This week the Chinese Communist Party approved a decision to “establish and enhance the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for national security” in Hong Kong. In response, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Hong Kong is no longer autonomous from China so no longer warrants special treatment from the US. Olivia Enos, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, spoke with Mark Melton about what this development means for Hong Kong’s democracy. She also analyzes how this will affect US-China relations, what Hong Kongers will likely do next, what this means for Taiwan, how the US should respond, and more. She also explains why she and others have called this predicament Hong Kong’s “worst-case scenario.”

In the podcast, Enos and Melton speak about her article in Forbes, which can be found here.

Rough Transcript

Mark Melton
Welcome back to the foreign policy ProvCast. My name is Mark Melton. I’m the managing editor for Providence and today we are joined by Olivia Enos who is the senior policy analyst for Asian Studies Center at the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. First off, thank you so much, Olivia, for joining us remotely for this podcast. 

Olivia Enos
Thank you so much for having me on. 

Mark Melton
As many of our followers probably know, the situation in Hong Kong has changed suddenly in the past week. Just so that people know, we are recording today on Thursday, May 28, in case things are changing over the weekend. So today, May 28, the Chinese Communist Party approved a decision to establish and enhance the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for national security in Hong Kong. So Olivia, what does this mean and how did we get here?

Olivia Enos
Well, this is a really significant development and will shape the foreseeable future for the Hong Kong people. The National People’s Congress, as you referenced, was considering a resolution on a new national security law that would make it so that individuals inside Hong Kong cannot discuss secession, they cannot engage in so-called terrorism or so-called foreign interference, which could be something as simple as coming to Heritage and speaking in a program or talking even with somebody from Providence. And they’ve also made it so that people cannot engage in seditious acts. And what we know from the Chinese Communist Party is that all of that will mean that what we bore witness to last year, the 2019 pro-democracy protests, would probably be characterized as one of those four things. And so the fact that this is being passed means that the governing structure for Hong Kong of “one country, two systems” is essentially coming to an end. What that looks like over the long term is a big question because it is, of course, in China’s interest to maintain the economic vitality of Hong Kong as an asset to China, but as one of my colleagues really aptly put it, China seems no longer okay with Hong Kong just being a global economic center; it needs to be a specifically Chinese economic center. And so, they are really undertaking a lot of transformations, possibly with a pretty significant risk economically because I think there’s going to be huge diplomatic changes, certainly to the US relationship—both to China and Hong Kong—but likely to how the entire world and the business community interfaces with Hong Kong.

Mark Melton
So, talking about the Chinese perspective on this where you said that your colleagues suggested that this is China trying to make Hong Kong into a Chinese financial center and not a global center, is China seeing this as, even if they lose Hong Kong as a global center, it’s a net positive for them economically?

Olivia Enos
I think that they see it as they’re putting their stamp on the economic activity that happens there, and I think that the two systems will really be no more. But the extent to which the sort of capitalist policies that are allowed to flourish there, and a lot of the democratic freedoms that have been enjoyed since the handover in 1997—I think those will be substantially diminished. And so, this is incredibly discouraging because this means that the individuals who are going to bear the brunt of the Chinese Communist Party’s decision to consider this resolution will be the Hong Kong people. They will bear the brunt of all of this, and as Secretary Pompeo put yesterday, any harm that should befall the people of Hong Kong is a direct consequence of the actions of the Chinese Communist Party, and this is really concerning—very, very concerning. The US needs to make sure that it has the Hong Kong people’s back, that we continue to stand on the side of freedom, that we continue to safeguard what we can of Hong Kong’s both freedom and prosperity, and that we very clearly communicate to the Hong Kong people that we still have their back.

Mark Melton
You recently wrote that this is Hong Kong’s “worst-case scenario.” Why did you say that?

Olivia Enos
This is the worst-case scenario because when the “one country, two systems” framework was established in 1997, there was an agreement that this was going to go on for at least 50 years, and so now that’s going to be coming to a close, it looks like, much, much sooner than anticipated. That means that a lot of the freedoms that Hong Kong people enjoy won’t be there anymore. And, you know, the worst-case scenario is not only my words, it’s also the words of Martin Lee, who is basically the founder of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. He was involved in writing Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which is what established that “one country, two systems” framework. We had him at Heritage last week for a public program along with Dennis Kwok, a current legislative council member in Hong Kong, and both of them were saying that this is incredibly concerning. They also put nuance into what’s going on right now. What went through with the National People’s Congress is not the law actually going into effect, but it is the National People’s Congress committing to that resolution, leading to the eventual law—passage of a law. And a lot of people are anticipating that that won’t come through until August, so it kind of remains to be seen. Maybe we have a little bit of time to work with, but it really does look like the die is kind of cast for Hong Kong. And I think, of course, we saw yesterday Secretary Pompeo saying that Hong Kong was no longer sufficiently autonomous from the People’s Republic of China, and so that, too, is going to have really significant implications. I think we’ll start to understand that a little bit better when the President makes his official statement on what decertification means for Hong Kong.

Mark Melton
What do you think this means for US-China relations? I know you said that President Trump is going to kind of clarify some more on this, but what are your speculations for now?

Olivia Enos
What Secretary Pompeo did yesterday was in response to a legal requirement that’s laid out both in the Hong Kong Policy Act as well as the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act that was passed by Congress, actually, last fall. And that specifically requires Secretary Pompeo to report to Congress whether or not Hong Kong enjoys sufficient autonomy. In the bill, it leaves out a couple of different areas that this would impact if it was deemed that Hong Kong was not sufficiently different, or didn’t merit different treatments than any other part of China. That can relate to trade issues, other econ issues, as well as collaboration with local law enforcement training that’s done between the US and Hong Kong. And I think that that’s where there’s quite a lot of room for the US government to determine what the next steps will be. And for decertification to fully take place, it will require an executive order from the president, and Secretary Pompeo indicated yesterday that President Trump will be coming out with a statement. Whether or not that actually means an executive order or something else, I think that kind of remains to be seen, but I think also Congress has a role in this since Congress kind of laid out the framework for this potential decertification process. And so I think that you know, Congress has always long been a voice in favor of freedom for Hong Kong and for all parts of Asia, and so I think we’ll really be looking for Congress also to be outspoken, as well as the executive branch. But there can be no question—there will be implications for US-China relations, potentially even relating to the trade deal, we don’t know; there will be implications for US-Hong Kong relations. But I think that there is no actor that will bear the brunt more than the Hong Kong people, and so I think that then it becomes the responsibility of the US to consider what we can do to extend help to the Hong Kong people in their time of need and to reassure them that we do have their back.

Mark Melton
So could the United States, or any other democratic country, have done anything to prevent this from happening, or is this just Xi Jinping doing… Is it all his fault, or not just all of his fault but could any other country have done anything to help Hong Kong more on this?

Olivia Enos
Well, I mean, I think that the US policy system was pretty responsive after the 2019 protests. Perhaps it took a little bit longer than it should have for there to have been both legislative action and also consistent statements coming out of the White House, but I think that everyone, whether it was lawmakers in the US or even the most cynical people in Hong Kong who expected the worst already—I don’t think anyone expected the National People’s Congress to be introducing such broad sweeping reforms that would so inhibit the freedoms and liberties of the Hong Kong people. I think it really did take everyone by surprise. And I think the only thing that I could think of that might have been a little more advantageous—and I think there are still opportunities to build this—is to have had better alliance management where you did have support for Hong Kong being expressed from all corners of Asia. And I think you see that in a very democratic fashion at the people level, at the ordinary person’s level expressing support for the Hong Kong people, but I think that it’s not… I think there needs to be stronger statements; there needs to be an international coalition building. I think I actually saw that the UN Security Council is calling for a special meeting on Hong Kong, and so hopefully that will help to build some international consensus, but there will be implications, I think, for US-China relations. I think that there are individuals who may be able to be held accountable from a sanction standpoint, targeting individuals or entities who are found to be undermining freedom in Hong Kong. And, of course, we talked about this before when there was, you know, during the protests, speculation about the possibility of an armed intervention on Beijing’s part. Any sort of armed intervention would need to be unequivocally condemned, and there would be huge, huge implications for that beyond even just targeted sanctions. So, I think we need to be really on our toes and keeping a close watch for how Beijing is acting because it’s important to remember, all of this is happening while the rest of the world is looking the other direction and focused inward as they fight their own battles with COVID-19. This is completely understandable, but while this has been going on, we’ve seen what’s taking place in Hong Kong. We’ve seen what’s happening on the China-India border with the disputes that are taking place there. We see China taking advantage of kind of the anonymity that’s created by a world distracted by the global pandemic that, of course, they grossly mishandled right from the outset, so there’s a broader need for accountability. I think there’s a need for an international investigation into the COVID-19 situation, and maybe that would dovetail very nicely with efforts to hold them accountable for their transgressions against Hong Kong.

Mark Melton
Last year we saw millions of Hong Kongers protest against the extradition bill that would have eroded their democracy, and at that time, it seemed like the CCP wouldn’t send in tanks and wouldn’t enforce its role too much at that time, that they were kind of allowing the protests happening. So is there anything Hong Kongers can do now to preserve their democracy, or what do you think will happen?

Olivia Enos
I think Hong Kongers will take to the streets if they can. Again, I think we will definitely see protests reemerging. And I think that there’s going to be people who are serving in the Hong Kong legislature who are going to continue to be outspoken. I think that that’s totally understandable. This is a much more severe situation than the extradition bill. The extradition bill was like another step in Beijing’s attempts to erode Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” framework. What is happening today with this new national security law is an attempt to eliminate the framework and throw the baby out with the bathwater. It will completely eliminate “one country, two systems” in practice. And so I think that there should be an even stronger response from the Hong Kong people because I think they’re literally watching freedoms and liberties that they have enjoyed over the past several years dissipate. I can’t imagine, actually, what it would be like to be in their situation. I don’t think it’s all going to happen overnight, though. I don’t want to overstate what’s going to happen. I think it’s, of course, in Beijing’s interest to maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity, but I think that they forget that democracy, that freedom… makes Hong Kong one of the freest economies in the world. It’s consistently ranked number one in Heritage’s index of economic freedom until this past year when it was moved down to number two, but that freedom is critical to Hong Kong’s success, to Hong Kong’s wealth, and to its well-being. And so, I don’t know how Beijing is going to square that circle.

Mark Melton
What do you think this means for Taiwan, or what lessons should Taiwan take from all of this?

Olivia Enos
I think it’s important to distinguish Taiwan’s framework and system from Hong Kong’s. It is different; the way that it was established was different. They have universal suffrage in Taiwan where they can actually elect their president, current president Tsai Ing-wen, as well as have local elections, whereas in Hong Kong they don’t enjoy those types of liberties. And the framework is different. It’s quite different. But I think that Taiwan and the Taiwanese people would be right to be concerned. I think Tsai Ing-wen is incredibly brave. She has already made public statements about extending safe haven to Hong Kongers who would like to come to Taiwan. This is huge for Taiwan to say that and to go that far. And Beijing is already threatening, what we’re doing in Hong Kong, maybe we will come for Taiwan next. I don’t know whether that will happen, but I think that that’s why it’s even more important for US policy to be grounded in values. The Trump administration’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is predicated on the promotion of values, that free and open aspect of the policy, and included in that is respect for human rights, respect for freedom, free markets, as well as protection of religious liberty among other important First freedoms. And so I think that’s what we’ve got to be thinking about right now.

Mark Melton
Do you think this episode says anything about American power and influence and its ability or willingness to preserve democracy for those who are fighting for it?

Olivia Enos
I think that US policy in Asia has long been supportive of democracy. We look at even our allies and the role that we played in South Korea, or in Japan, and you just appreciate that the US has historically supported those countries and that we need those countries as allies in freedom. So I think that the US needs to defend both Hong Kong and any threats that might be posed to Hong Kong, or excuse me, to Taiwan as well. I think that has to be a critical part of US policy, and, frankly speaking, I think this administration especially has been very supportive of Taiwan in particular, and, I think, even if it took a little bit longer than it should have, has been pretty good on Hong Kong. So, hopefully, there will be follow-on steps that are very clear and unequivocal about the consequences to Beijing for continuing to move forward with this national security law, but I think it kind of remains to be seen.

Mark Melton
During the COVID-19 pandemic, several commentators have said that China’s flawed response would harm it domestically. It’s clearly harmed it internationally, I think, so the extra argument [is] that it would harm them domestically, and that they were facing a Chernobyl moment—or something that would cause them to fall the same way that the Chernobyl moment caused the Soviet Union to fall, as some say—so are we seeing any of that, or would a better analogy be the Prague Spring in 1968, when the Soviet tanks snuffed out democracy in Czechoslovakia for a couple of decades?

Olivia Enos
I think that China is certainly taking advantage of COVID-19, sort of getting at the first part of your question, to really undermine liberties and to really harm Hong Kong. It’s kind of trying to take final blows while the rest of the world is distracted. I think this is really dangerous, not only, and arguably most importantly, to the people of Hong Kong, but to the balance of power in Asia. And I think that kind of gets at your more historical aspects of the question [which] is how is China reshaping the rest of the world in its own image. I think it’s tried to use COVID-19, and also pre-COVID-19, through its Belt and Road Initiative investments to export its forms of authoritarianism. And if they can’t export them and have other countries accept them willingly, it will go to its special administrative regions like Hong Kong, and it will forcibly impose its way. This is hugely problematic because the values that are widely accepted as global and as shared are being undermined by Beijing and its leadership and its authority. If the world is not careful and doesn’t pull together, really, a coalition of the willing, both to hold them [China] directly accountable for their mishandling of COVID-19—and by that I mean silencing of whistleblowers, disappearing of citizen journalists, its sidelining of Taiwan, its lying to the World Health Organization about the transmissibility of COVID-19, its failure to report accurate numbers about COVID-19—not even to mention what’s going on in Hong Kong, or the one to three million Uyghurs that it currently holds in detention facilities inside its own country, that can’t go untested. And I think that the US presents a really excellent model that stands in stark contrast to China. We are values-loving; we do want to have connections with other countries across the globe, and when we make investments, we make them not just for our own good, but for the good of the countries that we’re investing in. I think we need to do a better job of highlighting the superiority of a US model, not only to the US but also to the rest of the world.

Mark Melton
So as you wrote earlier that this could be the worst-case scenario for Hong Kong, what should the United States do if this is actually the worst-case?

Olivia Enos
That’s a great question. I think that there are several policy things that the US should be considering. Obviously, Secretary Pompeo already took the first move by issuing, sort of, the statement that Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous from China. And, like I said, we’ll see where things go with that and should get more clarity from President Trump himself. But I think that there’s also other steps that can be considered. One, if there are individuals found undermining freedom and rule of law in Hong Kong, they should be sanctioned. Two, if we have a sort of armed conflict situation, the US should be considering granting priority to refugee status to Hong Kongers, those freedom-loving people, industrious people, who share a lot of US values would make excellent refugees to be resettled here in the US. And I think that there’s a strong need, finally, to just build a coalition of the willing to hold China accountable for not only mishandling COVID-19, but also for addressing some of the concerns related to Hong Kong. So, hopefully, we can build up strong rapport with other countries in order to press for Hong Kong’s freedom and to demonstrate to the people of Hong Kong that we have their backs.

Mark Melton
Well, Olivia, thank you so much for joining us again. I think you’ve done this, what, three or four times now, coming onto ProvCast. Thank you for joining us, and stay safe. 

Olivia Enos
Thank you, you too.