account for very much of its total imports, and President Trump knows how important politically a free trade agreement is—and perhaps economically is—to Boris Johnson to prove his Brexit credentials, that he can deliver Brexit and that he can strike a great trade deal with a non-EU power. Given this, Trump and his negotiating team will have a list of demands and if those demands are not met, they’re not just going to make concessions in order to have a free trade agreement. I think there’s a number of issues that are also very sensitive. And it’s not so much with regards to terrorists because there’s already quite an established trading relationship between the UK and the US, plus more so in terms of regulation. And, of course, one of the big issues in the UK is what would the National Health Service be part of of a free trade agreement, and under no circumstances would Boris Johnson be able to countenance that vote, of course. Trump could say—well, he already did say that it will be part of it, but then he backtracked, but it’s unclear in terms of that. There’s also other sensitivities that will get in the way of really a substantial trade agreement that will have any economic substance. So, what you’re probably more likely to see is something like a smaller trade agreement that’s on a case-by-case issue or that’s some kind of non-controversial goods. And then Boris might be able to sell it back at home saying, look, this is a stepping stone to perhaps further success. We’ve already got something by October 31 or by December. Look what this will enable us to achieve in the future. But something substantial is highly unlikely. And I don’t think Boris Johnson will be in a position to just give away any kind of national… issues of national sensitivity just to have a free trade deal with the US because that would be electorally very damaging, and it would really strengthen the opposition because, for example, the Labour Party, their strongest issue—electoral issue—is the NHS. If you start playing with something like that, you’re just giving them an opportunity to win support.

Mark Melton  
If I’m not mistaken, when the British were asked what their top achievement is since World War Two, didn’t they list NHS, the National Health Service, as one of their top achievements?

Niall Walsh  
Absolutely, because in the post-war period, unlike today, a lot of the rebuilding of the economy focuses on nationalization, on building up national models, and the NHS is certainly one of them. Despite all its flaws, it’s still an extremely prized asset. Even at the moment, what Boris Johnson announced yesterday is that he’s gonna pump an additional 1.85 billion into the NHS. So he’s clearly seeing this as an important election issue for him. So while at the moment he’s concentrating on the NHS, to then sell it in the US-UK free trade agreement would be suicidal.

Mark Melton  
There’s been a lot of talk out of the UK about creating a global Britain that would trade more with countries like China, India, the US and other places that the perception or the rhetoric is that the EU has prevented the UK from being able to create these types of trade deals. So, kind of looking at, for instance, China, are they going to be able to do much more trade with China, or is that going to run against some other near relationships with the US, for instance? 

Niall Walsh  
Yeah, exactly. If the idea that… Just to give some context, I mean, one of the main reasons for the creation of the EU is to be able to compete as a global power with the Soviet Union, with Russia, and with China—sorry, with the Soviet Union, the United States and with China—and, of course, the UK, I mean, its budget, its capacity is considerably weaker than that of the United States or China, so inevitably, in the case of after Brexit, it’s not going to exactly become a global power that’s on a level playing field with China and the US. So, it’ll inevitably have to take sides. And, of course, currently with the Boris Johnson administration, and just in terms of the Brexit divisions more generally, I mean, Brexiteers are very wedded by the idea of a special relationship between the UK and the US. So it’s very likely that the United Kingdom will fall under the wing of the United States under Boris Johnson’s administration, post-Brexit. And, of course, that has implications, for example, perhaps for trade with China, but also on issues like Huawei on the next generation and technology, and on these kind of issues. Also, I think we might discuss it in a bit in terms of relations with Iran, but certainly while Trump is in the White House, and given that trade is really his biggest issue and his biggest foreign policy issue, that the UK, in terms of who it trades with post-Brexit, could be influenced somewhat by that—particularly regarding the rivals of the United States in the world—the countries like Iran, countries like China. […] I think, again, it all depends how Brexit pans out because I think if there’s a no-deal Brexit, there is obviously going to be an urgency to get some kind of agreement with the EU because it is the UK’s closest trading partner—biggest trading partner—and easiest block to trade with, given the geographical proximity. So I think that will take up all the tension—that, and perhaps the US—whereas I think if there’s some Brexit agreement, and there is at least an implementation—if there’s a Brexit deal, there’s an implementation period of 18 months, which basically means that the status quo in terms of regulation continues until December 20, 2021, and I think that will give the UK more time to, perhaps, identify a larger group of future trading partners. But if there’s no deal, I think the immediate priority would be with the EU and the United States, so a lot rides on what happens with Brexit.

Mark Melton  
You had mentioned just briefly there, Huawei and the 5G network. I was in Scotland about a little bit more than a month ago and that was one of the news items. When I was there was the rollout of 5G by Huawei, and some of the cities—I believe they were doing it in Edinburgh—but where does that stand; what is Huawei doing in the UK right now and how is that affecting US-UK relationship?

Niall Walsh  
Well, at the moment, there was leaks in June that the UK had officially accepted—or had officially offered Huawei to be part of the future of the building of a 5G infrastructure. But after that leak happened, one of the ministers was sacked who was apparently responsible for the leak, Gavin Williamson, but since then there’s been no mention of it in the press. It seems to be something that has gone on hold since, because this happened at the time when Theresa May’s 10 years were coming to an end and Boris Johnson was coming in, so at the moment the situation is extremely quiet in terms of is Huawei actually going to play a role or not? I’d imagine Boris Johnson will be a lot more conservative in his approach than perhaps Theresa May, in terms of giving Huawei an opportunity to build 5G, especially now that he’s moving the UK closer towards the US in terms of a number of issues. So, to be honest, it’s one that hasn’t received a lot of attention in the last month or two. And the UK Government has never officially confirmed that it has given Huawei this opportunity. Now, it’s whether Boris Johnson will be basically influenced by President Trump—whether President Trump’s influence on Boris Johnson will go to cover all these kinds of issues, or whether the UK administration can deal with certain issues separately. But given the nature of Huawei, and given the opposition in the US, I would think that the prospects for Huawei in the UK aren’t as good as it would have been under Theresa May, but I’m not sure when there will be a government announcement on this issue. There isn’t at the moment, and MPs are away on holiday so it might be something that takes […] until September, October.

Mark Melton  
You mentioned Iran a couple of minutes ago, and Iran seized a UK flagged oil tanker in the Persian Gulf and the Royal Navy had warned the Iranians not to seize the ship, but they did it anyways. So, a couple of questions related to that. How is this news playing out in the UK, and how is the Johnson administration responding to this crisis?

Niall Walsh  
In the UK, the attention towards the story has kind of died down in the last week. It received a lot of attention when Iran seized the Stena Impero, the UK flag tanker in the Gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz, but it seems to have died down a lot. However, at the moment, we’re at a situation where both tankers remain in the—well, the UK tanker is still in Iranian hands and the Grace 1, the Iranian oil tanker that was seized, I think, on July 4 off the coast of Gibraltar, I think is still in UK hands. There hasn’t been any progress, I believe, in terms of a quid pro quo swap of those tankers, giving them back and settling this dispute. The main kind of focus in the UK has been on the degradation of the Royal Marines, in the sense that there’s far fewer warships today than there was, say, in the 1990s. A number of them spend vast amounts of time throughout the year being serviced, not in operation. Of course, this isn’t a quick fix. So, of course, the plans are to increase defense spending over the next few years, but this is also a really serious situation in the short term. So, essentially, given the picture that the UK can no longer defend itself [and] its shipping interests in the world, and it needs to rely on allies, and then the big, of course, challenge with that is, well, who do they rely on? They can’t work with the Europeans and the US simultaneously given the divisions over the Iranian nuclear deal. The Europeans want to separate themselves from the US on these kind of issues, especially if it’s somewhat related to the Iran nuclear deal or Iran in general, because Iran, the Iranians, will see this as a provocation. They’ll see the Europeans siding with the US, for example, if they have some alliance, a European-American alliance to protect shipping and the Strait of Hormuz. And, of course, even trying to get the Europeans to join the UK in terms of bolstering shipping security in the Gulf is very difficult because, well, in general, European militaries are really depleted, but it’s also a very sensitive subject, say, in a country like Germany, where if you mention the defense or military, the memories of Nazi Germany come up straight away, and that’s particularly among left wing parties. One of those, the Social Democrats, the biggest left wing party, is currently in government, so it’s very difficult for Germany to take a direct line in this. And of course, at the same time, the Europeans are so concerned about the Iran nuclear deal. They want to protect that, so even a European security alliance in the Gulf would probably be seen as a provocation by Iran, and what this means for the Iranian nuclear deal and all that there, I mean, that’s a real big concern in Berlin and in Paris. So, I think what it basically means is the UK is kind of stuck between Paris at the moment. It’s in a situation where it can’t go it alone in the world in something like defense and something like maritime security, and it needs allies, but positioning themselves or working with those allies has consequences. Whether you go with the Europeans, this could be opposed by the US, who, for example, in the case of a trade deal [would say], look, you have to take on board our policy on Iran, and then that really creates obstacles in terms of them working with the Europeans, so it has all these implications. I think at the moment the situation is kind of in a—I guess what they call, say, for someone who goes in the hospital when they’re critical but stable, it’s a kind of a critically stable situation where, I think, if both tankers were returned, I think that would solve the issue for the moment. And those tankers were taken under a previous administration, and I think, especially when the Iranians took the UK tanker, they knew that Theresa May was essentially weak […] and maybe they used her as an easy target in order to make a point. They might now take someone like Boris Johnson more seriously, and also the other big change I think is that Jeremy Hunt, the former foreign minister, was really—you know, he wanted to preserve solidarity with the Europeans on the Iranian nuclear deal and whatever that meant, whereas now he’s being replaced by a more hardline individual, Dominic Raab—he’s the former Brexit secretary under Theresa May who resigned in opposition to the withdrawal agreement—and he is saying that the Iranian tanker should not be returned to the UK because it was unlawfully seized. So, at the moment, he doesn’t seem to be too much up for a compromise, and I think the big risk then is if the Iranians by accident or on purpose do create another provocation in the Gulf, how will this administration react? I think that’s the key issue. How will—if another UK tanker is seized because there’s no real protection for UK shipping in the Gulf—how will Boris Johnson react? The Iranian strategy all along seems to have been, they’ll respond aggressively, but they might not provoke something. So, the UK seized the Iranian tanker. Now, the Iranians seized the UK tanker; maybe they’ll leave it at that. I think the big concern is what happens if there’s another escalation in tensions, and how will Boris Johnson’s administration react, and that could be a crisis point for the government.

Mark Melton
Well, Niall, thanks so much for speaking with us on the foreign policy ProvCast and explaining everything on the other side of the pond for the American audience here to understand how are things working out with the Trump administration and the new prime minister of Great Britain.

Niall Walsh
Thanks, Mark, it’s been a pleasure.