The following lecture was recorded during Providence’s 2017 Christianity and National Security Conference. David Shedd underscores the relationship between intelligence and national security. He argues that intelligence is the first line of defense for the US as it provides it with information to make appropriate military and political decisions. He argues that espionage is a moral good because it defends state interests and protect citizens. The following is a transcript of the lecture.
Well, I think it’s now good afternoon. It is indeed a privilege to be here. You would think a former case officer would be able to find himself into the location that he was directed to. I have been wandering the campus which I attended, I think it was 36 years ago, 37 years ago, as a graduate school student at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown. So, it’s kind of like a double whammy that I couldn’t find the location. So, Mark is being very kind by taking that responsibility.
I’ll say, and this is not a hit on anybody over the age of, let’s say, 40, but I love seeing young people. As an adjunct professor at Patrick Henry on intelligence and national security in the National Security Act of 1947, I enjoy sharing a practitioner’s view of intelligence in a world that, if you have seen whatever form you take your media in the last three minutes, will confirm that it is going, it’s falling apart all around us. The need for intelligence is absolutely critical.
So, to those in the audience, I look forward to hearing your questions. I’ll talk for maybe 10 to 15 minutes and then really open it up to you for questions that you may have or comments that may be germane to asking someone that served in the intelligence community for 33 years. My last job was acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and prior to that, for four years, I was the deputy there.
Before that, and this is an important marker on the career, I was a plane colonel during the stand-up in the office of Director of National Intelligence in 2005. Why do I raise that? I raise that because it’s a direct outgrowth of events in our nation such as 9/11, and as a response to the 9/11 Commission report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed in December of 2004, creating, among other things in those reforms, a Director of National Intelligence.
Prior to that, it was four and a half years in the White House during, to understate it, a fascinating time, which was February of 2001 to May of 2005. I tell you that not to impress you with the career or anything like that but to underscore the importance of the tie-in or the relationship between intelligence and national security. It is, if you will, the lynchpin in order to create decision advantage.
You say, when was I recruited to CIA? Well, technically 1982, but it actually started as an 11-year-old. So there’s hope for you young people. Let me explain. I’m a son of missionaries, born in Bolivia, raised for the most part in Chile from 1964 to just before 1973 in the coup of Pinochet. Why do I say 11 years old? There was an international stage set at that time, which was the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970. I’m 11 years old, no television at home, and guess what? My father, the missionary, and my mom and three other brothers talked about the news.
Now, it wasn’t how you take your news now. We generally had to dial it in, and it would go, and eventually, we could get shortwave or that. It was a very, very basic way of getting the news. But I had one fundamental question, and that fundamental question in 1970, as an eleven-year-old, was why does Washington DC, or the United States, however I put it, care about Chile? It was a very important question in terms of what was behind asking that question of curiosity. And what was behind that question was an unstated, how are these things connected that something in the skinniest country in the world, with its widest point at 168 miles—don’t look it up, it’s roughly that depending where you are—that anyone cares about that thousands and thousands of miles away. It’s a pretty important question to ask yourself.
So that’s when I was recruited. I was recruited in the sense of developing a passion for trying to connect events. I won’t call them dots but events that affect or, by definition of the focus of our national security community all the way up to the President and the US Congress, connect world events. To me, in talking today about Christianity and the relationship to intelligence has everything to do with that and the necessity to do that and to do it well. That is, in other words, our first line of defense. That intelligence focus in understanding how the world works and creating the advantage to whomever the decision-maker is. That may be the President, it may be the combatant commander in Central Command if it’s related to Iraq, Iran, that part of the world. It may be in Pacific Command or US forces Korea as it pertains to North Korea.
I could go on and on and on, which is, of course, your news feed of all the things that are going on in the world that add to instability and affect our vital interests in one form or another. So a tagline for today that I would leave you with is that in a world where governments have a responsibility to protect their own citizens, the events and actions that would inflict harm on those citizens require secrecy and secret services. Okay, I’ll get really crass—espionage—in order to defend those interests.
If you had to define what the military does in uniform, for whom I have great respect, and at the Defense Intelligence Agency—get it, defense in the first name of that—resides inside DoD, it was not only to give the combatant commanders and the warfighter that decision advantage, it was so that in every possible way, you prevent war, and should, God forbid, require to go to war, you win decisively. That’s the role of intelligence because, again, you are creating that decision advantage.
You ask yourself, so what happened in a place like Iraq in 2003, when by the end of that year, no weapons of mass destruction were found? Just to refresh your memory, the invasion was in March of that year. By October, November, arguably, there was in fact a fully growing insurgency in Anbar province, and at the same time, there were no weapons of mass destruction, which was the predicate and the basis for going to war in Iraq. Do you remember all that? Right.
So you ask yourself, where was the decision advantage to the President who decided to do that invasion in March and the case before the UN the previous month in February with Colin Powell and John Negroponte and all the characters in that era making that case for the war in Iraq? And you say, well, the decision advantage wasn’t matched with the decision confidence. Decision confidence is where the failure actually took place. Someone forgot to tell the President that, well, on those mobile bio labs and all of that, it’s the same source called Curveball reporting with five different source descriptions, giving the analysts the impression that there are five sources talking about bio labs that are mobile throughout Iraq, as just one little piece of it.
I want to leave you with the distinct message that the implications of getting intelligence wrong is equally as profound as getting it right in creating that decision advantage while at the same time addressing decision confidence, which in the more vernacular way, you would say, what’s the counterintelligence weight that you give to that information?
As a Christian in a world that is fallen, where good and evil are at war constantly, and that in the vacuum and in the absence of good, evil will prevail, intelligence is necessary. Therefore, by extension, espionage is necessary in order to, in the just war cause of defining it, essentially finding proportionality, finding the right authorities, establishing a just cause for what you do in intelligence, with the right intention, with a reasonable hope of success.
There are three, and I repeat, three primary lines of effort when it comes to intelligence in the area of foreign intelligence. It’s the offense. I don’t think I have to describe that because you look at any sports team, you know what that is. That’s the objective—to score, that is, to recruit, to acquire intelligence—that’s going on the offense. The defense, the second line of effort, is your counterintelligence. That is, how do I protect my nuclear arsenal secrets or my plans and intentions? Fill in the blank as a national security matter, the war plans on X, Y, and Z, which the five-sided building called the Pentagon works on each and every day along with nine combatant commands and two sub-unified commands throughout the world.
The more controversial of the third line is the third line of effort—covert action. Covert action is defined in the National Security Act essentially as being activities to which your government is not prepared to acknowledge a hand in doing. So, in other words, it’s what covert means. Those have led to successes in some instances in what is now a historical fact in pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but at the same time, its ramifications in creating the Mujahideen led to obviously a world that we know as al-Qaeda subsequently in terms of some of the very same allies that we had in 1979-1980 through the very late 1980s.
We have had debacles in the area of covert action, the overthrow of the Shah in 1952. You have Track 2 of Chile in 1970 that was taken off the books. Iran-Contra—I lived the Contra piece of it in Central America in the mid-1980s, and my history with that is fairly well known out there. So it was doing something that clearly violated the Boland Amendment. Three lines of efforts in intelligence, and as a Christian, I was able against the backdrop to be able to rationalize why a nation-state requires those efforts, needs those capabilities. That is, espionage for collection, the counterintelligence to protect what you have by way of secrets, and then protect what you have by way of secrets then the tool in the proverbial handbag of the President and the Congress when it comes to covert action factors for a Christian to consider when it comes to intelligence and with this I’ll close my remarks. I have had a number of discussions with fellow believers who would, I would very much say, are like thinkers in my way of intelligence. And they go, well, there’s deception involved in intelligence from the very first day. Absolutely. There’s deception involved in your cover persona. There’s deception involved in what you even tell your family about what you do. When silence doesn’t really answer the question, you have a what cover story you sow.
Deception is inherently built into intelligence activities. These same interlocutors go, well, that’s not really a lie. Well, you got to get past that. It’s a lie. Now how you justify lying is different than denying that you’re lying or denying that it’s deception. And I found many a good person who could not live that out. And that is perfectly fine if their conscience was going to be so seared by having to live in that manner. It’s probably not a good career, alright? So think about that a priori to thinking about an intelligence career and where deception is inherently built into the activities that you do, lest the adversary know that you’re doing it. So it seems pretty obvious, but you have to come to terms with your conscience as I had to do prior to joining CIA and then at different points in my career in terms of what I was asked to do.
Here’s perhaps the great irony: you need individuals like yourselves that are of an unimpeachable character to do the very thing that I just described about deception. You sort of scratch your head. No, I thought you’d want the lowest of the low, the just bold-faced liar that lives a lie constantly in their social media and social life and all the way. No, quite the opposite. There is so much trust placed on an intelligence officer. The character of that person, when I say, is unimpeachable, is above reproach in not just using very powerful tools that you’re given. And don’t just think electronics authorities that you’re given responsibilities as a human intelligence officer. I was the only one in the meeting where I was told certain things for which he was suborned or he had some other motivation for doing it. No one else there is to check it. I go back and write a report.
That report could be embellished. Imagine that. Embellishment never happens in your life, I’m sure. You come back and the only one that when the President is reading that or the intelligence analysts are reading that, they’re going to the mat on that report in terms of that. So the ethics of the person have to be above reproach. And thirdly, and I think this is really important, this is why I’m so delighted to see particularly the young people here and I’ve lifted the age now to 75 and below, the importance of having a clear, unambiguous worldview. Alright? The number two was about your personal ethics. This is about an understanding of where the world is and where it’s going. How does it make any difference? It makes a fundamental difference in your commitment to the mission. If you believe, for example, that evil is real, how I could sit with, and I’m not going to tell your nationality, but sit there and try and recruit that individual materially is affected by how I view how that regime, that might give you a hint of what kind of country it is. In other instances, governments are going to affect our national security.
If anyone thinks it’s sitting down with Kim Jong-un in North Korea or outside of North Korea, let’s pick a neutral place, not so neutral Beijing, and it’s all just going to work out because he’s going to have an aha moment and say, “I don’t need my nuclear weapons and I don’t need to work on an ICBM anymore in the K no. 8, which has our t250 engines that somehow got there in the last two years.” You say, “What? Wait a minute, Mr. Kim. Let’s all due respect. You already had nuclear weapons to ensure that you weren’t going to be invaded by the by South Korea or us by proxy through South Korea pick your choice of threat. What exactly why do you need an ICBM that reaches the continental United States?” And of course, he can’t answer that question apart from evil. And if you think for one moment that, I’m assured by mutual self-destruction as a doctrine, the way it’s used with Russia and China in the case of North Korea, you’re wrong, unambiguously wrong. It’s not a good bet if he has that capability to reach the continental United States.
So you see your perspective on your worldview of good and evil and the elements that enable you to understand that, and for me, it’s a biblical view. It’s called Genesis 3. Genesis 1 and 2, there’s perfection in the Garden of Eden. There’s the thing we call the fall. The fall occurs in Genesis 3, and there ever since we’ve been living with the ramifications of that fall of humankind restored through the Redeemer Jesus Christ coming 2000 years ago and all of that. But the story of good and evil is contained in 66 books we call the Bible. So if your frame of reference of good and evil and your frame of reference of where this world is going has that point of reference, it will affect materially every way you see the world. Does this make sense? It will affect your personal ethics. It will affect your worldview. It will fundamentally define your worldview. And so when you put that in context of intelligence, that’s the backdrop. And so with that, let me open it up on that really happy note. Let me open it up to questions or comments. And particularly, I’d like to hear from the young people, and that’s anybody 75 and below.
I don’t want to make it about age, but what’s on your mind? How can I help with what you’re struggling with, or do you have a question? Here’s what I tell every audience: don’t worry about it being classified. Let me handle that; I will tell you if I can’t share something or simply won’t tell you. So, I’m responsible for how I answer your questions. You can ask anything. How’s that for a pretty good deal?
We have about 15 minutes for the questions you’ve always wanted to ask of someone who is not James Bond. Yes, please.
Q&A
Question: Hello, Bruce Carson, Regent School of Government at Regent University. I have a couple of questions. Looking at cyber as now a warfare domain, it appears that over the last five years, the United States has been lacking in exporting that domain. We see ISIS effectively exploiting cyber, whether it’s Facebook, Twitter, or other platforms, and then there’s mention of Russia doing the same thing. Are you confident that the United States, with its bureaucratic levels in intelligence and national security, can adapt to respond to threats in the cyber domain? Also, how would you say integrity meets injustice in the intelligence field, and how can we foster that kind of good and evil dialogue within ourselves?
Shedd: Regarding the adaptability of the U.S. government, which includes our men and women in uniform doing great work at Cyber Command and elsewhere, I’ve come to have a deeper appreciation for the private sector. The non-public sector has incredible capabilities that are underutilized by the government. When I joined the CIA in 1982, the research and development for exquisite technologies were all inside the agency. However, over the last 10 to 15 years, that has dramatically flipped upside down.
We have a great acronym: COTS, which stands for commercially off-the-shelf technology. This is growing exponentially and improving at a rate much faster than the government can keep up with, especially in areas related to cyber. I’m a big advocate for public-private partnerships. The CIA uses an organization called In-Q-Tel, which is a great example of bringing innovation from the private sector to meet requirements in this area.
On the topic of integrity, as someone with an OPM file presumably in Beijing along with 23 million others, it’s upsetting because there’s a social contract with the government that there will be protection of your data. This includes the data of those who provided information about you during background investigations. This plays a role in counterintelligence efforts. However, when it comes to offense in cyber, the government is still wanting.
The single biggest issue missing in government is policy. It’s not about lacking capabilities; it’s about having clear policies on when to engage with adversaries in cyber. Latent cyber warfare is ongoing, evident in Russian intrusions and similar activities. It’s clear that we have the capability in the private sector, but the focus should be on policies regarding when to utilize these capabilities.
Interestingly enough, I’m running a tabletop exercise at Patrick Henry this coming Monday morning, simulating an NSC meeting scenario focused on Russian cyberattacks. The role players include students acting as the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others. I get to play the president, which is quite an experience. This illustrates how complicated these issues are. It’s not that we lack policy because it’s not considered; it’s just incredibly difficult to navigate.
You had about 100 to 150 years to develop the law of the seas, which now governs anti-piracy and related issues. In contrast, we don’t have that time frame to establish robust cyber policies, which need significant strengthening. Regarding the ethics of intelligence, the whole issue of Just War theory is applicable here. Intelligence should serve the objective of bringing good into the world.
A great example is the lead-up to the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. This involved years of what we now call the Reagan Doctrine, characterized by massive covert actions. These included going into labor unions in Poland, supporting Lech Wałęsa, and the involvement of the Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II. All these efforts were aimed at fostering freedom in Central and Eastern Europe.
When asked what was the best day of my career, I would say November 9, 1989. I joined the CIA to defeat the Soviets, plain and simple, and I didn’t know I would be part of such significant historical events.
Able to see it in my lifetime so I’m not saying I predicted it. I’m saying what energized me and drove me to the passion I had was a sense of just cause, which was a defeat of that. Now, in my particular case, and I’m unabashedly about it, so that the gospel of Jesus Christ could go behind the Iron Curtain. It wasn’t that it wasn’t there in the underground. I wanted it to offer opportunities for people to hear that had not heard.
So, you say, what a weird motivation to be in government in order to meet that. That was my passion, and my justification for being able to, for long-spended periods of time (not now, but then), live a lie, which I did, including with my own parents who have gone to glory, so they never knew where I worked because that was years ago. But it just gives you a sense of what you’re anchored in then, in terms of that. Is it always just? Absolutely not. Is it abused, particularly in covert action? Yes, at times. So, those are just things you have to work through, and they’re complicated, yes, and they’re very back.
Question: Hi, Professor. Thanks for this. This has been very insightful. Matt Hawkins with the Southern Baptist Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, and also a George Mason grad, on the worldview subject. What can you tell us about your career time? What you observed as far as your cohort around you having a coherent worldview compared to your later years and once you left? Do you see any trend lines among the people entering that profession? Does that make sense, kind of like sure we would ask of professors what are you seeing in students nowadays versus when I first entered related to that coherent worldview point?
Shedd: Well, starting in a strange place. I love people who blame our Congress for everything, and there’s many good reasons they have an 8% approval rating. And then I remind them, they are us. I did not plan that. Okay, just to, uh, as we clear our ears, that as a way of getting the wax out of them. The change that I have seen to your question is no less about a commitment to want to do good things, to join the intelligence, patriotism motivations, or right call to service, all those factors where I’ve seen a decline is in stability and what do I mean by that?
Government being government, and doesn’t matter if it’s CIA or the Health and Human Services or whatever department you serve in, there is a very clearly defined process for reaching journeyman status at the mid-career and hopefully for everyone has the ambition to reach a senior executive service at around 32 to 35, speaking just for the Defense Intelligence Agency of 17,000 or so employees. I had about a 9 to 10 percent attrition rate, which was way too high. Why? Because they thought it was just going to be better somewhere else. I predict many of them will return because that called the service that got them there in the first place won’t be met somewhere else.
But, as opposed to the idea of committing to a career where you continue to really grow your skill sets and your experience base in terms of that service. That was a disappointment to me. The flipside was that at the retirement age, not enough of them were leaving. And so, I’m a big advocate up and out, which is after three years if not promoted, thank you for your service, I hope you enjoy, fill in the blank. And we appreciate what you did for us that way creating what they proverbially call headroom, right? And that would also encourage it.
I’m a huge believer in Goldwater-Nichols, which DoD did in terms of joint assignments in which you cross over. That hasn’t nearly matured that where the intelligence community needs to be. So, my observation is that the workforce at the start end is no less committed. 115 interns per summer at DIA, 3,000 to 3,500 applicants, that was never the problem end of it. The problem is the commitment for the long term, and as we call the gap between expectations and reality is called what? Disappointment. They’re disappointed that they’re not senior executive officers at 30. Well, that’s not going to happen. Doesn’t happen anywhere better chances of that in winning the lottery, I think.
So, you say, just stick with it and do the job well and that there has been a toll and this is very real, a real toll on combat zones and the demands on families. There’s no question it’s 15-16 years of combat duty, yes it applies to civilians in the intelligence community, not just uniform, but you see it on the military side and you see it in families, just say enough, I can’t. The demands are different in this world. And then finally, the adaptability of the organizations of which they’re 17 in the intelligence community, not all created equal, you know the big acronym names, CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA, the National Geospatial Agency and that, and they account for 80 to 85 percent of the total IC, intelligence community size.
There is a reluctance at the more senior levels to transition to the Millennials and younger. And you’re seeing the private sector adapting to that much faster. And so, one of the things I brought to DIA was if you had your security clearance and you decide to leave, you can keep your security clearance for five more years. That was done on the bet that you actually would return. So, there are things you can do, but it’s clearly changed. One last thing about it, the unifying objective in a bipolar world cannot be understated.
The Soviet Union was the driver. Why we did it, its relative comparable is 9/11 in terms of motivations, but as that fades and it becomes more amorphous as to what, what we call the Bush White House, the war on terror, which I continue to believe that it is. It’s less of a unifying factor of where my Directorate of Operation colleagues in the 1980s said we’re here, we’re all here to defeat the Soviet, yeah, it was a unifying theme and they mattered Democrat, Republican, that didn’t matter that unified you.
