During Providence‘s Christianity and National Security Conference in 2021, Elbridge Colby discussed US-China relations. The following is a transcript of the lecture.
Colby: Thank you. It’s a pleasure and an honor to be here. I know there’s been a rich discussion already. What I thought I might do is offer some preliminary remarks, particularly coming off my book that Mark kindly mentioned (The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict), and then we could have a discussion, but also touch on the theological and moral aspects. My basic argument, if you want a shorter summary, is in a piece in the Wall Street Journal today that gives the bottom-line version: China must be the priority for our nation’s foreign policy, particularly its defense and strategic approach.
This is the first time the United States will face another superpower in the international system. The Soviet Union was to some degree, but this is the first time we face an economy in the international system as large as ours since 150 years ago, which was before we really entered the international arena. This is a novel situation. We’ve made some progress over the last years, but I don’t think the country has fully internalized how serious this is. China is pursuing, at a minimum, a regionally hegemonic position over Asia, which will comprise about half or more of global GDP, and from that position a dominant place in the world, with the ability to shape and dominate our lives here.
Our economic fortunes and futures, and the economic future of the world, will be determined in China, and ultimately our liberties, as we see daily. For instance, social media companies show how intimately connected economic regulation and affairs are with our freedoms.
This is the future we want to avoid. To do so, we can’t just say nice or tough things about it; we must summon and sustain a coalition of states, primarily in Asia, sufficiently strong to block China’s attempt to dominate the region. This sounds good and is happening through efforts like the Quad (the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia) and the AUKUS agreement. But China has a natural response. I imagine this is what the Chinese are thinking: they can pry this coalition apart through the focused application of pressure and force. Contrary to the Biden administration’s public line, I believe the military dimension of this competition is central. The only way to make it not central is by focusing on it.
I worry they’re missing this critical point. To prevent China from breaking apart this coalition, we must defend other countries in this anti-hegemonic coalition. This requires a military strategy. The Chinese are already using economic coercion against coalition members and failing. Australia, for example, is subjected to intense Chinese economic pressure and is very dependent on China as an export market. Yet, Australia is standing strong. The Chinese issued 14 demands, which Australia publicly rejected. If anything, Australia has drawn closer to the U.S. This shows the limits of economic coercion.
The problem is unless China gives up its ambitions, it has other options, particularly the military option. This is the argument of my book: if we neglect China’s military option, it will have a rational avenue to attain regional predominance through military action, especially by seizing or occupying critical territory of coalition members tied to us by a security commitment, including Taiwan. China could then present the U.S. with a situation too difficult to reverse. This is a very good strategy, and the Chinese have been resourcing it for 25 years while we’ve been distracted. Currently, the military balance is not good. U.S. military officers indicate that in war games or assessments, we regularly lose. It’s not hopeless, but we’re not doing well.
Taiwan’s defense minister recently said the Chinese may already be able to occupy Taiwan, and by the middle of the decade, they’ll be able to do so easily. This is sobering. Taiwan is the canary in the coal mine. If China succeeds in Taiwan, it won’t stop there. Taiwan is geopolitically important. China seeks to break America’s credibility as a security partner in Asia. If it humiliates us over Taiwan, it could repeat the operation against the Philippines, a U.S. ally. China wouldn’t need to rampage across Asia to cause a “run on the bank,” where countries doubt U.S. reliability and cut deals with Beijing to avoid its ire. Lee Kuan Yew once remarked that Thailand “bends before the wind blows.” Thailand worked with the Japanese before World War II and with the British when they were ascendant. I mean no disrespect to Thailand, but the remark applies to many Asian countries. If they believe the wind is blowing a certain way, they will adjust accordingly.
This will matter to us at home. If China attains dominance over this region, we will no longer be the center of global economic development, regulation, or currency. The dollar as the reserve currency will disappear. The most dynamic companies and educational institutions will be in China. Whatever your politics, whether you support a particular political coalition in Washington or not, the premise is that we can change things through elections. But if Beijing is dominant, we lose that ability. This affects all Americans, regardless of political affiliation. We should want to chart our future for ourselves. This is the strategy I lay out in my book.
Implicitly, this strategy aligns with a just war approach—a moral approach to international security. Pacifism, in my view, is not a responsible or morally defensible position for a state. As an individual, one might take such a position, but you cannot compel others to follow against their will and call it moral. Any war we engage in must be fundamentally defensive, not aggressive or aggrandizing, and the way we wage war must relate to the interests at stake, consistent with just war criteria. My urgency stems from a desire to ensure we are in this position. If we neglect the problem, we will face a choice between accepting a Chinese-dominant Asia or waging a much larger and costlier war, less consistent with just war theory. This is the moral approach I take. With that, I’ll open it up to questions.
Q&A
Question: China has a very large diaspora community in Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, some areas are 10 percent Mandarin-speaking. How should we engage with China and its near abroad, especially when they might view an attack on Chinese communities in Southeast Asia as an attack on itself? Sometimes the Chinese communities there have been disparagingly called “the Jews of Southeast Asia,” not in a positive sense. How do we navigate that when China sees a massive community of what they might consider their own citizens in these countries?
Answer: This is a very fraught issue. The most terrifying instance is the massacres of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the mid-to-late 1960s. That’s in living memory, and there were issues in Malaysia at the time as well, along with difficulties elsewhere. It’s a fraught problem, and it’s critical to think ahead about it to avoid awful outcomes if things escalate unexpectedly.
Most ethnic Chinese in these countries are citizens of those countries, so their first duty is not to the People’s Republic. Our position must be grounded and involve working with governments in the region that have a better understanding of these dynamics and are accountable to their citizens, either through democracy or other governance systems typical of Southeast Asia, which doesn’t have many pure democracies. The United States should clearly oppose any ethnic violence or discrimination against Chinese populations, and these communities should be part of the overall coalition-building effort.
The key point is that this strategy is not anti-Chinese. People in Taiwan, for instance, speak Mandarin, and many regard themselves as ethnic Chinese. They’re as Chinese as diaspora populations abroad, though their Taiwanese identity is distinct. This is an important issue that needs careful monitoring to prevent bad outcomes.
Question: Should we engage with non-traditional partners such as Russia to combat China?
Answer: Great question. Ideally, we would position Russia to have more distance from China or even partner with us in checking Chinese ambitions. Two problems: First, we have serious conflicts with Russia in Europe. Asia is more important than Europe, but we still have significant interests there. Second, it’s unclear how we could bring Russia along. What’s likely to shift Russian behavior is a growing perception of China as a greater threat than the U.S.
We should aim to remove obstacles that prevent Russia from seeing China as the primary threat. My general view, which aligns with Wess Mitchell’s argument in a recent National Interest piece, is that we should hold the line but avoid escalating against Russia in Europe. Meanwhile, we should seek to bring Russia into the Asian sphere to counterbalance China’s ambitions. That’s likely the most feasible approach at this point, and it’s a critical angle to explore.
Question: I lived in Taiwan for a year. I think part of the problem is that the Taiwanese don’t seem as committed to defending their nation as the Americans are. The military service is more like a summer camp, only lasting four months. My question is: It’s really a matter of when, not if, China will take over. People agree they’re a threat, but not on whether it’s an immediate or long-term threat. How can we spread the message, especially to American policymakers? What practical steps can Taiwan take now? Would sending U.S. troops help?
Answer: Excellent question. Your skepticism is warranted. I’m not an expert on Taiwan, but there’s significant scorn for the Taiwanese military in American defense circles. The situation is so severe that I’ve told a few Taiwanese recently they might need to consider extrication, like Hong Kong, for people who wouldn’t fare well under Communist rule.
Many Taiwanese seem to think the U.S. will bail them out. I point out that while it’s in America’s interest to defend Taiwan, there’s a limit to how far we’ll go. If the cost surpasses that threshold, we’ll likely cut them off because it wouldn’t make sense strategically. President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan showed that the U.S. is willing to cut ties if costs become too high.
The most critical step for Taiwan is improving its own defense. The fate of Taiwan’s people is primarily in their own hands. Taiwan should increase its ability to resist invasion—sink ships, shoot down aircraft, and neutralize invading forces. They also need to stockpile essential resources: fuel, medicine, munitions, food, etc.
Why isn’t Taiwan spending 10 percent of its GDP on defense? People say it’s politically difficult, but it’ll be far worse politically if Taiwan ends up like Hong Kong. This urgency must be communicated clearly. If Taiwan doesn’t step up, it risks being abandoned because defending it could become too costly for the U.S.
Question: Why don’t the Europeans see China as a significant threat? How can we get them to adopt our view? Or do you think our European allies aren’t as important in this conflict?
Answer: Good question. We won’t get Europeans to view the China threat as we do. Their states are smaller, perspectives more limited, and China is geographically distant. The U.S. is a superpower with global interests and has been a Pacific power since the 19th century. Europe’s focus is primarily on its immediate neighborhood: North Africa, the Near East, Central Asia.
European economies are also weaker, and their primary focus is economic recovery post-pandemic. My view is that we should not expect much European involvement in confronting China militarily. Instead, Europe’s role should focus on securing its own region. We’ll need to reduce our military presence in Europe to concentrate on Asia, so European nations, particularly Germany, must step up in their defense roles.
Economically, Europe can still play a crucial part. There’s growing concern in Europe about predatory Chinese economic behavior. Transatlantic economic arrangements could help counterbalance China’s economic power, which will only grow with its population and increasing per capita income.
Question: My question is with Taiwan and the South China Sea. When China takes Taiwan, can we expect a domino effect in the South China Sea?
Answer: I don’t think it’s a done deal yet. Taiwan is still salvageable, but we need all hands on deck. If China were to take Taiwan, which is possible, then the domino effect would involve countries like Vietnam. There’s truth to the critique, but what was true about the domino idea is evident in the fate of other countries.
If you’re in Iceland, you won’t be too worried about Taiwan being taken over. But if you’re in the Philippines, with Taiwan right next door—you can see Taiwan from the northern end of Luzon on a clear day—you’ll think, “Why am I different? Do Americans have a special place in their heart for the Philippines? Not really. Some people know we’re allies, but most Americans don’t.” You’ll start thinking, “Maybe I should cut a deal.” The same logic applies in Hanoi, Bangkok, or Jakarta. That’s a real problem.
The irony is that those who are dovish on Taiwan fail to appreciate that abandoning Taiwan would force us to take more dramatic actions elsewhere. If we give up Taiwan, countries will say, “Why would you treat me differently?” The Biden administration has said we have a rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. But if we fail to act, why would others believe us? That’s the reality we’ll face.
Question: To what extent does the idea that we can cooperate on some issues with China and compete on others make it more difficult? Is that even a possible dichotomy?
Answer: I keep mentioning this op-ed, but I wrote it because my op-eds usually come from when I get really angry about something. There was an article in the *New York Times* last week where some unnamed senior administration officials said, “We’re going to compete vigorously.” I think Jen Psaki said, “We’re going to compete vigorously and joust in the South China Sea.” It sounded like they were going to put on their boxing gear, like a 19th-century comic, and then said, “But we’ll cooperate on climate” and all the things the administration claims are most important.
Did the Chinese sign on to that? It doesn’t even make sense because climate policy is about future growth. It’s one of the most geopolitical things you could think of. I’ve heard credible arguments about thinking competitively in the climate space—Andrew Erickson has an important article on this. But I don’t think this idea works as a strategy. It works as a preferred outcome. I want to get to a place where we limit competition and cooperate, but that’s a wish, not a strategy. To get there, we’ll have to confront them and stand strong so the Chinese understand the cost-benefit for them.
Question: How do we instill national pride in countries? It seems like they either act because they think the U.S. is behind them or fear the U.S. will leave. How do we make countries act for their own sake?
Answer: This is a great question and something I’m thinking about a lot. The primary driver of why countries do more for their own defense is a perception of threat. This includes both a direct threat from the potential enemy and how much they expect from the Americans.
For Taiwan, there was a relatively low sense of threat for a long time because the Chinese couldn’t cross the strait, coupled with a high sense of reliance on the U.S. Meanwhile, in Korea, threat perception is very high. If you live in Seoul, you’re within range of North Korean artillery along or behind the 38th parallel.
If countries mostly react to threats, how do you push them given limited time? First, we should be tough and candid. We shouldn’t be over the top because that provides an escape hatch, but we should be clear and tough, and we should be willing to use sanctions—both metaphorically and potentially literal sanctions if it’s critical.
Second, there’s the threat of abandonment. During the Cold War, we wanted West Germany to pull more weight. We told the West Germans, “We’ll defend you from a Soviet attack, but we can do it in different ways. We can try for a conventional defense at the inner German border, but only if you build up. Otherwise, we’ll drop tactical nuclear weapons on Soviet forces invading West Germany.” The West Germans didn’t want that and built a large conventional army in the 1980s.
For Taiwan, it’s likely the U.S. would defend them, but how Taiwan defends itself matters. Is the fight going to be over the island—over Taipei or Kaohsiung—or mostly out at sea? Taiwan has a lot of control over that. If Taiwan doesn’t want to become the primary battlefield, it can do something about it.
Our options are not zero or 100. At the end of the day, these alliance relationships aren’t love affairs. They’re deep business partnerships. If they stop making sense for one side, they won’t continue.
