At the Christianity and National Security Conference, Paul Marshall gave a lecture on the history of Christian-Muslim relations. The following is a transcript of the lecture. 

Thank you, Mark. Just a note: the screens are at the sides of the room. If you can’t see a screen, you may miss something. I know many of you have a mental map of the world, but you might not have a mental map of the world in 750, 1100, and 1500, which is what some of these maps will depict. Feel free to reposition yourselves if necessary.

I want to discuss Christian-Muslim relations, or more specifically, the relations of Christendom—a cultural-political area influenced by Christianity—with Islamdom, a comparable term for regions shaped by Islam. It’s essential to remember that not everything done by Muslim-majority countries is inherently Islamic. I’ll cover 1400 years of history in 15 minutes, so this will be generalized and lack nuance. 

Why is this important? America, uniquely among nations, often disregards history. Americans say, “That’s history,” meaning it doesn’t matter. Everywhere else, “That’s history” means it’s central to understanding the present. Particularly when dealing with radical Islam, historical references abound. For instance, in Afghanistan, ISK (Islamic State Khorasan) derives “Khorasan” from an ancient region. Saddam Hussein called George W. Bush “Hulagu,” referring to the Mongol leader who sacked Baghdad. These references resonate deeply but are often lost on us. Ambrose Bierce’s *The Devil’s Dictionary* defines war as “God’s way of teaching Americans geography.” It should also teach Americans history.

Muhammad, Islam’s prophet, was successful as a religious leader, founding the world’s second-largest religion, as a political leader, and as a military leader. The dark purple area on this map shows the territory controlled by Muhammad and his followers at his death. Within 60 years, this expanded to the middle purple area. By 750, the entire purple region was under Muslim rule, stretching from the Atlantic to China. This rapid expansion isn’t unique to Islam; had the Byzantines or Persians been able to achieve this, they would have. This was empire-building on an unprecedented scale, with Muslim armies 120 miles south of Paris by 732. 

Now, fast forward to 1100. The green line shows the extent of Muslim-controlled territories: Spain, West Africa, across to India and Central Asia. By 1500, this line includes much of West Africa, down to Nigeria, and across Southeast Asia to the southern Philippines. Over half of Europe was under Muslim rule at some point for over two centuries. This history influences current events; for example, Hungary’s anxiety about Muslim immigration stems from Ottoman rule.

Islamic civilization experienced a millennium of dominance: militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. But things changed. Starting with the Reconquista in Spain, completed in 1492, Muslim power faced pushback. The Russians advanced into Central Asia, and European colonial powers carved up Muslim territories. By the 20th century, after World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed. France controlled Syria and Lebanon; Britain controlled Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and parts of Arabia and Egypt. Only Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen retained Muslim rule, and even Turkey became secular under Ataturk. In 1924, he abolished the caliphate, ending an institution that had lasted 1300 years. 

This left Muslims feeling disempowered. In the 1920s, fewer than 10% of Muslims lived under Muslim rulers. Osama bin Laden often referenced this era as a turning point, framing it as a crusader conquest of the Islamic world. His rhetoric after 9/11 highlighted this history, calling American troops in Saudi Arabia the “latest and greatest aggression.” This sense of historical grievance fuels radical movements.

So this brings the question of why. A thousand years of stunning success followed by 300 years of crushing failure—why did this happen? Many of you will know Lewis’s book What Went Wrong. My lecture here is essentially “What Went Wrong for Dummies,” or the shortened version. There are broadly two responses. One argues: We failed because we didn’t keep up. We rejected foreign ideas, became closed off, rigid, and believed we had all the resources within ourselves. We should have learned more from the West’s success. The other view is nearly the opposite: When we were good Muslims, we succeeded. When we ceased to follow Islamic law, sharia, became disobedient, and unwilling to sacrifice, our decline began. The solution, according to this view, is to return to the purity of original Islam. This perspective is central to groups like ISIS. Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the caliphate anew, with himself as caliph.

Radical organizations, largely non-violent in some areas, but not all, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, advocate for a caliphate. This is their map of the caliphate they seek. The blue area corresponds almost exactly to the territories once controlled by Muslim rulers. They omit some areas but include southern India, once under Muslim control. It’s a restorationist movement.

Here is ISIS’s map of its envisioned Islamic State caliphate. Curiously, it excludes much of India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia—three of the four most populous Muslim-majority countries. The large black region in the top right corner represents Khorasan, the namesake for ISIS-K in Afghanistan. This map also includes large swaths of Europe, including Greece and possibly Italy. The churches in Rome were burned by Arab armies in the ninth century. ISIS represents the more radical restorationist movement, aiming to reestablish what they consider a pure form of Islam from the seventh century.

This ongoing internal conflict within the Muslim world, between those advocating adaptation and those seeking restoration, fuels groups like ISIS and other radical factions. It also drives a broader sense of grievance among Muslims regarding the past 1300 years of history, particularly the last 300. Understanding this historical backdrop is crucial. This history lives vividly in the minds of many Muslims, particularly radicals, and we often fail to grasp its importance. I recently read a U.S. government inspector general’s report on reconstruction in Afghanistan. Remarkably, the word “Islam” appeared only in titles, with one paragraph on Islamic finance. The substance of Islam’s influence on Afghanistan wasn’t addressed. We must overcome this myopia and engage with this history seriously.

Q&A

Question: In the worldview of those seeking to establish a physical caliphate, where do Muslims living overseas fit? I’m from a part of New Jersey known as Little Ramallah because it’s about one-third Palestinian. Do they want people to return, like an Islamic Zionism, or do they aim to expand borders further?

Answer: For groups like ISIS, the expectation is to return. Their call—“We’ve established the caliphate, we have land, come here”—is clear. Historically, Muslims were not expected to live under non-Muslim rule. Exceptions existed for ambassadors or merchants, but generally, a good Muslim had to live under Muslim governance. Thus, people from New Jersey or other parts of the diaspora would be expected to return, then work to expand the caliphate further. Normatively, living under a Muslim ruler is essential.

Question: A couple of curiosities about your talk, maybe more certain questions. I’m fascinated by the history of Islamic rule in India, where the common story Westerners are told is that there were the Indians, the Hindus ruling themselves, and the British came in and displaced that with European rule. It’s more complicated to find out that the Hindus of India were living under an Islamic rule that they found presumably not too good, and then the British came and displaced them. Thinking about the history of Islamic-Hindu relations, which I find fascinating, and then secondly thinking about in the 60s and 70s the pan-Arab nationalism, like under Nasser. I don’t believe they used the language of a caliphate but that did seem to be the closest thing in modern history, not that ISIS was ever actually going to achieve anything they wanted to, but who could have brought a really high degree of Islamic or at least Arab unity. It seems like Nasser became the closest. I’m wondering if you have any thoughts on what the future of a pan-Arabism or Islamism could be.

Answer: Someone once said predictions are hard, especially about the future. I’m not sure pan-Arabism is going to go far. I think it’s dead. Who knows 1,500 years from now, but in the next few decades I don’t think it’s much of a factor, with one qualification. Pan-Arabism was seen as an alternative to Islamism. Islamism wants to unite Muslims, whereas Arabism wants to unite Arabs. Arabs are the people who speak the language of the prophet, the language of the Quran, so in that sense they are, and generalization often see themselves as the better Muslims. 

Often you get resentment from other Muslims. Arab is not the same as Muslim, and there’s tons of non-Arabs as well as non-Muslims in the Middle East. It was mainly an alternative, a sort of quasi-nationalism, can we get an Arab state which would be able to compete with Turkey or Iran? Now you’re getting sort of more Arab unity at least in the Middle East because of Iran. This is another historical pattern. Iran is doing what it’s been doing for almost 3,000 years, which is coming down from the mountains and trying to take over the heartland of the Middle East, the land of the two rivers. In that sense another historical pattern is coming back. So there’s uniting against Iran, but giving concrete political form to an Arab identity, I don’t think that’s on the cards, at least for a while.

Question: In understanding these historical perspectives and motivations behind these groups in the face of Western subjugation or colonization of these areas, how can this knowledge of history be applied practically to our policy approaches? What’s the most important thing for us to focus on?

Answer: The major thing is, what are their goals? What are they seeking to achieve? Mary Habeck, a book she has written dealing with the worldview and how it affects the military doctrine of radical Islamic groups, puts this in terms that are militarily useful, that is, what are they trying to achieve. Take it now with the Taliban. The discussions about how we’re going to relate to the Taliban; it says, well they want to be accepted by the world community. No they do not. They don’t care about the world community, they don’t believe any such thing as the world community is the ummah, the Muslim world and the infidels. 

But this pattern of ignoring what people say to you very clearly that they want and what they’re striving for. In terms of our diplomatic engagement, that needs to be part of that. Of course they’ll make deals with Russia and make deals with China, they can make deals with us, all sorts of tactical things, but in terms of understanding what they want and what they’re likely to do militarily and their relationship with al-Qaeda, these things are key. As Eric Patterson said earlier, the senior guy at the Pentagon says al-Qaeda is probably going to be in a position to attack the American mainland within 12 months. Why does it want to attack the American mainland? It goes back to this: we’re the far enemy. We’re the ones stopping them taking over the Muslim world.

Question: I had a question about this idea of a third caliphate, and we kind of talked about individual groups. How hard would it be for the different groups in the Middle East to band together as one unit to try and take over?

Answer: We’re dealing not just with the Middle East. We’re dealing with the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, certainly Indonesia, and many other places. Look at Somalia, al-Shabaab. ISIS is active, killed thousands of people in Mozambique, right next to South Africa. Southern Africa, and the most deadly place is west Africa. Far more people there are being killed by Islamist terrorist groups than in Afghanistan or the Middle East. Probably over the decades several hundreds of thousands dead and thousands a year, 10 to 15 thousand. You’re dealing with this phenomenon throughout the world. In Congo, northeastern Uganda, Kenya, throughout west Africa. 

When the Europeans and Americans destroyed Libya, many of the terrorists and their weapons move south into the Sahara and are very active. You’re dealing with a worldwide phenomenon. Let’s not think Muslim Middle East. Most Muslims live east of Pakistan, by population largely an Asian religion. The Middle East is the heartland, so it has much more influence. In terms of what is going on and where people are being killed, they’re all over the place. Now to your question, which I didn’t repeat, but to what degree is it possible these groups can unite and work to re-establish the caliphate, many of these groups are seeking various alliances. 

In west Africa, some groups are swearing fealty to al-Qaeda, others to ISIS. They’re attempting to unite, but in different groups, and they fight each other. One of the senior special forces guys said, well, at one level, you don’t have to worry about these guys less because they’re all going to kill each other, which they do. ISIS and al-Qaeda are fighting in west Africa. So you can unite and engage in guerrilla warfare throughout the world and terrorism, which they’re doing. To do so at a larger scale, I don’t think so. There’s so much conflict. You have ISIS now fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The possibility of them achieving this is very low.