

SUMMER 2017 • ISSUE 8

PROVIDENCE

A JOURNAL OF CHRISTIANITY & AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY



SEX, LIES, & SPIES

BY DARRELL COLE

REPARTEE

LOVE, WAR, & HONEY TRAPS

BY LELA GILBERT

SERVING GOD OR CAESAR: ALVIN YORK & THE MORALITY OF WAR

BY DOUGLAS MASTRIANO

ALSO: JAMES TURNER JOHNSON ON HOW TO READ AUGUSTINE • ALAN DOWD MUSES ON MISSILE MATTERS • ROBERT LECKIE WAXES POETIC ON GUADALCANAL • MARK TOOLEY DEFENDS WESTERN CIVILIZATION • TIMOTHY TAYLOR TALKS TRADE • BEN FRANKLIN NOMINATES GOD & MOSES • EWELINA OCHAB & BARONESS COX DISCUSS PERSECUTED MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST • AN AMERICAN HERO LONGS FOR HIS CABIN IN THE WOODS • ROBERT NICHOLSON EXPLAINS HOW TO LIBERATE PALESTINE • JOHN MARK MATTOX DEBATES DETERRENCE • & MARC LiVECCHIE, J. DARYL CHARLES, & HERB SCHLOSSBERG REVIEW THREE WORKS ON WAR

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SERVING GOD OR CAESAR:
ALVIN YORK & THE MORALITY OF WAR



Cary Grant and Ingrid Bergman in Notorious (1946), a "spy noir" classic directed by Alfred Hitchcock. Bergman plays Alicia Huberman, the American daughter of a convicted Nazi spy who is recruited by U.S. government agent T.R. Devlin (Grant) to seduce and surveil a leading member (Claude Rains) of a sinister Nazis organization in post-WWII Brazil. In the course of working together, Huberman and Devlin fall in love, even as she succeeds in winning the affection of, and marrying, her target. Notorious depicts the emotional entanglement of three lives bound together in a web of duty, deceit, betrayal, and espionage.

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ROBERT NICHOLSON

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ISSN

24713511

FEATURE

SEX, LIES, & SPIES

DARRELL COLE



Spying is a method of learning information about the enemy (and others) that enables us to obtain political ends that could not otherwise be obtained. No spy service could exist without the use of deception, and most spy services also use sex as a way to achieve their ends.

Numerous popular Hollywood films are filled with spies who employ these crafts for the good of their country. Notable examples began early with Marlene Dietrich lying and seducing for

the good of WWI France in *Dishonored* (1931), quickly followed by Greta Garbo doing the same for the good of Germany in *Mata Hari* (1932). Perhaps most memorable to cinema lovers,

agent Ingrid Bergman took advantage of a lonely German fascist for the good of the Free World in Alfred Hitchcock's famous *Notorious* (1946). Then there appeared the whole James Bond phenomenon, whose offspring are still going strong today. If the fictional spy drama has left any sort of impression upon readers and viewers, it is that the world of spies is one of constant deception and manipulative (if not always unenjoyable) sex.

Can this possibly be just? If so, then we are saying that, when an agent lies to or has sex with someone in the line of duty, the people deceived have justice done to them. In other words, just agents do not necessarily treat their targets unfairly. Their objects of deception may deserve to be deceived.

Spying methods, like all acts of force, can be hard to accept for people of peaceable honor and virtue. But the Christian tradition has always included a notion of a just use of force. Why? Because in a world of fallen human beings who love themselves more than they love justice or God (something agreed upon by theologians as diverse as Augustine, Chrysostom, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin), those who are given the mandate of providing for the defense of the common good must often use force if they are to succeed. In other words, coercion, or at least the threat of coercion, is necessary for the common good.

Formative figures within the Christian tradition such as Augustine and Aquinas helped to shape what has come to be known as the just war tradition, while Protestant Reformers such as Luther and Calvin confirmed that tradition within their writings. One of the common features of the Christian literature in the tradition is the effort to prove that there is nothing necessarily incompatible between being a good Christian and being a good soldier. The very title of Luther's famous essay on the topic suggests the common feature: *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved*. Luther's affirmative answer fits squarely within the tradition first articulated by the likes of Augustine and Chrysostom: Yes, soldiers can be saved if they go to—and fight—wars under just conditions. If the governing authorities did not employ

a military, then there would be no peace or order for anyone. Thus, it is appropriate for Christians to participate in this office for the common good. Those Christians who do ought to do so out of love of their neighbors.

Governing authorities that cannot protect their citizens from threats internal and external fail to achieve the most basic requirement for good government. Augustine may have exaggerated when he famously remarked that human history since Cain killed Abel is a history of bloodshed, for there is far more to history than fighting and killing. Nevertheless, recorded history reveals that wherever we find the formation of political states, we find soldiers and spies. Spies were employed by the earliest political states on record.¹ Soldiering and spying are necessary parts of any governing body's ability to protect its citizens. Aristotle put it with typical clarity and precision: no army means no state, at least not for long (*Politics* 7.1330a-1331a). The same can be said for the spying services, which is why every political body has always employed spies of some kind. Spying is an act of force like soldiering. Even the most seemingly noncoercive jobs a spy might do—observe and report—are done for the benefit of those who can use that information to guide policies of force.

As should be familiar to regular readers of this journal, upholders of a just use of force, particularly those who refer to the just war tradition to provide moral guidance in such areas, are generally agreed that an act of force for the common good may or may not be justifiable depending upon who does it, the reasons they do it, and how they do it. Only those who have the job of making decisions about the use of force and carrying out those decisions may be permitted to use force. Only when we have good reasons to use force—self-defense, defense of others whom we are pledged to defend, or humanitarian intervention—may we do so.

We must also use tactics that intend to bring about more benefit than harm, and we must never intentionally target the innocent—those who do not deserve to have force used against them. Just wars and just war-fighting are all about giving enemies their due. In other words,

when we say that a war is just, we mean that those we attack deserve to be attacked. We also mean that our enemies are getting justice when we attack them in the way that we do. That is to say, our combat tactics ought to be just. We are pointing out here an important moral distinction between claiming a war is morally permissible to fight and what is morally permissible in fighting that war. Some conflicts are more notable for moral controversy in one criterion than the other. To use two contrasting examples probably familiar to the reader, there is little moral argument about the Allied decision to wage war against the Axis powers in WWII. Most of the moral controversy of that great conflict was generated by the indiscriminate use of air power culminating in the use of atomic weaponry upon Japan. We still argue over whether or not it was morally acceptable to use so indiscriminate a tactic. On the other hand, the American (with allies) invasion of Iraq was fought with scrupulous concern for just tactics, but there remains a veritable hornet's nest of controversy about whether or not the war ought to have been waged. Spying is a tactic of war, and, as such, is liable to moral analysis in the same two categories. Once the case for employing a spy in the first place has been made, the question of *how* to spy comes into focus, and thus one of the major moral problems for spies is trying to make a case that lying and sex are just (combat) tactics.


There is a good case to be made within the tradition that lying for the common good is morally permissible. But that case is not without protest among the formative theologians who helped us build the just war tradition. This is not surprising given that Christian Scripture, on the one hand, tells us that truth is one of the attributes of God and extols honesty as a prime virtue but, on the other, includes stories in which the just tell lies in a just cause. And how often the stories of spies appear when it comes to honorable lies! In fact, many of the discussions about the morality of lying in the Christian tradition find their locus in those portions of Scripture that concern spies and those that aid them. Of particular note is the Israelite spies aided by the lies of Rahab (Joshua 2) and the spies who aid David in his fight against the unjust rule of his son Absalom

(2 Samuel 15-17). In the latter story, David even has his own "mole" in Absalom's court who intentionally misleads Absalom with false advice about how to hang on to power. In both cases the writer makes no bones about the good of the lies told, and Rahab is even held up as a Christian hero of faith by the writer of the New Testament letter to the Hebrews (11:31).

None of this made much of an impression on Augustine, who in his book *Against Lying* very famously (and very influentially in the Christian West) argued that truth-telling—being honest—is a moral absolute because it reflects God's nature. Paul Griffiths has made a convincing case that, for Augustine, if human beings are anything at all, they are the image of God.² So insofar as human beings reflect the image of God, they fulfill their basic nature. Augustine concentrated on the truth-telling characteristic of the communication between the three persons of the Trinity, in which there is never a will to deceive. The argument works like this: Truth-telling is essential to the Trinity, so it is essential to the nature of God. Because truth-telling is essential to the nature of God, then it must be essential to the image of God, so it must be essential to the image of God in human beings. This being the case, every time we speak with honesty we reflect the image of God within us, and every time we lie, regardless of the good consequences, we deface that image.

Most Western theologians followed this sort of thinking, most famously and influentially Thomas Aquinas, who made lying contrary to the natural law (*Summa Theologica* II-II Q.110). We find the absolute prohibition carried over into the Reformed Protestant tradition by Calvin, who for instance condemns Rahab's lies in a good cause in his commentary on Joshua.³ We even find the absolute prohibition in secular Enlightenment moral philosophy, particularly in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, in which he argues that all lies lead to a loss of rational integrity and undermine our basic humanity.⁴

However, alongside this absolute moral prohibition in the tradition, there always existed a more permissive tradition, typified early



Riffs on a theme. British posters warning of the threat of sexual espionage, especially feared in a capital swarming with refugees from enemy territories. Images Source: The Imperial War Museum, London.

on by the Eastern Fathers such as Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* VII.9), John Chrysostom (*On the Priesthood* I.8 and *de Poenitentia* VII.5), and the Western Father John Cassian (*Conferences* 17). Chrysostom even comments concerning Rahab's lies to save the Israelite spies: "O Beautiful falsehood! O beautiful deception! Not of one who forsakes divine commands, but of one who is a guardian of piety" (*On the Priesthood* I.8).⁵ For Chrysostom, lies and deception are not merely permissible but possibly positively praiseworthy in certain circumstances. On this view, lies and deception do not necessarily forsake divine commands but can actually express piety.

Cassian would agree with Chrysostom and comment upon the woman who hid David's spies and lied to Absalom's agents that her deception was a product of love and that all those who deceive in like situations follow the Apostolic command to love others by placing their good above themselves. We find this connection between piety and virtuous lying upheld by Martin Luther, who helpfully points out in his *Lectures on Genesis* that those portions of Scripture that explicitly condemn lying always have a particular kind of lying in mind, namely lies to harm the innocent or to pervert justice.⁶ We see this exemplified in the Decalogue, which states that "[y]ou shall not bear false witness against your neighbor" (Exodus 20:16, ESV), and in the prophet Isaiah,

who warns us that on the day of judgment, God will cut off those "who by a word make a man out to be an offender, and lay snare for him who reproves in the gate, and with an empty plea turn aside him who is in the right" (29:21, ESV). Even in the Reformed Protestant tradition, we can see a move away from Calvin on this point in the famous Puritan Divine John Owen, who in his exposition on Hebrews comments that the sort of lies told by Rahab to protect the Israelite spies are "lawful, just, and good."⁷

For what we may call the Permissive Tradition in Christian theology, not all lies harm the innocent, and not all lies pervert justice. Indeed, some lies save the innocent and preserve justice. The recognized Father of International Law, Hugo Grotius, argued that lies told in public defense are good.⁸ Jeremy Taylor, a champion of strict moralism in the 17th century, and therefore not one to take any moral weakness lightly, argued that it was a moral weakness not to lie in order to save an innocent person's life.⁹ Taylor was not convinced by the Augustinian argument that we ought always tell the truth because truth-telling is part of the nature of God. God always speaks the truth because he has no reason to fear anyone and he has the power to bring about all his just and loving purposes. Human beings do not have that kind of power; that is, they do not have the power always to use truthfulness for just

and loving purposes. Wicked human beings can sometimes overpower good human beings when good human beings tell the truth. So, the wicked can use truth to harm the innocent and pervert justice. The morally good will always do what is advantageous to charity and justice. Sometimes lies rather than the truth fulfill this purpose. The just war tradition recognizes that some people are treated fairly when lethal force is used against them. So too do we hold that some people are treated fairly when deceived.

For the Permissive Tradition, speech is morally neutral in itself and so must be guided by wisdom. True, the purpose of speech is communication, but wisdom, justice, and love must govern our communication. We must always consider whether or not the person with whom we are speaking deserves the truth. True, human beings are in the image of God, but they are not God. We cannot always guarantee that truthful speech and acts will serve the purposes of wisdom, justice, and love, for the person we are communicating with may be an enemy of justice and love and more powerful than us.

This is the conclusion formulated by the famous German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who served in the German Counter Intelligence Corps during World War II. Bonhoeffer had to tell many lies while acting as a courier for those involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler. He even wrote an unfinished essay on truth-telling that fits firmly in the Permissive Tradition upheld by Luther.¹⁰ To illustrate his argument, Bonhoeffer uses the example of a schoolmaster who asks a student an inappropriate question in class, one that would, if answered truthfully, reveal something which ought *not* to be revealed about the student's family. In this circumstance, the schoolmaster is abusing his authority, doing an injustice to the student, and exhibiting hatred of God and neighbor. The student serves justice best in this circumstance by lying. Bonhoeffer was motivated by a love of God and neighbor. He was also motivated by love for a justice perverted by the governing authorities of his own country. In his position, telling the truth could only serve to help the Nazi regime; telling the truth could only show hatred toward God, neighbor, and justice.

We can make a clear and convincing case that the Christian tradition may support the idea that lies told for the public good are justifiable. When spies tell such lies in the line of duty, their deceptions fall into that category and, so, are justifiable. Can the same be said for sex in the line of duty? Can manipulative sex for the public good be justifiable?

Sex is clearly used as a tool by some spies. Espionage service case officers can seduce potential targets for development that would be useful in penetrating enemy governments (say Iran or North Korea). Even if those services were to prohibit the use of sex in such circumstances, there is bound to be a certain amount of sexual tension when the case officer and target are of different sexes. Besides, the case officers cannot help but be aware of this and be tempted to use it to their advantage.

The CIA and FBI do not use sexual entrapment for moral and practical reasons. They find it morally distasteful, and they are concerned about the potential loss of their agent's objectivity. But that is not the norm in the world of spies. Manipulative sex was a tactic employed by all sides in World War II and was routinely practiced during the Cold War by the Soviet Union, China, and East Germany. CIA agent Aldrich Ames and FBI special agent James Smith were both successfully targeted by Chinese MSS double-agent Katrina Leung. Markus Wolf of East Germany's security service described his successful Romeo Operations in his autobiography.¹¹ He regularly seduced single middle-aged women who had access to valuable information.

Let us concentrate on one such famous agent, code-named Cynthia.¹² British Secret Service recruited Cynthia in 1941 to attach herself to Charles Brousse, the Press Attaché at the Vichy Embassy. The embassy was suspected of having information concerning Vichy naval ciphers and of being a clearing house for German spies. In order to attach herself to Brousse, Cynthia maneuvered her way into becoming his mistress. She did well in deceiving her lover, but when she was found



Markus Wolf, whose autobiography recounted his sexual espionage operations for East Germany's Ministry for State Security (MfS, or Stasi) during the Cold War, speaks at a demonstration on November 4, 1989. Source: German Federal Archives, via Wikimedia Commons.

out, she did even better. Cynthia managed to persuade Brousse to turn traitor to Vichy (and thus loyal to Free France and the Allies) by helping her in her work. Brousse did so by giving her access to information on all incoming and outgoing embassy telegrams and daily reports on all appointments and interviews within the embassy. She was also allowed to break into the embassy safe and photograph important documents. The two were later married and, contrary to current FBI and CIA worries, provided a useful source of information to the Allies throughout the war.

One of the reasons why Cynthia was so successful with Brousse was that she had practiced her tradecraft quite a bit before being offered the Brousse assignment. In an interview conducted with Cynthia toward the end of her life, she was quoted as saying that she “had nothing to be ashamed of.” She admitted that it was particularly difficult to sleep with an unattractive man in the line of duty, but that, in such cases, she adopted the habit of closing her eyes and held on to the hope “that this, like so much else that I wanted to do, would be for England.” She

reasoned, “Wars are not won by respectable methods... I was not a loose woman. I hope and believe that I was a patriot.”¹³

Perhaps she was a good patriot, but the question here is whether or not she could have been a good Christian while engaging in such activities. Recall that we’ve already agreed one can be both a good soldier *and* a good Christian. To put it bluntly, this means that stabbing, shooting, and bombing other human beings are conformable to being good Christians. So, too, deceiving and lying are probably conformable to being a good Christian. But is having sex in the line of duty likewise conformable? If we can kill our enemies for the common good, can we not have sex with them?

When we look at the Christian tradition on sex, we find widespread agreement that the primary purpose of sex is to consummate a covenant of marriage and, only within this covenant relationship, to procreate and to experience the pleasure of sexual intercourse.¹⁴ There was, and still is, a minority voice within the tradition that opts for a more ascetic view of the good life, one that denies a place for sex

or, at least, looks at those who do marry and have sex as a kind of second-class spiritual part of the body of Christ. Nevertheless, the great majority of Christian theologians who have shaped the tradition, East and West, have taught that sex within a marriage is a good from God. Marital intercourse is, in a sense, a Trinitarian act in that the couple give themselves completely to each other in the sexual act. Loving sex within a marriage expresses not only a romantic desire (*eros*) but is informed by a God-like love (*agape*) that totally gives to the other for the other's sake. So, sex within marriage is yet another way to brighten the defaced image of God within us.



Amy Elizabeth "Betty" Thorpe, codenamed Cynthia, looking back on her sex and espionage activities said, "Ashamed? Not in the least. My superiors told me that the results of my work saved thousands of British and American lives. It involved me in situations from which 'respectable' women draw back—but mine was total commitment. Wars are not won by respectable methods."

Unfortunately, like all genuine human goods given to us by God in creation, sex too suffers from the Fall. We are now tempted to use sex for selfish and manipulative reasons. We can use sex to control and harm others. When spies have sex in the line of duty, they are clearly not expressing *agapeic* love for their partners. Even if in love with their targets, they cannot give themselves entirely to the other for they are hiding their motives for having sex. Cynthia did not tell her future husband about her status as an agent when she first seduced him. Whatever may have developed between them in the future, Cynthia at first manipulated her future spouse with sex. The sex such people have is always manipulative.

However, we could say that spies like Cynthia have the motive of love of country—love of neighbors, just as the just soldiers who kill and the just spies who deceive. The problem for such an argument is it assumes that non-spousal sex is not an inherently evil act. In other words, Cynthia's defense depends on us looking at sex in the way the Permissive Tradition looks at speech and other forms of communication: morally neutral acts that demand context before we determine them good or evil. But no one who had a hand in shaping the Christian tradition as we know it even attempts to argue such a view, and the reason is obvious. Unlike soldiering and lying, there are no Biblical sources from which to build a case for just non-spousal or manipulative sex.

While the Christian tradition agrees that homicide comes in different kinds—some morally appropriate—fornication comes in but one.

Of course, other contemporary Christian theologians, such as Joseph Fletcher, have argued for exceptions to all moral rules, not only to ordinary moral norms but also to clear commands from God found in Scripture. Fletcher argues for a situational ethic of love, in the sense that love may lead someone to contravene ordinary moral norms or those revealed in Scripture.¹⁵ Paul Ramsey criticized this sort of ethic and used the example of Mrs. Bergmeier, an inmate held in a post-WWII Soviet concentration camp, who managed to get herself impregnated by a guard so she could be released and return again to a family life with her husband and children, who rightly needed her. Fletcher's reasoning allows us to say that Mrs. Bergmeier made an *agapeic* quantification that more overall good came about through her manipulative act of sex.¹⁶ A similar quantification could be made for Cynthia and other agents who use manipulative sex in the line of duty.

Ramsey found this sort of logic wanting, and for good reason. If one is going to be a Christian, then one is, at the least, committed to certain covenant obligations with God and with other people. There are certain clear obligations that may never be overridden for some supposed greater good. Love may be the fulfilling of God's law, but it is fulfilling insofar as Christians

do good and avoid evil. There must be some content to guide right action, some principles that are non-negotiable, or we end up with a kind of consequential moral reasoning that says it is permissible to boil a baby in oil for a good cause. Traditional Christians East and West, Catholic and Protestant, can agree that love is a virtue but that it does not, cannot, create its own standards of behavior. Scripture gives us norms of human behavior that admit no exceptions. There is, for example, never a time when murder is the right thing to do. We may argue over what counts as murder, but the principle holds firm in all places, in all times, and for all peoples. Scripture gives us plenty of moral room for a just use of force, which is why the Christian tradition has largely agreed on the possibility of a just war. Scripture does not give us so ready a space for lying, which is why there is a larger division in the tradition on lying than on the possibility of a just use of force. Nevertheless, Scripture does offer some material to build upon a permissive tradition that would support the kinds of deceit used by spies. Scripture gives us no room at all for merely manipulative sex. As Ramsey reminds us, when it comes to some actions, “it cannot be shown that Christians or just men should never say Never.”

None of this is to say that no one within the tradition has made the attempt to distinguish the level of evil done in non-spousal sex. Aquinas, for example, distinguishes between several degrees of sexual sin as he had done with the various degrees of lying (*Summa Contra Gentiles* III.2). Surely we can agree that sleeping with the enemy in order to further your country’s cause against something so evil as a Nazi regime is not as blameworthy as sleeping with your spouse’s friends because you like the way they look. Nevertheless, unlike the case of lying, the Christian tradition is one in holding that non-spousal sexual relations are morally evil acts. The prohibition on fornication, like the prohibition on murder, is absolute across the tradition. No intention can justify such acts. In Cynthia’s case, of course, we may claim that it was an evil done for the sake of a very great good, namely the defeat of Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Christian tradition has always held with the Apostle Paul that we may

never do evil that good may come. In short, there is no case to be made that Cynthia—or anyone like her—can be a good Christian. Unlike the tactics of lies and deceit, the tactics of manipulative sex are always incompatible with God’s will.

Of course, nothing prevents spies from using their positive physical attributes to further their cause. While we do not have an indisputably Biblical example of this sort of thing, there are two intriguing and suggestive near-examples. First, in the Old Testament book of Esther, we have the story of a young Jewish woman who is forced into concubinage to a Persian king, soon becomes his queen, and is then persuaded by her uncle to allow her favor in the king’s eyes to work for the Jewish people by influencing the king to adopt a more protective policy toward the Jews. The heroine of the story is forced into a sexual relationship against her will, but she allows the king’s desire for her to be used for good purposes. Esther is portrayed as an entirely virtuous woman. She proves to be a faithful queen, even to the point of protecting the life of the king by passing along information about an assassination plot, thus foregoing any desire for personal revenge she may have harbored. At the very least, we may draw the moral lesson that it is permissible to use your good looks for a just cause. At the most, we may say that those forced into sexual relationships may use the desire of their captors as a means to achieve good.

But Esther is not a case of manipulative non-spousal sex. She does not seek out a sexual relationship in order to target someone for a good cause. She does not seek to take advantage of anyone; indeed, she is the one who is taken advantage of by the king. Esther does not seek to deceive the king, her husband. She even proves to be a loyal wife to the very man who had forced her into a way of life she probably did not desire, which suggests an extraordinarily *agapeic* act.

The other notable example occurs in the book of Judith (a second-century B.C. document originally written in Hebrew and considered canonical in the Catholic and Orthodox Churches but merely edifying in Protestant

Churches and in the Jewish tradition). In it we find the story of Judith, a pious Jewish widow who uses her guile and beauty to assassinate Holofernes, general of Nebuchadnezzar and would-be sacker of Jerusalem. Judith poses as someone who believes that Israel will fall to Holofernes, gains his confidence by using her womanly charms, and chops off his head at the first opportunity. On her return to Jerusalem, she declares, “As the Lord lives, who has protected me in the way I went, it was my face that tricked him to his destruction, and yet he committed no act of sin with me, to defile or shame me” (13:16, RSV).

What is so telling about this story is that Judith definitely does not have manipulative sex for a greater good. Thus, even when the sky is about to fall in, even when Jerusalem is about to be sacked—with all the killing, raping, looting, and destroying that is to result—Judith does not even consider actually having sex with Holofernes as a moral option. In other words, better all the consequent destruction of Holofernes alive and well than Holofernes dead as a result of Judith using sex as a tactic to kill him. Nevertheless, Judith does use Holofernes’ sexual desire for her as a weapon against him, and the author praises this as a virtuous act. The moral lesson is clear: it is a praiseworthy act—a virtuous act—to be able to use your good looks to entice your unjust enemy into a position of weakness as long as you do not actually engage in sexual intercourse.

Esther used the desire of a foreign king for her in order to protect a Jewish population against unjust aggression. Judith enticed her enemy in order to assassinate him. Cynthia enticed her unjust enemy in order to get information helpful in a just war. All used the sexual desire of others for them in order to achieve victory over the unjust.

Would Cynthia have been praiseworthy had she merely used her good looks in order to get men to give her information? Such relationships would, of course, be built upon lies (unless we are talking about straightforward interrogation), but lies are praiseworthy in those cases. In such cases, the enticement is one in which we use the sexual desires of our targets, but

we do not actually fulfill those desires to the extent of sexual intercourse. If lies can be seen as virtuous, and I think the moral tradition here points us in that direction, then it would appear that using one’s attractiveness to the opposite sex as a way to gain information is also virtuous. However, the virtuous must stop short of non-spousal intercourse even when the life of the nation is at stake.

This moral restriction limits the effectiveness of the spy, but this is only to be expected. The whole point of the just war tradition is to place limits on what can count as justice in war. P

Darrell Cole is Professor of Ethics at Drew University. He writes regularly on the ethics of war and is the author of *Just War and the Ethics of Espionage* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

(Endnotes)


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*to Rebel to Tyrants is
 Moses, standing on the Shore, and extending his Hand over
 the Sea, thereby causing the same to overwhelm Pharaoh who
 is sitting in an open Chariot, a Crown on his Head & a Sword in his
 Hand. Rays from a Pillar of Fire reaching to Moses, to express
 that he acts by the Command of the Deity. Motto, Rebellion to Tyrants
 is Obedience to God.*

Benjamin Franklin's design for the Great Seal of the United States.

On the afternoon of July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress appointed Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams to “to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of America.” While Franklin’s design would ultimately be rejected, it allows a remarkable window into the revolutionary mindset of the founders. Franklin’s description reads: “Moses standing on the Shore, and extending his Hand over the Sea, thereby causing the same to overwhelm Pharaoh who is sitting in an open Chariot, a Crown on his Head and a Sword in his Hand. Rays from a Pillar of Fire in the Clouds reaching to Moses, to express that he acts by Command of the Deity. Motto, Rebellion to Tyrants is obedience to God.”



Queen Esther, by Edwin Long, 1878. National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne. Source: Google Art Project, via Wikimedia Commons.

REPARTEE

LOVE, WAR, & HONEY TRAPS

LELA GILBERT

“All is fair in love and war.” Not only is this a familiar phrase, it’s one that has long been used to justify scheming, conniving, and misbehaving in two notable and very vulnerable arenas of human life.

For some, it is a cynical dismissal of bad behavior. For others, and especially those with only a few scruples, it’s a welcomed, and dangerous, loophole. But whatever “all is fair” includes in its scope, the possibilities of wrongdoing in romance and warfare can be blurred and even erased by such an expansive platitude.

But from the earliest days of the Christian tradition, when it came to falling in love—and more specifically what we physically do in response—there was no room for “all is fair.” Believers have long demanded chaste behavior in the community of the faithful. The Bible, and those who interpreted it over the centuries, provided certain iron-clad rules. Rule #1 was perfectly clear: Sexual intercourse is exclusively limited to marriage. While never comprehensive, Christian sexual mores had a not inconsiderable effect on the, at least articulated if not faithfully practiced, sexual commitments of the surrounding culture more generally.

So too, when it comes to war, Christian thinking has helped reshape societal perceptions of right and wrong. Altering the contours of the warrior ethos, the just war tradition, grounded in the political thought and practice of ancient Israel and classical Greece and Rome, came into being in the Middle Ages and offered a uniquely Christian conception of the use of force in the context of

responsible government. As this theological ethic developed, it would also strengthen under the influence of the ideas, customs, and practices drawn from the chivalric code and resurrected interest in Roman law.

Times have certainly changed. Today, while the classical just war tradition has not been carried forward in a single, unified stream—but is found in diverse currents both religious and secular—it still has influence. Indeed, the rules of war have been magnified, in some cases, well beyond any theological origins and are analyzed in sometimes overly-exhaustive detail. Battles, and particularly successful ones, are scrutinized for “war crimes,” for violations of Geneva Conventions, and for tallies of civilian casualties. Battle plans are closely defined by stringent rules of engagement and overseen by civilian observers, zealots of various stripes, and journalists with questionable political leanings.

But the opposite fate has attended sexual concerns. Those strong and well-enforced boundaries that once surrounded matters of sexuality in Western society have crumbled and even vanished. Although this is less true in the Christian community, even there some steadfast rules have been reshaped and even replaced by more flexible “best intentions.”

Meanwhile, love and war are always intertwined in human experience, in legends,

tales, ballads, and in the real world. And it is against this backdrop that Darrell Cole has written his thoughtful essay “Sex, Lies, & Spies.”

In his reflection on sexual morality, Cole concerns himself specifically with the realm of espionage, which he understands as an act of coercion. “Spying is an act of force like soldiering,” Cole writes, “Even the most seemingly non-coercive jobs a spy might do—observe and report—are done for the benefit of those who can use that information to guide policies of force.”

Addressing the use of deception and fraud in spying, Cole ultimately questions whether or not sexual seduction is an appropriate weapon in the arsenal of a Christian spy.

Cole’s first step is to make room for the use of deception as such. He takes care to acknowledge the scope of Christian opinion on the matter. On one side is the Augustinian assertion that “truth-telling is essential to the nature of God, and so must be essential to the image of God in human beings.” Cole points out that John Calvin, too, prohibited lying and “condemns Rahab’s lies in a good cause in his commentary on Joshua.”

On the other hand, he notes, John Chrysostom poetically *defended* Rahab’s lies to save Israel’s spies: “O beautiful falsehood! O beautiful deception! Not of one who forsakes divine commands, but of one who is a guardian of piety.” (More about Rahab in a moment.)

Cole’s own conclusion is that the Christian condition “may support the idea that lies told for the public good are justifiable. The lies that spies tell in the line of duty fall into that category and, so, are justifiable.”

But then he asks the question that consumes the rest of his essay: “Can the same be said for sex in the line of duty? Can manipulative sex for the public good be justifiable?”

Cole’s answer is a resounding “No.” And although he makes room for various shadings of interpretation in the pros and cons of

justifiable lying during espionage, and even for the limited use of sexual attraction and sexual circumstances, he is unable to find any defense for the deployment of non-spousal sexual seduction as an instrument of spycraft.

This raises an unavoidable question: What makes sex for the purpose of espionage less acceptable to Christians than lying, deception, violent intervention, or other forms of subterfuge?


First, a couple of queries about the purpose of espionage. Why is spying as defensible as soldiering in a Christian’s chosen career? Simply put, espionage is used to discern the plans of an enemy, to minimize military losses, and to bring warfare to a successful end as quickly as possible. In that context, cannot spying be viewed as an act of mercy? Is it not a means of saving lives of both civilians and warriors?

In any case, it isn’t always pretty.

For one thing, spies do more than fib to accomplish their missions. They steal, forge, blackmail, infect, assassinate, kidnap, blow up, incinerate, raise false flags, and create complex distractions that may involve even further casualties. And sometimes they lead entirely double lives—perhaps for a lifetime.

In the 2016 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, *The Sympathizer*, author Viet Thanh Nguyen, whose lead character is a double agent for the Viet Cong, describes his struggle with a dual identity: “[S]ometimes I dreamed of trying to pull a mask off my face, only to realize that the mask was my face.” Not only was he lying to the world, he was also lying to himself.

Are all espionage tactics acceptable for Christian spies except sexual intercourse? Although in this particular essay Cole neither defends nor really even discusses violent and lethal tactics, he has written extensively elsewhere on the just war tradition and the participation of Christians in the martial vocation, including the use of deadly force. So it’s safe to suppose he does believe that, apart from sexual intercourse, so long as the given action falls within just war conceptions



Ruth and Boaz (*Ruth 2:2-20*), by Gustave Doré, 1866. Doré's English Bible. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

of discrimination and proportionality then, as the augmented saying goes, “All [else] is fair in war.”

So why the denial of sexual action in espionage? Cole explains, “Marital intercourse is, in a sense, a Trinitarian act in that the couple give themselves completely to each other in the sexual act. Loving sex within a marriage expresses not only a romantic desire (*eros*) but is informed by a God-like love (*agape*) that is totally giving to the other for the other’s sake... When spies have sex in the line of duty,

they are clearly not expressing *agapeic* love for their partners.”

Cole goes on to say that there are no biblical sources from which to build a case for morally justified non-spousal or manipulative sex. Now that is a startling statement, and debatable.

At this point it is worth noting that, in terms of espionage, “honey traps” usually involve women using their beauty and sexual allure to lure targeted men into compromising situations



Rahab and the Emissaries of Joshua, by unknown artist, 17th century. Musée des Beaux-Arts de Nîmes. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

where secrets are revealed, blackmail is initiated, poisons are inflicted, and so forth.

Interestingly, the most notable biblical accounts of sexuality (including intercourse) being used for worthy causes involve, indeed, clever and cunning women. Not all those involved in sexual acts were engaged in anything like formalized warfare, but in the following examples one did, in fact, take place at risk of imminent war, one involved the survival of the Jewish people, and the others, at the very least, were battling to continue their vulnerable existence, both for those they loved and to whom they belonged. And, amazingly, all of them played a role in an almost unbelievable legacy.

To begin, Cole cites Queen Esther as a woman who clearly used her beauty to obtain

a politically advantageous marriage, and used the terms of that marriage to further advantage still. While he avoids the claim of some that Esther and Xerxes did not have sexual relations until after she had been made queen, I am not convinced he gives the sexual element its due weight.

Consider again the biblical text (Esther 2, NIV):

Before a young woman's turn came to go in to King Xerxes, she had to complete twelve months of beauty treatments prescribed for the women, six months with oil of myrrh and six with perfumes and cosmetics. And this is how she would go to the king: Anything she wanted was given her to take with her from the harem to the king's palace. *In the evening she would go there and in the morning return to another*

part of the harem... She would not return to the king unless he was pleased with her and summoned her by name. (My italics)

Clearly, harem girls and the king were not playing backgammon during that evening-till-morning interlude. But it's also less convincing that Esther was purely "forced into concubinage." I say this because it seems that Esther made the most of her time in the king's palace. The sex was apparently quite good, for the biblical account reveals that "the king was attracted to Esther more than to any of the other women." Presumably this doesn't just happen without at least some enthusiasm on Esther's part. In any case, she wins the day, and the king places the royal crown on her head.

This series of events wouldn't, perhaps, seem so significant if it didn't fit a pattern. But Esther is not the only biblical account of intentional non-spousal or manipulative sex that is described without condemnation. Tamar, whose story appears in Genesis 38, found herself victimized by her irresponsible father-in-law, Judah, who was the son of the Jewish patriarch Jacob.

Tamar had been married to Judah's firstborn son, Er, but what Er "did was wicked in the Lord's sight; so the Lord put him to death." Tamar did not have a child with Er, so after his death, Judah gave Tamar to his next son, Onan. Onan decided to shirk his familial duty to provide his older brother with a son and used his sister-in-law for his own sexual gratification. He "went into" Tamar several times and "wasted his semen on the ground" to prevent pregnancy. This action was evil enough to warrant the Lord to put Onan to death as well. Still Tamar was childless. At this point, Judah promised Tamar his third but much younger son, Shelah, who was not yet old enough to perform his familial duty. But even when Shelah was old enough, he was not given to Tamar in marriage.

Still without proper standing, and therefore security, within the family and larger community, Tamar, in an act of what can only be described as "non-spousal or manipulative

sex," decided to take matters into her own hands. She covered her face with a veil and placed herself directly in the path of her foolish father-in-law.

The Bible says, "When Judah saw her, he thought she was a prostitute, for she had covered her face. Not realizing that she was his daughter-in-law, he went over to her by the roadside and said, 'Come now, let me sleep with you.'"

One thing led to another, and Tamar stealthily obtained Judah's personal seal and staff. Three months later, she was pregnant and her community—including Judah—called for her death. At that point, Tamar outed Judah as the child's father by offering to return his seal and staff to him. "She is more righteous than I," Judah confessed, "since I wouldn't give her to my son Shelah." *Mea Culpa*.

And then there was Rahab. Her story is well known (Joshua 2). She really was a prostitute in the ancient city of Jericho. And there really was a war going on.

Joshua, the Israelite general and spymaster, sent two of his intelligence officers to Jericho to assess and analyze the city's defenses. (Precisely why the two spies happened to be overnighing in a prostitute's house isn't spelled out in the biblical text.) But Rahab was very much afraid of the Israelites—their reputation for military valor preceded them.

So, Rahab made a deal with the spies and agreed to lie and hide them from the local king, but at a price. She demanded they protect her and her family when the city was finally assaulted by Joshua and his army. "Our lives for your lives!" Joshua's fervent spies assured her. "If you don't tell what we are doing, we will treat you kindly and faithfully when the Lord gives us the land" (Joshua 2:14).

And so they did.

Another heroine of the Bible is Ruth, who devotedly remained with her Israelite mother-in-law Naomi during hard times. After the death of Naomi's husband and two sons,



Judah and Tamar, *School of Rembrandt*, circa 1650 – 1660. *Residenzgalerie, Salzburg, Austria*. Source: *Wikimedia Commons*.

grief-stricken and with no one to care for her, Naomi decided to leave Moab and return to Israel, her homeland. Ruth lovingly refused to leave her side. “Where you go I will go, and where you stay I will stay. Your people will be my people and your God my God. Where you die I will die, and there I will be buried.”

It so happened that Naomi had a wealthy relative named Boaz. He owned fields of barley, and Naomi told Ruth to glean in his fields, following behind his harvesters. Boaz was a kind and good man, and Naomi trusted him.

Later she instructed Ruth, “Wash, put on perfume, and get dressed in your best clothes. Then go down to the threshing floor, but don’t let him know you are there until he has finished eating and drinking. When he lies down, note the place where he is lying. Then go and uncover his feet and lie down. He will tell you what to do” (Ruth 3).

The *NIV First-Century Study Bible* explains in an extensive footnote:

“Uncover his feet”...has some potential sexual overtones. “Feet” can refer to the genital region... To “uncover” can sometimes mean to have sexual relations. It’s

not obvious that Boaz and Ruth had any sexual contact, but the scene is charged with such possibility. This explains why Boaz wanted no one to know that Ruth came to see him at night (see 3:14). It’s likely that the narrator wanted to communicate Ruth’s culturally scandalous actions and tremendous risk while at the same time maintaining her noble and righteous reputation. This is not unlike the story of Tamar’s morally questionable actions in pursuit of a greater good.

And then there’s the story of Bathsheba and David, which has been told and retold, and is perhaps best recalled in Leonard Cohen’s discography:

Your faith was strong but you needed
proof
You saw her bathing on the roof
Her beauty and the moonlight overthrew
you...
Hallelujah!

The biblical version is found in 2 Samuel, chapter 11:

One evening David got up from his bed and walked around on the roof of the palace. From the roof he saw a woman bathing. The woman was very beautiful, and David

set someone to find out about her. The man said, “She is Bathsheba, the daughter of Eliam and the wife of Uriah the Hittite.” Then David sent messengers to get her. She came to him and he slept with her... The woman conceived and sent word to David saying “I am pregnant.” (2-6)

Bathsheba and David’s first child died because of the Lord’s judgment against David, as revealed by the Prophet Nathan. But the next son Bathsheba bore to David, Solomon, not only ruled as a king of legendary status, but he reigned and wrote with enormous wisdom and gained unimaginable wealth. He also built the first Jewish Temple that crowned the holy city of Jerusalem and the iconic Davidic kingdom.

Did Bathsheba realize that she was in plain sight of King David’s palace when she bathed on the roof? Most of us know when to pull down the window shades, but who can say? Perhaps she had grown weary of Uriah’s obsessive devotion to the army and his endless tours of duty and secretly hoped the king was watching. Or was she simply forgetful of her surroundings and caught unawares?

In any case, David’s moral failures are indisputable. How could Bathsheba say no to the king? Whatever may have been going on in her mind, David was responsible for the adultery, and that was not the worst of it. He had also abused the royal authority the Lord had given him by arranging to have Bathsheba’s husband killed in battle. David murdered Uriah so he could marry Bathsheba.

In the aftermath, however, Bathsheba remained a key player in the royal court. She was regally waiting in the wings while David was shivering on his death bed. And, in that strategic moment, she made sure that David decreed, before he died, that their son Solomon should be next in line for Israel’s throne. She, too, used another’s sexual attraction to her for her own benefit. While the sexual activity was, eventually, rightly within the nuptial covenant, it remains an open question whether Bathsheba ever freely gave the kind of self-giving, *agapeic* fidelity

that Cole requires. Surely spousal sex can be just as mercenary as non-spousal. In either case, *agape* is absent.

Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and Bathsheba—all strong-willed women with clever minds, courageous hearts, and, not incidentally, pleasing forms. And what was their legacy?

In the book of Matthew, chapter 1, we read the genealogy of Jesus in the lineage of his adoptive father, Joseph, who like his mother Mary was of the “house and lineage of David.” Uncharacteristic of most genealogies of the time, four women are included in the list: Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and Bathsheba. The rest of the listed characters are fathers—Jesus’ forefathers.

Those four women, along with Queen Esther, were not only heroic and notable for their cleverness and courage. They were also involved in somewhat risqué escapades. In our day, they would be thought of as women with a past.

Fortunately for all concerned, they were also women with a promising future, although they might not have imagined it at the time. In fact, to this day, illustrative of God’s unpredictable wisdom, justice and mercy, they remain unforgettable heroines. And while we cannot say that it is the risqué elements of their pasts for which they are found worthy to be in the lineage of Christ, they, at least, are in that lineage *despite* such risqué moments. While not a wholesale endorsement of sex in deception—espionage or otherwise—we ought, perhaps, to pause to consider. P

Lela Gilbert is an internationally recognized expert on religious persecution, an award-winning writer, and an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute who lived in Jerusalem for over a decade. She is Religion and Freedom editor at *Newsmax*, a contributor to Philos Project, Fox News, *Algemeiner*, and others. Her book *Saturday People, Sunday People: Israel through the Eyes of a Christian Sojourner* received wide critical acclaim. She is also the co-author of *Persecuted: The Global Assault on Christians*, and *Blind Spot: When Journalists Don't Get Religion*. Follow her on Twitter @lelagilbert.



York nervously poses for the camera on the deck of the S.S. Ohioan after docking in Hoboken, New Jersey on May 22, 1919. York had no idea that the April 1919 piece in the Saturday Evening Post about his battle exploits had made him a national hero. York was officially welcomed by the Tennessee Society and whisked away to be feted in New York City and Washington, DC. Source: AHEC.

SERVING GOD OR CAESAR: SERGEANT YORK & THE MORALITY OF WAR

COLONEL DOUGLAS MASTRIANO

...there was one guy in my outfit who was a conscientious objector—but once he was in the thick of battle, he fought like a true American and almost captured the whole d-nmed German Army single-handed. His name was Alvin York and he was a hero.

Otis Merrithew (aka William B. Cutting)

October 21, 1965

On October 8, 1918, the American 82nd Division was preparing to attack the heavily defended Argonne Forest in France. The Argonne was seized by the Imperial German Army in late 1914 and was developed into a defensive network that exploited the rough terrain and thick forest. To compound matters, the week prior a battalion size element of 590 Americans broke through the German lines. This unit, later known as the Lost Battalion, was surrounded for five days and threatened with annihilation. They had to be saved. In desperation, the 82nd American Division was ordered to advance into the forest to force the Germans to give up their siege of the Lost Battalion.

As the 82nd prepared the assault, the Germans fired gas-filled artillery rounds into the ranks of the Americans, making their climb towards the Argonne all the more difficult. Among the advancing soldiers was Corporal Alvin C. York, one of the unit's few practicing Christians. Most of the officers had strong Christian faith, but of the soldiers in York's platoon, only he and another corporal, Murray Savage, were noted as trying to live out their beliefs. York and Savage would be seen studying the Bible and praying together instead of

frequenting the French cafes behind the lines or chasing mademoiselles. Because of this, neither Savage nor York fit in well with their fellow soldiers and often felt isolated or alone.

This isolation was exacerbated by the tribal nature of the 82nd. The unit was called the "All American Division" as it had soldiers from 46 of the then 48 states.¹ This mix resulted in regional and ethnic "tribes" forming within the division. In York's case, the Italians, Irish, Greeks, Russian, Poles, etc., tended to spend time with their likeminded people group. Being Christians not from one of these ethnic groups and not having anything in common with the other soldiers made military service daunting for York and Savage.

As the 82nd Division prepared to "go over the top" and hit the Germans, York was heard muttering that "he was willing to die for his country, but not to kill for his country"—not something any soldier wanted to hear from one of his squad leaders. The attack was to commence at 6:00 am with a ten-minute artillery barrage focused against the German positions. At 6:10 am, the Americans would attack. However, the barrage never arrived.

The unit leader, Major Tillman, directed that the men would attack with or without the artillery. At 6:10 am, York's unit began its advance into the Argonne. Initially, things seemed to go well, but the Germans had set a trap.

The day before, the German commander of 2nd Württemberg Landwehr Division, General Anton Franke, read reports of the American units' movement and rightly assessed where the attack would occur. General Franke had two of his regiments, the 120th and 125th Württemberg Landwehr, create a kill zone just inside the forest. The Americans would be allowed to enter the kill zone with little resistance, but once in it they would be attacked by rifleman and machine guns from three sides. General Franke also received reinforcements from the 45th Prussian Reserve Division, who would join his Württembergers in a large counterattack to eliminate the American attack and then drive them out of the forest. Things could not be worse for the Americans.

Without supporting artillery fire, the Americans swept into the Argonne Forest, straight into General Frank's kill zone, and hit a wall of fire, which stopped the attack. York described the scene in his diary, saying:

The Germans met our charge across the valley with a regular sleet storm of bullets. I'm a-telling you that-there valley was a death trap. It was a triangular-shaped valley with steep ridges covered with brush, and swarming with machine guns on all sides. I guess our two waves got about halfway across and then jes couldn't get no further nohow. The Germans done got us and they done got us right smart. They jes stopped us in our tracks. Their machine guns were up there on the heights overlooking us and well hidden, and we couldn't tell for certain where the terrible heavy fire was coming from. It 'most seemed as though it was coming from everywhere.

The American attack literally faded away. To make matters worse, German artillery fire began to rip through the floundering assault. In the midst of the horror, Platoon Sergeant



Harry Parsons ordered Sergeant Early and Corporals York, Savage, and Cutting to gather up their men and find a way behind the German lines. This group of 17 men saw a deep cut in a ridge to their south and began moving towards it, putting them under the barrels of five German machine guns. As the German gunners prepared to open fire, the belated American artillery fire providentially erupted on them, enabling York and the other Americans to successfully get behind the German lines.

The Americans wound about a mile behind the lines when they encountered two German soldiers carrying large water tins. Upon seeing the Americans, the Germans dropped the tins



This photo was taken outside of Varennes-en-Argonne and is confirmed to be of York's group of prisoners. The three German officers in the front of the formation each played a central role in the October 8 battle. At left is German Lieutenant Paul Vollmer, the commander of 1st Battalion, 120th Württemberg Regiment, who personally surrendered his unit to York after losing many men and seeing his friend Fritz Endriss fall in combat. The German officer in the center is Lieutenant Max Thoma, commander of the 7th Bavarian Mining Company, who refused to surrender unless Vollmer accept responsibility. To the right is German Lieutenant Paul Lipp, who commanded the 125th Württemberg machine gun that killed or wounded half of the Americans with York. The American in the center of the photo, just behind the German officers may be Alvin York. Source: AHEC.

and ran straight back to their headquarters to report the breach to their commander. However, the 17 Americans pursued them, surprising a mass of 70 German soldiers. The Germans were so shocked to see the Americans that they surrendered. The 17 Americans struggled to push the throng of 70 German prisoners into a manageable mass. Suddenly, the word “*runter*” was yelled, with the Germans all falling to the ground. This was quickly followed by the rat-a-tat-tat of a German MG 08/15 machine gun that killed

six of the Americans and wounded three. The surviving Americans fell to the ground hoping to survive the next burst of German machine gun fire.

The scene was utter chaos. German machine gun fire sprayed over the heads of the surviving eight Americans and 70 German prisoners, all huddled on the low ground. In between bursts from the German machine gun, the Americans yelled to each other to determine, who was left alive. Of the leaders

Form 1		REGISTRATION CARD		No. 27
1	Name in full	Alvin C. York	York	Age in yrs. 29
2	Home address	Pale Male	Tenn	
3	Date of birth	Dec	13	1887
4	Are you (1) a natural-born citizen, (2) a naturalized citizen, (3) an alien, (4) or have you declared your intention (specify which)?	A. Natural Born		
5	Where were you born?	Pale Male	Tenn	U.S.A.
6	If not a citizen, of what country are you a citizen or subject?			
7	What is your present trade, occupation, or office?	Labor on farm		
8	By whom employed?	P.C. Rice		
9	Where employed?	Pale Male Tenn		
10	Have you a father, mother, wife, child under 12, or sister or brother under 12, solely dependent on you for support (specify which)?	Mother, Borne, Sister		
11	Married or single (which)?	Single	Race (specify which)?	Cauc
12	What military service have you had? Rank	none		
	years	Nation or State		
12	Do you claim exemption from draft (specify grounds)?	Yes, Don't want to fight		
I affirm that I have verified above answers and that they are true.				
				Alvin C. York
				(Signature or mark)

Sergeant York Draft Registration Card. Block 12 is where he asked for exemption. Source: National Archives.

Early, Cutting, York, and Savage, only York was not killed or wounded. The burden of command had passed to him. As an outspoken conscience objector, what would York do?

York's journey to conscience objection began in the hills of Pall Mall, Tennessee, in 1911 when his father died. With the passing of his dad, York became responsible for running the family farm and blacksmith shop while providing for his widowed mom and younger siblings. The pressure was too much for him, so he sought a way to escape. Fortunately for York, a place to do so was just a few miles to the north along the Tennessee-Kentucky border.

Enterprising bootleggers found a way to sell their unregulated alcoholic beverages to the populace by building their bars (called blind-tigers) on the state border, with the building half in Tennessee and half in Kentucky. Whenever local law enforcement officials arrived, the alcohol and those in the blind-tiger simply staggered to the opposite half of the building and into the other state. Beyond the risk of consuming unregulated

alcohol, the blind-tigers were renowned for knife fights, shootouts, brutal fist fights, and drunken brawls. It was not uncommon for people to be killed during the busy weekend drinking binges. Such was the environment where Alvin York spent his weekends in various stages of drunkenness.

York's mom was terribly worried about him. He was raised with strong Christian values, but had rejected these in exchange for his weekend drinking binges. He refused to speak with his pastor, or listen to the counsel of Christian family or friends. To many, York was a good-for-nothing drunk and would never make any positive contribution to life. All hope seemed lost for him.

However, things began to change when a neighbor, Gracie Williams, caught his attention. The problem was that she and her family were all practicing Christians. This was particularly true for Gracie's father, Francis Asbury Williams, who was deeply devout and a leader in the local church. There was no way that he would tolerate Gracie spending time with Alvin York. The only place where they could see each other was at church. With the sole desire to spend time with Gracie, York became a regular churchgoer.

Things forever changed for York on New Year's Day 1915 during a special church service. On that day, a preacher from Indiana preached a sermon that gripped York's heart. The preacher, Reverend Russel, walked through the basic Gospel message that proclaimed the sinfulness of man and the need for redemption. Reverend Russel followed up the bad news with the Good News and explained the saving grace offered through a relationship with Jesus Christ. An altar call was given for those who wanted to turn from their sins and accept Jesus as their personal Lord and Savior. York would later say that it was like lightning hit his soul. He went forward and prayed. Reflecting on this he wrote:

I found out the truth of what the Bible says: "There is more rejoicing over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety-nine just persons that need no repentance." I truly

felt as though I had been borned again. I felt that great power which the Bible talks about and which all sinners feel when they have found salvation, I felt in my soul like the stormy waters must have felt when the Master said, "Peace, be still." I used to walk out in the night under the stars and kinder linger on the hillside, and I sorter wanted to put my arms around them-there hills. They were at peace and so was the world and so was I.²

The change in York's life was complete. He stopped going to the blind-tigers, became a leader in his church, taught choir and Sunday school, and even preached sermons as the assistant pastor. For York, the new life was not easy. He said that the temptation to go back to the blind-tigers was hard to overcome. Of this time, York noted:

And the more I thought the more I kinder figured that all of my trials and tribulations in the war had been to prepare me for doing just this work in the mountains. All of my suffering in having to go and kill were to teach me to value human lives. All the temptations I done went through were to strengthen my character. All the associations with my buddies were to help me understand and love my brother man. All of the pains I done seed and went through were to help and prepare me.³

This was the most important epoch in the York story. As he resisted the temptation to "cuss, chase women and drink," he in turn built his moral character, making him brave and heroic in his heart, in his soul. He said of this:

Sometimes Everett or Marion or some of the other boys would drop around and tell me they were putting on another party and invite me to join them. Then it was that I was most sorely tempted. I prayed most awful hard and got a good hold on myself and didn't go. Each time I refused it was so much easier next time; and every day it became easier. In a few months I got them there bad things out of my mind.⁴

This was also the time when York immersed himself in the Bible. He knew that the Bible was God's Word and he should follow it in

every aspect of his life. Those who once viewed him as a good-for-nothing drunkard were astounded at the change in his life. Over the next two years, York became a respected leader in his community, later saying:

And that is the greatest victory I ever won. It's much harder to whip yourself than to whip the other fellow, I'm a-telling you, and I ought to know because I done both. It was much harder for me to win the great victory over myself than to win it over those German machine guns in the Argonne Forest. And I was able to do it because God showed me the light, and I done followed it.⁵

However, his world turned upside down in 1917 when the United States entered World War I. Like so many other Americans, York was drafted into the Army. The idea of going to war and killing Germans was something he could not imagine. As far as York was concerned, when the Bible said, "Thou shall not murder," a Christian could not kill another human for any reason. Having barely a third-grade education, York did not go to the original Hebrew to discern the difference between kill and murder. However, he found himself faced with either fidelity to his Christian convictions or to the demands of his government. He doubted he could both follow God's Word and join the Army. On block 12 of his draft card, where it asked, "Do you claim exemption from draft (specify reason)," he wrote, "Yes, Don't want to fight."

In its rush to prepare for war, one of the areas that the United States was least prepared for was what to do with conscientious objectors. Those who refused to do anything to support the war were often treated brutally and even imprisoned. York's request for military exemption was denied by the county board, and he appealed to the state board. The state board denied this appeal. A subsequent appeal to the federal board was also denied. York had to serve despite his sincerely held beliefs. He was filled with doubt and confusion and prayed for God's intervention, later explaining:

I wanted to follow both. But I couldn't. They were opposite. And I couldn't reconcile them nohow in my soul. I wanted to

do what was right. I wanted to be a good Christian and a good American too. I had always figured that the two were sort of connected. And now I was beginning to find out that they were kinder opposed to each other. If I went away to war and fought and killed, according to my reading of the Bible, I weren't a good Christian, And if I didn't go to war and do these things, according to Uncle Sam, I weren't a good American... I wuz sorter mussed up inside worsen'n ever. I thought that the word of God would prevail against all of the laws of man and of nations.⁶

With his appeals to avoid the draft denied, York joined the United States Army on November 14, 1917, and he would eventually be assigned to the 82nd Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia. York determined that it would be best if he did not make his conscientious objections known and that he would endeavor to be the best soldier he could. He would write:

I jes went to that old camp and said nothing. I did everything I was told to do. I never once disobeyed an order. I never once raised my voice in complaint, but I was sick at heart jes the same, heard the boys around me talking about what fun would be to go overseas and fight in the trenches I heard them telling of how many Germans they were going to kill if ever they got a chance. I heard all sorts of things about the glory of war. But I couldn't see it like they seed it no-how. I prayed and prayed that God would show me His blessed will.⁷

Being a hard working soldier who did not complain and being the best shot in the unit made him stand out. Furthermore, Alvin York did not spend his free time in the neighboring town of Augusta, Georgia, getting drunk and chasing women. Instead, he attended Bible classes, sang in the chapel choir, and lived a quiet and clean life. This made York stand out further as a model soldier. Because of this, his company commander, Captain Danforth, and battalion commander, Major Buxton, offered Private Alvin York promotion to corporal.

York had been struggling with reconciling his faith with military service and still was

conflicted. He simply could not kill. With the offer of a promotion, Alvin nervously expressed his misgivings to Captain Danforth about being in the Army. Danforth listened intently to York and said that he would arrange a meeting with Major Buxton to figure out a way to sort out this dilemma.

York was apprehensive about meeting with both Captain Danforth and Major Buxton. When the time came, he was immediately put at ease by Buxton:

The major was very friendly-like; he always was with us boys. He told us to sit down. He said he didn't want to discuss this question as a battalion commander discussing it with an officer and a private. He wanted us to discuss it as three American citizens interested in a common cause. He said he respected any honest religious conviction and would be glad to discuss things as man to man.⁸


Providentially, York could not have been assigned to a better leadership team. Both Danforth and Buxton were outspoken Christians who knew their Bible well. The discussion began with Danforth and Buxton quoting Bible verses that supported a person serving in the military. York replied with verses that supported pacifism. The tone of the discourse was perfect for Alvin, who said, "We didn't get annoyed or angry or even raise our voice. We jes examined the old Bible and whenever I would bring up a passage opposed to war, Major Buxton would bring up another which sorter favoured war. I believed the Lord was in that room. I seemed somehow to feel His presence there."⁹ Yet, it seemed as though the two sides were at an impasse. Finally, Captain Danforth opened up his Bible and read a portion of Ezekiel 33:

Again the word of the LORD came unto me, saying, Son of man, speak to the children of thy people, and say unto them, When I bring the sword upon a land, if the people of the land take a man of their coasts, and set him for their watchman: If when he seeth the sword come upon the land, he blow the trumpet, and warn the people; Then whosoever heareth the sound of the trumpet, and taketh not warning; if the

sword come, and take him away, his blood shall be upon his own head. He heard the sound of the trumpet, and took not warning; his blood shall be upon him. But he that taketh warning shall deliver his soul. But if the watchman see the sword come, and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned; if the sword come, and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at the watchman's hand. So thou, O son of man, I have set thee a watchman unto the house of Israel; therefore thou shalt hear the word at my mouth, and warn them from me. When I say unto the wicked, O wicked man, thou shalt surely die; if thou dost not speak to warn the wicked from his way, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at thine hand. Nevertheless, if thou warn the wicked of his way to turn from it; if he do not turn from his way, he shall die in his iniquity; but thou hast delivered thy soul.¹⁰

Danforth nailed it. York reflected on this scripture and at that moment knew that he *could* serve in the military as a “watchman on the wall.” But he was not convinced that he could kill for his country. Sadly, word spread across the unit that York was a conscientious objector. Several members of his squad called him a coward and someone using religion to get out from doing his duty. He found himself ostracized and continually mocked by his fellow soldiers. As the unit traveled across the Atlantic, through England, and into France, his one real friend remained Murray Savage. Their friendship was close: in addition to praying and studying the Bible together, they kept each other accountable in avoiding the ladies and wine in France.

Fast forward and return to York's crisis in the Argonne Forest. When those machine guns fired over the 70 prostrate Germans and into the American patrol only thirty feet away, the first burst ripped into Savage, tearing him into pieces. York fell to the ground to avoid the next deadly salvo. As the Americans sounded off, it was clear that York was the only leader left alive or able to fight. Laying in the meadow with his only friend and five others he knew well dead, along with three other Americans severely wounded, and with



him now in charge, York pondered what to do. His thoughts were accompanied by neither rage nor hate, but rather were focused simply on the fact that he must stop the killing of his brothers. In that instant York changed from a conscientious objector to a warrior. Inaction would only result in further American death and destruction. As both a watchman on the wall and a Christian leader, it was his responsibility to save his friend's lives. Everything suddenly became clear for York in that moment, and the debate of whether a Christian could ever morally kill ended.

As bullets passed over his head, York charged up the hill to a position that outflanked the German machine gun, as well as a group of infantry whom he discovered were also shooting at the pinned Americans. Together, there were 19 enemy soldiers in front of York. Without wasting a moment, York opened fire, pausing long enough to shout to the Germans to surrender. However, the enemy refused to lay down their arms, and York ended up killing all 19 of them. Seeing more German soldiers coming towards him from further up the hill, and needing to return to his men, York ran back down the hill, only to be charged by a German officer (Lieutenant Fritz Endriss) and a second group of enemy soldiers armed with their bayonets. York pulled out his own Colt Automatic Pistol and fought off this assault, shooting Endriss in the abdomen, dropping him to the ground. York redirected his fire toward the other Germans reinforcements.

Meanwhile, Endriss was still alive, in agony, and begging for help. Included in the throng

of the original 70 Germans who had surrendered and were continuing to hug the ground to avoid the crossfire, was Lieutenant Paul Vollmer, who had been friends with Endriss for more than a decade. Desperate to save his friend, Vollmer cautiously stood up and walked over to York, who would recount the exchange:

Vollmer: "English?"
York: "No, not English."
Vollmer: "What?"
York: "American."
Vollmer: "Good Lord! If you won't shoot any more I will make them give up."¹¹

York told him to do it, whereupon Vollmer blew a whistle, and the Germans above came down the hill with their arms up. The skirmish was over. In the end, this good-for-nothing drunk from Pall Mall, Tennessee, this conscientious objector, had killed 25 enemy soldiers and captured 132. His action saved his unit from certain defeat and forced the German Army to retreat from their Argonne Forest fortress. York was awarded the Medal of Honor for this action, for which he always gave God the credit. When one of his officers, Brigadier General Julian Lindsay, asked how managed this extraordinary task, York later recalled responding, "It was not man-power but it was divine power that saved me. I told him that before I went to war I prayed to God and He done gave me my assurance that so long as I believed in Him not one hair of my head would be harmed; and even in front of them-there machine guns He knowed I believed in Him."¹²

The morality of Christians serving in the military is a debate that stretches across two millennia. There are no easy answers on whether a Christian can kill for his country. The Just War ethic as offered by Augustine of Hippo, although a thousand years old, provides a good road map and strong reasons for when and why a follower of Jesus Christ can kill. Yet, in all cases it seems to be a personal and individual decision. Such was the case for Alvin York. However, it took the reality of war, surrounded by the death

and the threat of death of those he loved, to bring the issue to a clear and abrupt finality. Perhaps the comfort and security that most Americans enjoy today gives us the luxury to debate and reflect on such matters. Yet, for York, when life itself was at stake, he knew what he ought do. P

Colonel Douglas Mastriano (PhD, University of Brunswick, Canada), US Army, is on faculty in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. A veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, he began his career in the 1980s, serving along the Iron Curtain with the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has served at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command ranging from the 3rd Infantry Division (Rock of the Marne), to the Pentagon and in NATO. His book, *Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne*, is an award winning biography on America's greatest First World War hero. Under the endorsement of American and French authorities, Doug led the expedition that discovered the precise Argonne location where York fought. The work led to the construction of a five-kilometer historic walking trail, replete with monuments and historic markers. For further information visit his website at www.sgtyorkdiscovery.com.

(Endnotes)

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- 2 York, Sergeant York, 144, 147.
- 3 York, 304-305.
- 4 York, Sergeant York, 146.
- 5 York, Sergeant York, 145.
- 6 York, 155, 161.
- 7 York, 166-167.
- 8 Skeyhill, 160-163; York, 169-170.
- 9 York, 171.
- 10 Pattullo, 4. Skeyhill, Sergeant York: Last of the Long Hunters, 163-164. There is a conflict in the sources as to whom read this to York. The 1928 York/Skeyhill book credits Buxton with this. As Danforth was interviewed for Pattullo's article, it is more likely that he read Ezekiel 33.
- 11 York, 229.
- 12 York, 278.

GOD WOULD NEVER BE CRUEL ENOUGH TO
CREATE A CYCLONE AS TERRIBLE AS
THAT ARGONNE BATTLE. ONLY MAN WOULD
EVER THINK OF DOING AN AWFUL
THING LIKE THAT. IT LOOKED LIKE
"THE ABOMINATION OF DESOLATION" MUST
LOOK LIKE. AND ALL THROUGH THE LONG
NIGHT THOSE BIG GUNS FLASHED AND
GROWLED JUST LIKE THE LIGHTNING AND
THE THUNDER WHEN IT STORMS IN THE
MOUNTAINS AT HOME. AND, OH MY, WE
HAD TO PASS THE WOUNDED. AND SOME OF
THEM WERE ON STRETCHERS GOING BACK
TO THE DRESSING STATIONS, AND SOME
OF THEM WERE LYING AROUND, MOANING
AND TWITCHING. AND THE DEAD WERE ALL
ALONG THE ROAD. AND IT WAS WET AND
COLD. AND IT ALL MADE ME THINK OF THE
BIBLE AND THE STORY OF THE ANTI-
CHRIST AND ARMAGEDDON. AND I'M
TELLING YOU THE LITTLE LOG CABIN IN
WOLF VALLEY IN OLD TENNESSEE SEEMED A
LONG, LONG WAY OFF.

DIARY OF ALVIN YORK, ACCOUNT OF OCTOBER 7TH, 1918

HELPING RELIGIOUS MINORITIES PERSECUTED BY DAESH

EWELINA U. OCHAB & BARONESS CAROLINE COX



Bell tower at the Quaragosh Church in Nineveh Plains, Iraq, approximately three weeks after liberation. November 2016. Photo provided by Ewelina U. Ochab.

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of 2014, Daesh (also referred to as Islamic State or ISIS) began to establish the so-called caliphate in many regions of Syria and Iraq. This self-proclaimed caliphate of Daesh was established by the sword and with the blood of

the area's indigenous people. As Daesh gained more territories, stories of mass atrocities perpetrated by the group started circulating in the media. The stories included mass beheadings of "infidels", throwing people from high buildings, burning prisoners in metal cages, etc. However, the mass atrocities

were not adequately addressed at that stage. Only after Daesh attacked Sinjar, Iraq, killed hundreds of Yazidis, and forced the rest to flee could the world no longer look away. This attack on the Yazidis on August 3, 2014, was followed by subsequent mass atrocities in the Nineveh Plains, Iraq, where Christians

were forced to flee or die by Daesh's sword. Most of them fled to Kurdistan, a part of Iraq Daesh could not conquer. Even though the August 2014 atrocities had gained international attention and provoked an international response from 73 countries (the Coalition against Daesh), only in the second half of 2016 did Iraqi forces start regaining significant territories previously under Daesh control for two years.

Over these two years, Daesh committed murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, abductions of women and children, exploitation, abuse, rape, sexual violence, forced marriage, and enforced disappearance—unabated. Daesh has specifically targeted Christians, Yazidis, and other religious minorities, including Muslim minorities, for destruction in an attempt to annihilate religious pluralism in the area and to establish a purely Islamic region. Indeed, the atrocities committed by Daesh against religious minorities have been recognized as a genocide by the Council of Europe, European Parliament, US Congress and the Secretary of State, UK House of Commons, and the Lithuanian, Canadian, Australian, French, Hungarian, and Austrian Parliaments.

During this time, many areas of the Nineveh Plains were subjected to Daesh destruction. They looted all homes, shops, schools, and churches. No stone was left unturned. Their fighters confiscated all valuables and possessions, and burned down houses. The destruction of villages sent a clear message—the looting was about more than just money. Daesh wanted to destroy all signs of the religious communities that

had inhabited the area for centuries as if they had never existed. Though Daesh seemed to flourish unabated and tried to conquer the region for financial gain and destruction of religious pluralism, they never establish a fully functioning and self-sustainable state. Daesh was and is ill-fated.

The central focus of this article is to explore the current progress in the fight against Daesh and what it means for the victims. First, we look into the current military actions against Daesh and whether the region is in a post-Daesh phase. Second, we examine the current progress of rebuilding in areas recovered from Daesh and the attempt of people to return home. Third, we consider the necessary security measures needed to ensure the vulnerable religious minorities are adequately protected from Daesh or any other perpetrators who may come later. Fourth, we scrutinize what reconciliation steps need to be undertaken to ensure a peaceful coexistence between the region's diverse religious communities. Fifth, we look into what legal measures have been taken to date or should be made to bring the Daesh perpetrators to justice. Sixth, we consider what the United States could do to help the persecuted communities. Our primary focus is Iraq, however, and where we refer to the Daesh atrocities elsewhere, this is expressly stated. Nevertheless, these proposed steps are replicable, and can and should be taken to address crimes against religious minorities committed elsewhere across the globe.

POST-DAESH?

Despite the fact that some actors speak of post-Daesh responses, the entity has not yet been defeated in Syria or Iraq, nor

in other parts of West Asia or North Africa. They have lost territories in Syria and Iraq, however, and have gained new territories in the Middle East while continuing its expansion in North Africa. Egypt has become one of the central North African countries where Daesh is present, and their activities, in particular against the Coptic Christians, have become more and more prominent over the months. On April 9, which was Palm Sunday, at least 27 people were killed in an explosion at St. George's Coptic Church in Tanta, and 17 people lost their lives in St. Mark's Coptic Church in Alexandria. Over a hundred people were injured in both attacks. On May 26, at least 28 Coptic Christians were killed when masked shooters ambushed a bus travelling to a monastery south of Cairo. Such attacks have been more frequent in Egypt over recent months.

Due to Daesh's continued and growing presence across West Asia and North Africa, along with attacks of Daesh fighters or sympathizers across Europe and North America, we mustn't yet adopt the language of post-Daesh. Such a narrative is not merely a matter of semantics. First, it changes the dynamics of the response. If Daesh is defeated, the military response ceases to be a priority. This narrative is a wrong approach as Daesh continues to be present in West Asia and North Africa and poses one of the most severe security threats in the world. Daesh still recruits new followers and conducts terror attacks across the globe. Second, the post-Daesh narrative gives an erroneous feeling of security and safety while neglecting survivors' needs. Religious minorities in the region are not safe yet, and they continue to be on the verge of annihilation.

That said, it *is* important to consider the eventual post-Daesh response. While such a response cannot be implemented until Daesh is in fact defeated, and mustn't overshadow current responsibilities, strategic planning for the future is still necessary and welcomed.

RECONSTRUCTION & RETURN

As Daesh is defeated village by village, the indigenous communities wish to return to their homes. Indeed, many people who fled Daesh in the Nineveh Plains in August 2014 want to go back to the recently liberated villages there, even if they must return to rubble. And they have a right to do so. The right of refugees to return is protected under the Iraqi Constitution (and international law). However, this right means nothing if it is not adequately respected and protected.

Rebuilding the Nineveh Plains will be a massive project requiring substantial funding. International organization Aid to the Church in Need has assessed that the cost of rebuilding nine villages is in the region of \$200 million. Reconstruction of villages does not mean only clearing the rubble and rebuilding the houses. There is no infrastructure, which would have to be rebuilt from scratch.

Reconstruction of the village Teleskof may be a model for other places. It is currently being rebuilt, and over 430 families have already returned. Many of the houses already have water access and electricity, but there are ongoing challenges. The next steps will be to reconstruct other infrastructure and ensure that the village is sustainable and safe. Teleskof's rebuilding and the people's willingness to return give some

hope that there is a future for the rest of the Nineveh Plains. However, Teleskof had not been subject to as much devastating destruction as other areas, such as Quaragosh—one of the biggest Christian towns in the region.

The villages' reconstruction and indigenous communities' return are closely interlinked. Without reconstruction, people will not return. Without people returning, reconstruction may seem futile. Moreover, without this reconstruction, the future of Christians in the region is questionable.

SECURITY MEASURES

Despite the fact that the Iraqi army has liberated many areas from Daesh, those areas are not safe yet. The Iraqi army and the Nineveh Plain Protection Units have to check all homes and properties for explosives. Underground tunnels that Daesh used to move between buildings have to be sealed off. However, the actors need to take other steps to ensure the area's safety and security and to ensure Daesh will not return. These measures include ensuring the villages are not abandoned by the military or security forces should Daesh manage to threaten them again. Military and security forces must protect the local communities "in sickness and health". The previous failing to protect the indigenous population from Daesh attacks in August 2014 has to be investigated and addressed. Only then will it be possible to prevent any such future security failings. Moreover, steps ought to be taken to ensure that, in a perceived post-Daesh vacuum, other violent extremist or terrorist groups are prevented from entering the region.

The proposal to develop safe zones to protect minorities from Daesh atrocities is commendable. But without viable security, any such efforts will not be sustainable. Additionally, there are questions relating to the effectiveness of safe zones in actually providing security. Safe zones have been established over the years in some other post-conflict regions, including Bosnia and Rwanda. But, in spite of what we called them, they were far from safe or secure. History has shown how such safe zones contributed to post-conflict re-traumatization of already vulnerable people. Although the safe zones established in Bosnia in 1993 or Rwanda in 1994 provided humanitarian assistance, they failed to provide adequate protection for vulnerable civilians in a post-conflict situation.

Establishing safe zones for religious minorities may also have an adverse impact on the perception that religious minorities are the "other" rather than a part of the Iraqi community. All religious communities in Iraq must be treated as a part of the Iraqi community, with equal rights enshrined in the Iraqi constitution and according to international law. Religious minorities must be able to live among other groups without fear, whether they live in a safe zone or not. Such peaceful co-existence must be accommodated and supported by the Iraqi government.

Other proposals include establishing an autonomous region for religious minorities, modeled on the Kurdistan autonomous region. However, creating such an autonomous unit would take years while persecuted religious minorities would continue to live in fear and uncertainty. Furthermore, establishing



Quaragosh Church in Nineveh Plains, Iraq, November 2016. Photo provided by Ewelina U. Ochab.

yet another autonomous region within the borders of Iraq would lead to further defragmentation of the country rather than uniting the torn communities.

These challenges may well be manageable. But previous mistakes in implementing safe zones in post-conflict regions must be analyzed to identify and address failings and to prevent previous errors from reoccurring.

INTERFAITH DIALOGUE & COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION

As mentioned earlier, calls to establish safe zones raise another important issue: religious minorities must be protected throughout all of Iraq and not only within the borders of the proposed safe zones. It is essential to help religious minorities feel that they are fully part of Iraqi society and for communities to work together to combat tensions and remove the atmosphere of mistrust. Religious

minorities in the region must be able to live as a part of the Iraqi community, not as a separate group. It includes the ever growing need of opening the interfaith dialogue and the process of reconciliation.

Interfaith dialogue must be accommodated by the Iraqi government and include all religious communities in Iraq. The government must include religious leaders of all religious groups in the process of establishing new policies aimed at protecting religious pluralism in the region. Religious leaders must ensure that the interfaith dialogue is implemented within their communities and engage all in the process.

The Daesh atrocities have sparked an atmosphere of mistrust between religious communities and communities in general. Some of the houses and properties belonging to Christians were snatched by their neighbors after Christians were forcibly displaced. There

were reports of people conspiring with Daesh to inform where Christians or Yazidis were hiding. These challenges have to be addressed in the process of reconciliation to ensure that the post-Daesh Iraq will be a stable country accommodating religious pluralism and ensuring the peaceful coexistence of diverse communities.

LEGAL MEASURES

Legal steps have to be taken to ensure that Daesh fighters and any other complicit actors are brought to justice. International institutions must take urgent action, such as collecting evidence, investigating, and prosecuting perpetrators.

There is still no independent commission of inquiry that would collect evidence of crimes committed by Daesh. It is a crucial step because without evidence no prosecution would have legal standing. Furthermore, evidence disappears every day as the



Destruction inside the Quaragosh Church in Nineveh Plains, Iraq. November 2016. Photo provided by Ewelina U. Ochab.

reconstruction of villages progresses. The independent commission of inquiry would obtain statements from victims, prepare for any future proceedings, secure and investigate mass graves that are being discovered as areas are liberated, and preserve and catalogue all evidence of mass atrocities perpetrated by Daesh.

Despite the fact that the independent commission of inquiry is not established yet, the international community, in cooperation with the Iraqi government, must put in place the most efficient prosecution mechanism that would address the challenges posed by the nature of an international terrorist group like Daesh. It may be an international criminal tribunal (as was used for Rwanda and Bosnia), a regional mechanism (similar to one implemented for piracy cases in Somalia), or a specialized national court supported by the UN (as in the

case of Cambodia). While it is still unclear what will be the nature of the tribunal that would engage with the prosecutions, Iraq would significantly benefit from international support in this endeavor. The Iraqi judiciary could take advantage of the resources and the expertise of the United Nations that led or assisted in other post-conflict investigations and prosecutions. It is highly relevant not only for the Iraqi judiciary but also for the people in Iraq. Ultimately, Daesh fighters originated not only from Iraq but also from over 80 other countries from all parts of the world. Daesh is not only an Iraqi issue; it is an international problem requiring an international response. The international community must show solidarity with Iraq in defeating the ongoing impunity of Daesh. States can prosecute fighters in their countries, but they should also assist the Iraqi judiciary in this important step.

International institutions and states have to take legal action to address past crimes and prevent future crimes. It is also crucial that the Iraqi government establishes a commission that would consider early signs of discriminatory practices and persecution of (religious) minorities before it reaches the threshold of genocide or other crimes against humanity. As genocide or war crimes do not happen overnight, an adequate consideration of the early signs may help prevent future mass atrocities from occurring.

Lastly, the Iraqi government must consider introducing changes to its criminal code. These changes must ensure that the crime of genocide is included and follows international standards (and especially the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide). The criminal code should also strengthen the use of the

concept of complicit acts to mass atrocities. Special protection of minorities must be adequately implemented in the whole of Iraq, and any failings must be addressed as a matter of urgency. The implementation of security must be subject to a regular review.

THE US RESPONSE

The United States should play a significant role in assisting Iraq during the progress toward a united and ever more resilient society. When President Trump took office in January, he made a promise to help persecuted Christians worldwide, and especially Christians subjected to Daesh genocide in Syria and Iraq. In an attempt to fulfil this role, Executive Order 13769, the so-called “Trump Ban”, made a clear commitment to prioritize religious minorities persecuted by Daesh. However, he replaced the first executive order with a second one with more apparently “politically correct” language. The prioritization of religious minorities was removed.

Subsequent months have not seen any significant attempt to assist persecuted religious minorities. However, civil society groups continue to put pressure on President Trump, calling on him to establish safe zones in Iraq. While there is no progress to date, the President continues to discuss the possibility of setting up safe zones in Syria for all civilians fleeing from conflict and associated persecution.

On June 6, 2017, the US House of Representatives passed the House Resolution 390 (HR 390), also known as the Iraq and Syria Relief and Accountability Act, put forward by Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.) and Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Calif.). Under the act, the US Administration is

to fund organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the communities affected by Daesh; address the vulnerabilities of the survivors; assist in identifying the early warning signs of mass atrocities; support organizations that help obtain and preserve evidence of Daesh atrocities or that engage in the prosecution of Daesh atrocities; and cooperate with other countries in preparing a database of the perpetrators or suspects. The act is an active and well-awaited development, and if implemented accordingly, it may well change the fate of minorities persecuted by Daesh.

CONCLUSION

The response to the Daesh atrocities is complex and goes beyond military measures alone. The steps ranging from reconstruction to security measures, from interfaith dialogue and community reconciliation to legal action are closely linked and interrelated. Failure to address any of the steps along the pipeline may mean the collapse of the whole project.

Previous responses to genocide or other mass atrocities indicate the direction that may be taken to address Daesh’s genocidal campaign. However, prior mechanisms have not been flawless. But lessons can be learned and concerns addressed, making possible a genuine opportunity to provide feasible policies which would enable religious minorities to return to their homelands and to maintain their religious traditions in the countries where they were born. But the international community of responsible nations must work together. Daesh is a global problem. Iraq and other directly affected countries cannot be left to deal with them and the resulting consequences alone.

Unity of purpose is required to preserve the religious communities now standing on the verge of annihilation. [P](#)

Ewelina U. Ochab is a human rights advocate and author of the book *Never Again: Legal Responses to a Broken Promise in the Middle East*. She works on the persecution of minorities around the world, with main projects including Daesh genocide in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram atrocities in West Africa, and the situation of religious minorities in South Asia. She has written over 30 UN topical reports (including Universal Periodic Review reports) and has made oral and written submissions at the Human Rights Council sessions and the UN Forum on Minority Issues. Ochab is currently working on her Ph.D. in international law, human rights, and medical ethics. Follow her work on Twitter: @EwelinaUA.

Baroness Caroline Cox sits as an Independent member of the House of Lords and is a frequent contributor to Lords debates on the humanitarian situation and human rights violations in Sudan, India, Nigeria, Uganda, Burma, and more. She is an advocate for Muslim women suffering gender discrimination from the application of Sharia Law in the UK, and is the founder and CEO of the Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust. Baroness Cox’s humanitarian aid work has taken her on many missions to conflict zones, allowing her to obtain first-hand evidence of human rights violations and humanitarian needs. Baroness Cox has been awarded the Commander Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland; the prestigious Wilberforce Award; the International Mother Teresa Award from the All India Christian Council; the Mkhitar Gosh Medal conferred by the President of the Republic of Armenia; and the anniversary medal presented by Lech Walesa, the former President of Poland.



Job's Tormentors, by William Blake, circa 1785 – 90. Source: Wikimedia Commons

WHEN DETERRENCE SIMPLY WILL NOT WORK: THE CASE OF JOB

JOHN MARK MATTOX*

One of the many defects with the social sciences is the increasing infatuation with everything *new*: new events, new issues, new sources, new data, new analyses, new publications—new *everything!* Indeed, the ticket to the top of the social science ladder of success is to come up with something so new that other social scientists pause and gaze in awe and wonder.

To be fair, everybody—not just social scientists—loves new stuff. Unfortunately, the social sciences' particular infatuation with new stuff results, all too often, in the woeful neglect of

old stuff and of the lessons of the past.

Social science narratives of the second half of the 20th century conditioned most national

security practitioners to think of deterrence in terms of nuclear weapons—and for good reason. When nuclear weapons appeared in the mid-20th century, they were *the* “new things”,

* Views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect those of National Defense University or of any other U.S. Government entity.

par excellence. They could produce destruction on a previously unimaginable (i.e., “new”) scale.

Not surprisingly, the problem of how to deal with nuclear weapons was likewise treated as something new. The phrase which captured the essence of this “new” problem was, perhaps more than any other, “nuclear deterrence”. Indeed, for many national security practitioners writing at the dawn of the nuclear age, “deterrence” equaled “nuclear deterrence”, and finding literature that dealt in depth with deterrence in any other sense was hard to come by.

Nevertheless, deterrence itself is, in reality, a very old concept. In fact, deterrence has been part of the human experience ever since a human being first uttered a threat or gave an ultimatum: “Don’t do such and such—or else!” The idea was, and has always been, that one’s uttered threat would induce sufficient angst that the other would either modify behavior or not act at all.

But angst about what? Answering that question is the key problem of deterrence: If one can discover the thing that is *essentially valuable* to the “other” and then credibly threaten the “other” with the loss of that essentially valuable thing, then one can deter the “other”. If not, the “other” cannot be deterred. In that case, four alternatives present themselves (listed from nicest to nastiest):

1. Make the “other” an ally.
2. Stop trying to deter the “other” and simply accept that the “other” is doing something objectionable.
3. Attempt to restrain or contain the “other”

by some combination of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, or law enforcement means.

4. Destroy the “other”.

To illustrate both what deterrence means at the most fundamental level and for just how long intellectually engaged people have been thinking about how deterrence functions, we turn to what many moderns might consider an unlikely source: the biblical Book of Job. Job comes to modern readers as one of the *Ketuvim* (כתובים), the so-called “Writings” or “Hagiographa”—the third and final section of the *Tanakh* (תנ"ך, what many non-Jewish readers refer to as the Old Testament). It is the account of a “perfect and upright” man from whom God allows Satan to take away everything of apparent value to him—his substantial wealth and livelihood, his health, his children, and the love and encouragement of those around him—in short, every external thing that one could possibly value. The only thing Satan is not allowed to take from Job is his life. Satan is certain that while Job’s righteousness is rare among men, even *he* can be deterred from continued faith in God. Satan is wrong.

The following excerpts from the Book of Job¹ provide thoughtful national security policy practitioners with occasion to reflect upon the question, “Just how many ‘Jobs’ are there—whether individuals or states—in the world today?” Whatever the precise answer, Satan seems to have been right about one thing: There *aren’t* very many. Almost every individual person or collectivity of persons has something the loss of which is so unacceptable that the individual

or collectivity will modify behavior rather than risk its loss. To discover that thing is to discover that upon which all meaningful deterrence efforts must focus.

The beginning of the story comes to us like this:

There was a man in the land of Uz, whose name was Job; and that man was perfect and upright, and one that feared God, and eschewed evil... And the LORD said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? Then Satan answered the LORD, and said, Doth Job fear God for nought? Hast not thou made an hedge about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath on every side? thou hast blessed the work of his hands, and his substance is increased in the land. But put forth thine hand now, and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the LORD said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put not forth thine hand. So Satan went forth from the presence of the LORD. And there was a day when... there came a messenger unto Job, and said, The oxen were plowing, and the asses feeding beside them: And the Sabeans fell upon them, and took them away; yea, they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. While he was yet speaking,



Job Rebuked by His Friends (from the Butts Set), by William Blake, 1805. The Morgan Library & Museum, New York. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

there came also another, and said, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, and hath burned up the sheep, and the servants, and consumed them; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said, The Chaldeans made out three bands, and fell upon the camels, and have carried them away, yea, and slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said, Thy sons and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brother's

house: And, behold, there came a great wind from the wilderness, and... the house...fell upon the young men, and they are dead; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Then Job arose, and rent his mantle, and shaved his head, and fell down upon the ground, and worshipped, And said, Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither: the LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away; blessed be the name of the LORD. In all this Job sinned not, nor charged God foolishly.

Not one to give up, Satan co-opts Job's wife to alter her husband's cost-benefit analysis. She

mocks him, "Dost thou still retain thine integrity? Curse God, and die." But Job will not be moved, "What?", he asks, "Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?" He cannot be persuaded to curse the Lord.

Next, up step three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, who seek to comfort Job by trying to persuade him that his afflictions are the result of evil he has done and must acknowledge because, by their account, God would never afflict a righteous man with the terrible suffering and loss that has come to Job. He simply *must* have sinned. That is the only possible explanation for his wretched condition. (How "comforting" these friendly observations actually

are to Job is left for the reader to ponder.)

Job, however, simply will not assent to the proposition that his misery is the natural—perhaps inevitable—result of wrongdoing on his part. He knows in his heart that he has been a righteous and upright man. Indeed, Job, who has lost practically everything except his life, continues to be unwilling to surrender the one thing over which he still has control: his integrity. In this respect, there are two things Job simply will not compromise: his insistence that he has done nothing wrong and his insistence that he must not foolishly blame God for his suffering. His unflinching faith is characterized by such exclamations as,

“Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him.”

Job “demands” (i.e., earnestly seeks) from God an explanation for why the afflictions have occurred without any wrongdoing being committed. When God responds with a challenge to Job’s prerogative to demand such a thing, Job “repents” (which implies not only sorrow or regret but also an actual turn in direction or a change of one’s mind) and acknowledges his subservience before his Creator. No matter what Satan throws at him, no matter how the enemy tries to alter his behavior, Job will not denounce God nor cease to follow him. In the end, God rewards Job for his integrity, chastises Job’s friends for their

insistence that his suffering could only have been the result of his wrongdoing, and blesses him with greater abundance than anything he had prior to Satan’s intervention.

However, it is not this happy ending that has principal claim on the attention of national security practitioners. Rather, it is Job’s response to not only the threat of loss but, indeed, to the *actual* loss of practically everything he has. This is so for several reasons.

First, it illustrates the principle that in order for deterrence to work, the one seeking to deter another must discover and put at risk the thing that the other essentially values. If one can hold at risk that thing which the other essentially values, the other can be deterred. If not, the other cannot be deterred.

It also strongly suggests that it’s the *risk* to value that deters. The fear of losing things valued is often harder to endure than actually losing them. (Moreover, deterrence presumably only works so long as one’s adversary retains hope that he can preserve what he values.)

It also demonstrates that it is likely easier to deter an adversary *from* a particular action rather than to coerce an adversary *to* a particular behavior.

Second, it invites students of national security studies to ponder the following questions about Job: What is Job willing and not willing to give up? Alternatively put, what does Job truly value? What are the limits of the other to influence Job’s decisions and conduct?

Finally, it provides a *point de départ* to extrapolate from Job’s experiences and reflect



Job Confessing His Presumption to God Who Answers from the Whirlwind, by William Blake, circa 1803–05. Scottish National Gallery. Source: William Blake Archive, via Wikimedia Commons.



Job's Evil Dreams (from the Butts Set), by William Blake, 1805. The Morgan Library & Museum, New York. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

upon contemporary problems of national security, such as the following:

- If X (i.e., state or otherwise) believes it is effectively “detering” Y but does not know what Y *essentially values*, is X actually deterring Y at all?
- If X correctly identifies that which Y *essentially values*, does the deterrence method X has chosen effectively threaten Y with the loss of that essentially valued thing?
- If X correctly identifies that which Y *essentially values* but is unable to effectively threaten Y with the loss of that thing, what other security options does X have?

As Job illustrates, there are those who simply cannot be deterred from particular behaviors

or compelled to “change one’s mind”. Even the story’s hopeful ending provides no reason whatsoever for Job to have supposed, at the relevant decision points, that anything short of death would have brought an end to his abject misery. The wise Job is unable to know the future—a trait shared with contemporary objects of deterrence. In short, the story of Job illustrates a case in which deterrence simply does not work.

The Book of Job’s salient point for national security practitioners is not that deterrence never works but rather that it does not always work. Hence, one of the security strategist’s foundational tasks is to distinguish those cases in which deterrence might work from those in which it will not. Moreover, it points to the need for resources that move beyond attempts to deter. When an adversary

cannot be persuaded to “change his mind”, one better have identified the viable alternatives to deterrence.

The Book of Job also points to an interesting but separate question of contemporary national security interest: Can persons with deep, especially religiously grounded, normative commitments be dissuaded away from that which they consider righteous? Can those motivated by extreme religious zeal—like radical suicide bombers—be deterred? Job suggests that, at least on some occasions, when ultimate things are concerned, God alone can deter those who rightly or wrongly claim to act in His name.

However, while the extremist functionary might not be open to deterrence, there’s reason to suspect their bosses can be. How do we know this? Because

their bosses do not strap on suicide vests. They hide in caves while they persuade some “other” to blow up himself or herself. A viable non-state actor deterrent strategy need not focus on the zealot wearing a suicide vest any more than a viable nuclear deterrent strategy need focus on the lieutenant sitting watch in an ICBM silo.

Indeed, deterrence strategy always must focus on where it *will* work—not on where it will not work. As the story of Job makes plain, the place to focus a deterrent strategy is always—*always*—on that thing that the key decision maker *essentially values*. Many things can be assumed to be valuable to an individual—like Job or lone, non-state actors. Likewise, many things can be assumed to be valuable to a collectivity—like Job’s friends; a non-state entity, such as Islamic State or al-Qaida; a recognized

nation-state, such as the United States or Iran; or even a multinational entity like NATO, the U.N., Microsoft, or Wal-Mart. However, not everything that an outsider may assume to be valuable is essentially valuable to the entity at issue. If one can discover what is essentially valuable to the “other” and then credibly threaten the loss of that essential value, then one can deter the “other”. Unless, this is the case, the “other” cannot be deterred.

The theory of deterrence is frequently criticized for relying upon an ultimately unprovable negative, as, indeed, it does. However, historical experience with the theory suggests that reasonable assessments as to when and under what circumstances deterrence might be expected to work are possible. And the hard, intellectual work required to distinguish between when deterrence might work

and when it positively will not work is worth the strategist’s effort. For in the absence of deterrence, the strategist is unavoidably left with four, and only four, difficult and unhappy alternatives. P

John Mark Mattox is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel, has taught at the United States Military Academy, the University of Maryland, and Missouri State University, and is the author of *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War*. He currently directs the Department of Defense Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellowship Program.

(Endnotes)

1 From the “Authorized” (King James) Version (1611), with spelling, capitalization, and punctuation preserved.



Satan Smiting Job with Sore Boils, by William Blake, circa 1826. Tate Britain, London. Source: Google Art Project, via Wikimedia Commons.

DEFENDING WESTERN CIVILIZATION

MARK TOOLEY

Donald Trump's July 6 Warsaw speech defending Western Civilization excited predictable accolades and condemnations. Critics claimed he was extolling a tribal blood and soil defense of the West. Fans acclaimed his mostly conventional affirmation of Western principles. Admirably, he declared that "above all, we value the dignity of every human life, protect the rights of every person, and share the hope of every soul to live in freedom. That is who we are. Those are the priceless ties that bind us together as nations, as allies, and as a civilization." He commended a "democratic Europe," although he unfortunately did not otherwise mention democracy specifically.

Defending Western Civilization, once commonly called Christian Civilization, is not a theme common to religious discourse on any part of the political spectrum. For the Religious Left, the presumed existence of such a civilization is morally absurd. They would largely agree with Mahatma Gandhi, who when supposedly asked his thoughts about Western Civilization, responded, "It would be a good idea," implying the existing West did not live up to its ideals. Ironically, the British-educated and South-African-raised Gandhi was himself a product of it, and his nationalist liberation movement grafted Western concepts onto a mostly Hindu culture.

Gandhi also said, "Western civilization is material, frankly material. It measures progress by the progress of matter—railways, conquest of disease, conquest of the air. These are the triumphs of civilization according to Western measure." This critique portrays the West as secular, anti-spiritual, unconcerned with the affairs of the soul and transcendence. He proposed that Eastern Civilization, supposedly less concerned with material progress, better harmonizes the material world with the life of the soul. There are many Western Christians who have accepted that critique.

Trump's speech mentioned Poland's traditional deep faith in God and that faith's central role in overcoming communism. This brief mention is more than what is present in most other contemporary references to Western Civilization, which is widely perceived to be secular or post-Christian. Secular elites throughout the West often act clueless as to the West's religious, largely Christian origins. And Christians too quickly accept the premises of Western Christianity's supposed sunset.

In fact, a civilization once shaped and transformed by the Gospel does not easily revert, absent violent revolution or external invasion, no matter the low rates of church participation or popular faith in theological particulars. Christian



concepts about human life and human equality have prevailed throughout the West to such an extent that prosperity, comfort, and human dignity are now presumed to be not just goals but rights guaranteed by society and specifically the state.

Yet Christian elites are curiously detached from the project of Western Civilization. The Religious Left in America unctuously demands social justice based on ultimately Christian premises, imposed by judicial or legislative fiat, in ways that could be sarcastically labeled as theocratic. The Religious Right is commonly accused of theocratic aspirations because of its resistance



President Donald J. Trump and President of Poland Andrzej Duda in the Royal Castle in Warsaw on July 6, 2017, the same day Trump delivered his speech about Western values. They stand in front of Rejtan, or The Fall of Poland, by Jan Matejko, 1866. The painting portrays Tadeusz Rejtan—a deputy of Poland's Sejm, or Parliament—as he protests against the First Partition of Poland, which Russia, Prussia, and Austria imposed on Poland in 1773. Many members of the Sejm had been bribed or forced to accept the Partition, so Rejtan blocked the doorway to stall them from accepting the demands. Official White House Photo, by Shealah Craighead.

to sexual egalitarianism, but its exertions are primarily defensive. Although the Religious Left is the more outspoken critic of Western Civilization as oppressive and genocidal, it still unconsciously demands that America conforms to a Christian-originated political theology.

American religious conservatives, in contrast, now typically see themselves in exile and under virtual house arrest within a hostile culture. At most they hope for legal defenses against judicial and regulatory assaults

on the autonomy of religious institutions. Claiming a vested interest in perpetuating, much less aspiring to lead, Western Civilization is rare. They have too quickly accepted the premise that that West, including America, is post-Christian and likely spiraling into ever-greater rebellion against the created order. The Benedict Option, conceived by Rod Dreher and inspired by Alistair McIntyre, proposes that Christians should focus on rebuilding the church and its accompanying spiritual institutions as the West enters into greater spiritual darkness.

Forty years ago Francis Schaeffer, from his L'Abri Alpine headquarters in Switzerland, inspired the creation of modern conservative Christian political activism in America by extolling the West's Christian origins and urging a return to those guiding principles. Political defeats on social issues have persuaded leading conservative Christian voices that this project to reclaim Western Civilization is over, now replaced by self-preservation.

Christian leaders in America's past, although living in more

troubled times, were once much more confident in Western Civilization, which they recognized was embedded within the church's own providential story. As they imagined it, the West was the earthly political projection of the church, and the civilization provided a protective umbrella under which the world would be evangelized and Christianized, spiritually and politically. They were not entirely wrong. One third of the planet is now affiliated with Christianity, including well over 2.5 billion people, thanks to Western missions and, it must be admitted, Western colonialism of the past. Today, Global South Christians outnumber Western Christians, a ratio that will continue to increase. Politically, Christian-nurtured Western economic and political concepts have been universalized, however haphazardly. The Western notion of material progress that Gandhi erroneously disparaged as soulless and secular is now the guiding force of global culture, including in his own India, plus China and other ancient civilizations where Christian communities remain relatively small if growing.

Amid this mostly unanticipated global success, Western Christian leaders are sanguine and mostly unappreciative of their own civilization. They barely speak anymore of Western Civilization, much less Christian Civilization. The project of civilization as a spiritual endeavor that should engage the church is largely denied or at least ignored. Similar indifference to civilization-building through the Gospel's power, with counsel and leadership from the church, is not common amongst the leaders of exponentially growing Global South churches. Christians in sub-Saharan Africa especially

take quite seriously the church's role in renewing and leading society, reshaping it to align with Gospel aspirations. It's not uncommon, if arguably unwise, for African nations with their burgeoning Christian majorities to legislatively inscribe Christianity by name into their constitutions and jurisprudence. They believe that societies must at their core be centered around a spiritual message. Western Christians have since lost that faith.

America's Religious Left heralds multiculturalism and diversity as civilizational markers. America's Religious Right largely cedes this point and speaks of Christian Civilization only in the past tense, and sometimes not even positively. Some conservative Christians, and many on the Left and in the middle, murmur against the Constantinianism that birthed the West by supposedly corrupting and exploiting the church for the imperial project. For them, spiritual recovery means rejecting and escaping the vestiges of Constantine's dark bargain.

Indifference and willful misunderstandings about Western Civilization by Western Christians are self-defeating and unfaithful to the church's social vocation. The church, by birthing and sustaining the West, has created a providential gift for social justice, prosperity, human dignity, and equality. The West's many failures to conform consistently to its own highest ideals do not negate those ideals.

The fruit of Christian civilization-building and its ideals are underappreciated. Christians in the West, particularly in America, need to regain their gratitude, their hope, and their confidence as builders and

leaders of civilization. The West of course is no longer confined to Europe and the Americas. Its principles to various degrees surge around the world. Even the worst autocrats and kleptocrats, even as they sometimes persecute the church, still conform unconsciously in countless ways to Christian Civilization's influence. They eat the fruit even as they deny the tree.

The West was never and will never be thoroughly Christian. Led and populated by sinners, it has always been corrupt and unfaithful. The church even at the apogee of Christendom was never wholly virtuous or wholly wicked, never had complete societal control, and never at its best harmonized the Gospel with every aspect of human society. Yet the West, as byproduct and partner with Christendom, is a real and living organism that was and is providential in purpose, and whose destiny should still be a source of inspiration and delight.

Trump's Warsaw celebration of Western Civilization may or may not reignite conscious Christian interest in the West as an ongoing project for the church. But even if Christians will not acknowledge the West as their own, the West is inextricably woven into the church's eternal story, with glorious chapters yet unwritten. Christian leaders, ecclesial and intellectual, should step forward into their responsibility for leadership and stewardship of the West. Contrary to despairing conventional wisdom, it's not too late. P

Mark Tooley is president of the Institute on Religion & Democracy, and the editor of *Providence*.



The Battle of the Tenaru

A helmet for my pillow,
A poncho for my bed,
My rifle rests across my chest—
The stars swing overhead.

The whisper of the kunai,
The murmur of the sea,
The sighing palm and night so calm
Betray no enemy.

Hear!, river bank so silent
You men who sleep around
That foreign scream across the stream—
Up! Fire at the sound!...

Into your holes and gunpits!
Kill them with rifles and knives!
Feed them with lead until they are dead—
And widowed are their wives....

Closing, they charge all howling
Their breasts all targets large.
The gun must shake, the bullets make
A slaughter of their charge....

God, how the night reels stricken!

She shrieks with orange spark.
The mortar's lash and cannon's crash
Have crucified the dark...


"Cease fire!—the words go ringing,
Over the heaps of all the slain.
The battle's won, the Rising Sun
Lies riddled on the plain.

St. Michael, angle of battle,
We praise you to God on high.
The foe you gave was strong and brave
And unafraid to die.

Speak to the Lord for our comrades,
Killed when the battle seemed lost.
They went to meet a bright defeat—
The hero's holocaust.

Robert Leckie

Robert Leckie was a machine gunner of the 1st Marine Division. He landed on Guadalcanal 75 years ago on August 7th, 1942. The Battle of the Tenaru occurred just after midnight on August 21st. It was the first major offensive of the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Sometime after daybreak the battle ended. All but 128 of the 917 attacking Japanese were killed. There were approximately 45 American casualties. The battle for Guadalcanal would rage until February. The allied victory was a turning point in the Pacific War.



Saint Augustine, by Antonello de Messina, circa 1472. Galleria Regionale della Sicilia, Italy. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

READING AUGUSTINE

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON

Augustine's influence runs deep and broad through Western Christian doctrine and ethics. This paper focuses on two particular examples of this influence: his thinking on political order and on just war. Augustine's conception of political order and the Christian's proper relation to it, developed most fully in his last and arguably most comprehensive theological work, *The City of God*, is central in both Catholic and mainline Protestant thinking on the political community and the proper exercise of government. Especially important in recent debate, the origins of the Christian idea of just war trace to Augustine. Exactly how Augustine has been read and understood on these topics, as well as others, has varied considerably depending on context, so the question in each and every context is how to read and understand Augustine.

Paul Ramsey was right to insist, in the process of developing his own understanding of just war, that in Christian thinking the idea of just war does not stand alone but is part of a comprehensive conception of good politics. This also describes Augustine's thinking. Those writers on just war who separate it from the larger context of good politics—and in recent debate there have been a good many of these—omit something essential to both: for the just war idea, its direct connection to political order, justice, and peace, the three goods classically defining the nature and purpose of politics; and for the sphere of government and statecraft, the necessity of a just but limited role for the use of coercive force. To treat each of these topics properly requires treating

them as connected. When they are separated, one or another kind of distortion is the result.

It is, of course, possible to approach either or both of these topics without taking account of Augustine's thinking or its influence, or indeed any form of Christian perspective at all. My focus on Augustine here reflects my judgment as to the impossibility of doing full justice to either without attending to his influence, so deeply imbedded is he on these topics in Western experience and ways of thinking. But to take account of his influence also requires recognizing and coming to terms with the different ways Augustine's thinking has been used in different contexts. How to make useful sense of these differences? This is the

fundamental problem for any reading of Augustine on these subjects.

My discussion begins by examining the use of Augustine by two prominent recent thinkers on just war, Paul Ramsey and Jean Bethke Elshtain, in the process of beginning to look more closely at Augustine's thinking in his own context. Then I turn to a very different way of reading Augustine and examine the way his thought was carried (and in the process, transformed) during the Middle Ages up to the coalescence of a systematic understanding of just war in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, again setting this over against Augustine's thought in its own context. Each of these historical contexts yields a different picture of Augustine's

thinking, and so I conclude this discussion by suggesting how to use these varied perspectives to shape a reading of Augustine and his influence for the present context.

PAUL RAMSEY'S READING OF AUGUSTINE

Among recent thinkers on just war, Ramsey has a seminal role. Not only did his two books from the 1960s *War and the Christian Conscience* and *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility*¹ take the first major step in recovering and redefining the just war idea for the context of contemporary warfare, but his use of Augustine, especially in the first of these books, set a pattern for later thinkers to build on. In chapter two of this book, titled "The Just War According to St. Augustine," Ramsey undertakes a theological exegesis of Augustine on Christian love (which Ramsey here calls "charity," following the King James Version and reflecting Augustine's term *caritas*). From this he develops his own distinctive conception of just war built on the Christian's obligation to love the neighbor, employing Augustine's discussion of love in *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* XV, a passing reference to *City of God* V, and then, in numerous citations and at more length, *City of God* XIX.²

Ramsey is not deterred by the fact that the first of these works says nothing at all about just war or the use of force as an instrument of neighbor-love. His argument is rather that the conception of love defined there serves as the theological basis for Augustine's entire ethic. After establishing the foundations of Augustine's theology in this way, Ramsey then devotes


the rest of his chapter to an extended discussion focused on *City of God* XIX, developing Augustine's concept of just war as an element in his understanding of political ethics and particularly his conception of justice. This choice is interesting because Augustine says relatively little directly about war here, and he does not make the connection to divine charity that Ramsey regards as central. So one must follow Ramsey's reasoning, not simply Augustine's words, to find this connection.

How Ramsey understands and draws out the connection to Augustine's theology of charity is especially well illustrated by his use of *City of God* XIX, chapter vii. Here Augustine directly discusses war, but his purpose is to show how war contributes to the misery of human life in sin. In this passage, which Ramsey quotes at length, Augustine writes, "For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars." Here the problem is sin, and Augustine links the justification of opposing it to prudence, not charity. Yet Ramsey argues that charity is present nonetheless in that wisdom. His thinking here reflects the description of Augustine's overall methodology given by Ramsey's doctoral mentor H. Richard Niebuhr in his book *Christ and Culture*,³ where Augustine's theology is characterized as an example of "Christ the transformer of culture." Ramsey puts his own version of the idea this way: "[S]ince the nature of that city in which men together attain their final end is divine charity, as a consequence even earthly cities began to be elevated and their justice was infused and transformed by new perspectives, limits, and principles."⁴ That is, charity draws human justice

towards it; its effect is present even when unacknowledged. This understanding permeates Ramsey's discussion throughout his chapter on Augustine on just war, and he carries it forward into his own conception of just war as centered on the Christian responsibility of love for the neighbor threatened or harmed by injustice. Ramsey's reading of Augustine is that of a theologian seeking to draw out the meaning of Augustine's theology for the idea of just war.

Yet Ramsey the theologian was also working out of his own theological context, which was one in which the centrality of love for Christian ethics was defined in terms shaped by late nineteenth-century Protestant liberalism, the Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century with its drive to transform society toward the Kingdom of God on Earth, and the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, with his emphasis on love transforming justice. In this context Augustine's own focus on love was especially attractive.

But Ramsey's reading of *City of God* XIX as an expression of a theology of love as one in which divine charity is drawing human justice towards it reflects Ramsey's own theological context rather than Augustine's position. As R.A. Markus has observed,⁵ Augustine did in fact hold a view something like this for a time during the middle period of his life, when the imperial establishment of Christianity as Rome's official religion promised reforms that would gradually change the nature of society towards the good. This changed in the last period of his life, when his duties as a bishop, his struggle against the Donatists, a shift in the imperial religious climate back toward paganism, and finally the



A page from the *City of God* by Augustine of Hippo, originally published in 426 AD. This copy dates from 1475. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

combined military-political-religious threat posed by the Arian Vandals all fed a darkening of his attitude toward the possibilities of history. Peter Brown calls this change in Augustine “the lost future.”⁶ By the time he wrote the last books of *City of God*, including Book XIX, Augustine was thinking in terms of this darker conception of human history, not his earlier optimism. Markus describes the change in these words: “In the *City of God*, and especially in its last books, Augustine turned his back on the mirage of the ‘Christian Empire’ of the Theodosian dynasty, and on the assumptions about God’s hand in human affairs which had sustained it.”⁷ His conception of the justification for Christian participation in a just war accordingly shifted to a more modest one: to help maintain the order

of the world, however fatally marred by sin, until God’s purposes for it had finally been realized. Again to cite Markus: “[W]ar now became for him one of the tragic necessities to which Christians must at times resort in order to check the savagery which is liable to break out between, as well as within, political societies.”⁸ This is a somewhat different understanding of the nature of the Christian moral justification for participating in just war than that read out of Augustine by Ramsey.

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN’S READING OF AUGUSTINE

I turn now to a briefer look at Jean Bethke Elshtain’s reading of Augustine. Unlike Ramsey, Elshtain was not a theologian but a political scientist, though she made significant use of

Christian ideas in her work. This is especially true for her thinking about just war, most fully given voice in *Just War Against Terror*, chapters three and seven.⁹ As she shows here, her understanding of just war is fundamentally shaped by Augustine, and two comments she makes—“The origins of this tradition are usually traced from St. Augustine’s fourth-century masterwork, *The City of God*” (actually completed in 425) and “For Augustine, a resort to force may be an obligation of loving one’s neighbor, a central feature of Christian ethics”¹⁰—correspond to the two features highlighted in Ramsey’s reading of Augustine on just war.

But a fuller look at her references to just war and its use shows a close fit to the references to Augustine provided in Aquinas’

question “On War.” The parallels include her characterization of just war on just cause, right authority, and limits on means;¹¹ the citation of Romans 13 as providing the scriptural basis for Christian authorities to use force; the rejection of certain motivations for resort to war;¹² the aim of resisting evil;¹³ and Augustine’s connection of just war to the end—aim—of peace.¹⁴ She makes these references without citations to Augustine, suggesting that this understanding of just war has become so imbedded in her mind as not to need such justification, though a look at Aquinas’ corresponding citations from Augustine shows that they come from a variety of works (letter 138 to Marcellinus, *Contra Faustum*, his commentaries on the Heptateuch and on the Sermon on the Mount, and letter 189 to Boniface). Moreover, none of these references directly links just war to the idea of Christian love of neighbor. The one citation of Augustine Elshtain does provide, supporting one of her comments on the relation of just war to peace, is to *City of God* XIX.¹⁵ Aquinas cites letter 189 to Boniface on this topic. The diversity of Aquinas’ citations of Augustine on just war reflects the way the historical tradition from which he drew recalled Augustine’s teachings on just war, while Elshtain’s readiness to root Augustine’s just war thought in the *City of God* mirrors the influence of Ramsey in American Christian just war thinking.

MODERN READINGS VS. MEDIEVAL READINGS

Neither Elshtain nor Ramsey refers to the way the historical tradition between Augustine and Aquinas defined and carried what Augustine said about just

war and how it manifested the diversity in Augustine’s thought on this topic. How Augustine was read here differed in major ways from the readings offered by these recent interpreters. The development of this medieval tradition of interpretation reflected important facts about its historical context and the changing nature of Christian religion.

First, there was an enormous difference between that age and our own in literacy and in the availability of published material. Today one can affordably access online all the major works of Augustine, other Fathers of the Church, Aquinas’ *Summa*, and other resources, either in the original Latin, English, or other major languages. Most of these were already in print before the advent of the internet: Ramsey’s reading of Augustine depended on the availability of a somewhat excerpted version of *City of God* and *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* in a Random House two-volume collection published near the beginning of his academic career.¹⁶

By contrast, during Augustine’s lifetime and increasingly as the Middle Ages developed, only a narrow range of people could read and write: the educated elite, a range of clergy, and some among the monks in monasteries. This situation was aggravated as the Roman Empire in the West came apart by the emergence of regional vernaculars and the decline in general knowledge of Latin, the language in which the Christian authorities had written. Moreover, during this period books were extremely expensive, a consequence mostly of the hours required to produce each copy but also to a lesser degree the materials composing them. Peter Brown comments that in the

fourth century (that is, during most of Augustine’s life) “each copy of the Gospels cost as much as a marble sarcophagus,”¹⁷ and this relative cost carried through the following centuries. When even individual volumes were so expensive, only the wealthy and, increasingly as the Middle Ages developed, monastic houses and major bishoprics could afford to own and maintain libraries. At the same time, these were the places where knowledge of Latin could be maintained. Augustine’s writings themselves made up an extensive library, and even in his own time not all his works were generally available. After his death this became a more acute problem—not only for his writings but also for the works of other important Christian authorities.

The character of Christian religion in Europe also changed in this period. During Augustine’s lifetime the Christian ideal, strongly influenced by Platonism, was the life of seclusion and contemplation. Augustine sought to follow this pattern in his early life as a Christian and never gave it up as an ideal even after accepting the office of bishop, with its necessary involvement in worldly affairs and the lives of his priests and congregation. This ideal remained for the medieval Church, but it was increasingly channeled by a distinction between those who had received the particular vocation to the “religious” life—monks and nuns—and those who had not, the majority of people of all social ranks. The religion of the latter had to be defined in some other way than by worldly renunciation, seclusion, and contemplation.

These three needs—the great expense of books, widespread popular illiteracy, and a simplified

form of religious and moral guidance for the majority of the population who had not received the calling to monastic life but still wanted to live as Christians—were met by the emergence of a new kind of Christian literature: collections of selections from the teachings of Christian authorities gathered and laid out as *canones*, canons or ritual and ethical rules for Christian living. The resulting volumes could be relatively inexpensively reproduced and circulated among bishops and clergy to use in their guidance of the faithful.

AQUINAS' READING OF AUGUSTINE, THROUGH GRATIAN

Collections of canons began to be circulated, according to Peter Brown, coincident with the collapse of the Western Empire, which provided a vacuum of unity and leadership the Church sought to fill. There were numerous such collections, building on one another as older volumes disintegrated from use and time, and most of them have been lost. In the twelfth century, their legacy was preserved and represented in two major collections, those of Ivo of Chartres and Anselm of Lucca, which provided the basis for the first systematic compilation of canon law, Gratian's *Decretum*, completed in 1148. The discipline of canon law effectively began with this work, and so does a comprehensive, systematic conception of just war.

Among the topics specifically treated by Gratian was the topic of just war,¹⁸ which earlier had been defined only in a scattered, non-cohesive way in the collections of canons by selections from various works by various authors. The *Decretum* brought

the canons together and organized them to address particular issues with the use of armed force. After two generations of canonists, Gratian clarified what was meant in particular cases and added content where there were gaps.

Aquinas' question "On War" came at the end of this process and directly reflected and summarized it with its definition of just war by three requisites (princely or sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention, which included avoidance of evil purposes and the aim of producing peace) and his heavy reliance on references to Augustine to provide authority for the main elements of the just war idea. All of Aquinas' references to Augustine came from Gratian. These references were, as noted earlier, from works of a wide variety of sorts: polemical treatises, biblical commentaries, and certain of Augustine's letters. In addition to these, all of which Aquinas took over, Gratian's references included selected biblical passages as well as various other works of Augustine: additional commentaries and sermons, Book I (but not Book XIX) of *City of God*, additional use of the *Contra Faustum*, and *On Free Will*. All these he placed alongside selections (that is, canons) from other early authorities, notably including Isidore of Seville and Pope Gregory the Great.

None of the passages Gratian included in this first systematic compilation on just war mentioned love of neighbor, and indeed there was no effort to give them a theological context. Rather, these passages were taken simply for their own content, and their authority as rules for Christian life was assumed because of their authors. Contrary to Ramsey, Elshain, and a good

deal of recent Christian thought on the just war idea, when this idea first coalesced into a systematic form, it was not presented as deriving from love of neighbor, and it was based on citations from a broad variety of Augustine's works, not Book XIX of *City of God*.

Two major concerns were reflected in this medieval conception of just war, in the canons chosen to define it, and in how they were interpreted. These concerns were the disorder and violence endemic to the society of the time and the nature of the relation between the Church and the temporal authorities in governing society. The canonists' definition of just war addressed both these concerns by giving lexical priority to the responsibility of sovereign temporal authority in the just use of armed force, then hedging this by defining this use as requiring a just cause and direction to the end of social peace. The result was a conception of just war that, as noted earlier, mirrored the understanding of the goods or final purposes of politics as inherited from the classical world. This first systematic understanding of just war was thus placed inseparably within an overall normative conception of politics and its purposes.

The immediate implication of this way of thinking about just war was to limit the right to use armed force to the sovereign authority in each political community—a major step in a society in which every male member of the knightly class claimed the right to use the sword on his own choosing, and particularly to settle disputes. Gratian set aside this claim by using canons from Augustine and Isidore to define the sovereign in every political community as the judge of last resort in all cases of disputes,

and to place the right to use armed force in the hands of this ultimate authority alone to enforce his judgments. Any and all uses of arms by persons not in sovereign authority here became a disordering of the justice and peace of the political community, and Gratian here cited Augustine on the need for just war to respond to injustice and restore justice and peace—a topic addressed in several of the Augustinian canons he cited.

The canonists after Gratian reached outside Augustine and other Church fathers to Roman law, recently rediscovered and being examined by some of the same canonical thinkers who were working on the just war idea first shaped by Gratian. From Roman law they drew the idea of natural law, defining the sovereign's responsibility in terms of being guided by the natural law in determining justice in particular disputes and in establishing and enforcing justice in the political community as a whole. Any political authority who flouted the natural law was not properly a sovereign but rather a tyrant, subject to removal and replacement by others within the community or, under special conditions, by other sovereigns.

Underlying the canonists' thinking on all these matters was their handling of the relation between the churchly and temporal authorities regarding the government of society. Some of Augustine's writings, including his correspondence with two high Roman authorities in Africa, Marcellinus and Donatus, could be read to place the authority of the Church over that of the temporal authorities. The canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries instead distinguished sharply between these two kinds of authority,



Consecration of Saint Augustine, by Jaume Huguet, circa 1463 – 70. Museu Nacional d'Art de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain. Source : Google Art Project, via Wikimedia Commons.

giving the temporal realm autonomy in its own affairs and reserving Church authority to the spiritual realm. To do this they drew on a letter from a late fifth-century pope, Gelasius, to the Eastern Roman emperor of the time, in which Gelasius made exactly this distinction. His purpose, in context, was to assert his authority in spiritual matters while granting that the emperor had all authority in temporal matters. But the medieval canonists' theory of politics and conception of just war turned the emphasis around, using this "Gelasian principle" to

assert the autonomy of temporal sovereigns within the sphere of temporal government and reserving the authority of the Church to spiritual matters. The effect was to further strengthen their idea of sovereign authority and the responsibilities it entailed.

When one reads Gratian's *Decretum* on just war, one finds a conception of just war built mainly on passages drawn from a number of Augustine's works, with selections from other Church authorities playing supportive roles, all drawn

together in a systematic frame determined by Gratian. His immediate successors, while honoring the pride of place given to Augustine, drew from additional sources—most importantly the idea of natural law and the Gelasian principle—to interpret the implications of this canonical collection and to reinforce it. There is no indication they were seeking to replace the authority of Augustine, but rather to draw it out, place it in a larger context, and thus apply it to the context of life as they knew it.

WHAT'S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?

Theirs was a very different reading from that which has been commonplace in Christian understandings of just war since the work of Ramsey, which begins with Augustine's theology of love and defines just war as proceeding from the idea that Christian love of neighbor ought to be manifest even in the use of armed force toward another. In the work of the medieval canonists, the idea of just war is imbedded in the goods of politics as defined by the law of nature. In Ramsey and much other recent Christian just war thought, just war results from the Christian obligation to love one's neighbor. In the former, just war does not stand over and against the practice of politics but embodies and serves the goods of politics. In the latter, by contrast, it is necessary to find some mediating connection between the ethic of Christian love and the secular arena of politics: hence the idea that love has entered history and is inexorably transforming history towards God's ends for it. There is much power in the idea that Christians ought to seek to express love of neighbor in their dealings with others, but this

is not itself a guide for the use of armed force in the service of politics in an unchristian world.

Both the readings of Augustine found in these different conceptions of just war extend and transform what Augustine himself did with the idea of just war, though they do so in very different ways. Augustine himself never wrote a systematic treatise on just war (by contrast, for example, with his numerous distinct treatises on aspects of sexuality). Rather, his thoughts on just war were occasional, scattered through works of various sorts, and conditioned by context. In most of these cases, Augustine's observations about war are functionally secondary, illustrating whatever larger point he is aiming to make. So what he says about killing in war in *De Libero Arbitrio* I serves to illustrate his larger point about the presence of *libido* (lust, or self-centered love) in acts of self-defense by contrast with its absence in the action of a soldier acting on orders from a superior; his enumeration of wrongful motivations in war in *Contra Faustum* 22 is part of a larger argument against Faustus over whether the Old Testament deserves to be a guide for Christians; and the comment about the necessity to wage just wars to oppose evil-doing that appears in *City of God* XIX provides an illustration of his larger point about the violence, chaos, and injustice in the world as he knows it. In his commentaries on various books of the Old Testament, what he says about war comes from that period of his life in which he believed Roman imperial policy was doing the work of God in this world. And in other cases, notably his letter 93 to Vincentius, letters 133 and 138 to Marcellinus, and letters 185 and 189 to Boniface,

his references to the idea of just war reflect the context of the ongoing struggle with the Donatists and his effort to enlist imperial Roman military help in this. Pulling these together to produce a systematic view of just war requires a reading that imposes a common purpose and order on them, and that is what both the modern readings I have been discussing provide.

Each of these readings' strength is also the source of problems. For Christians, Ramsey's reading of Augustine on just war has the important strength of the central place it gives to the idea of love of neighbor and the connection of this moral obligation, through Augustine, to the New Testament, and particularly to the parable of the Good Samaritan. It also, as indicated above, fits squarely within a century and more of Protestant thought about the ethical nature of Christian life. But its special Christian character makes it appear sectarian and irrelevant to non-Christians, and it is difficult to extend it to the needs of secular politics.

The conception of just war read out of Augustine by the medieval canonists has the strength of placing just war squarely within the sphere of temporal political life and its responsibilities, but its intentional sundering of this conception from the sphere of the Church and its reliance on natural law rather than an ethic drawn from the Bible opens it to the criticism that it is non-Christian and paves the way for alternative ways of thinking about Christian responsibility in the face of violence and injustice. As to the centrality of natural law in this conception of just war, Protestants have long been uncomfortable with the idea of natural law, and Reinhold Niebuhr's explicit rejection of

the just war idea in *The Nature and Destiny of Man*¹⁹ came in the course of an extended criticism and rejection of the Catholic conception of natural law as he understood it.

In my own work on just war, I have focused on its development and transmission as a tradition within Western culture as a whole, with the specific Christian contribution one element alongside others in the overall tradition. On this conception there have been multiple kinds of inputs into the overall tradition, and in the modern period this has resulted in somewhat different ways of carrying the tradition in the arenas of Christian theology, academic philosophy, military theory and praxis, and international law. The problem here is taking pains to bring these different streams into mutual communication, which I have tried to do not only by identifying present-day commonalities among them but by showing how they are connected to the unitary pre-modern conception. This approach makes use of a reading of Augustine, but my reading has sought to show how Augustine in himself and as seen through his interpreters fits within the tradition of just war as a whole. It is not an approach that produces a privileged Christian conception of just war, but it seeks to understand the Christian element in the tradition as a whole and to bring contemporary, specifically Christian, conceptions of just war into conversation with the disparate other streams of just war tradition and with the moral traditions on politics and war developed in other cultures.

This work seeks commonality not only in the particular outcomes of these various streams

of moral reasoning but also in the moral bases for such reasoning. Providing a moral base was the function natural law played for the medieval canonists who produced the classic systematization of the idea of just war and, *pace* Niebuhr, something that functions like this is needed in contemporary reasoning about just war. I have argued that positive international law on war serves in somewhat this way for contemporary discourse on war and political order, but the commonality expressed there remains relatively thin, and it is an intellectual reach to assume that a particular state's agreement on a specific point of the positive law genuinely or fully expresses that state's underlying values.

For these reasons I have increasingly argued for an effort to develop a thick dialogue across cultures on fundamental moral values and their implications for politics and war. I believe any such effort must take special pains to explore the thinking of important historical figures in the moral traditions of each culture. For the West, this must include Augustine and not only the variant readings discussed above but also the influence of other ideas potentially relevant to the subjects of war and politics. That is, much remains to be done in exploring how to read Augustine. P

James Turner Johnson (PhD, Princeton), was the Distinguished Professor of Religion and Associate of the Graduate Program in Political Science at Rutgers – The State University of New Jersey, where he was on faculty for more than forty years. His research and teaching have focused principally on the historical development and application of the Western and Islamic moral tradition related to war, peace,

and the practice of statecraft. He is a contributing editor to *Providence*.

(Endnotes)

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WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE ON FOREIGN TRADE?

TIMOTHY TAYLOR

They agreed. At least on the single issue of foreign trade, Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton agreed the United States must retreat from free trade agreements. In the midst of the most polarized presidential election in living memory, both major party candidates converged on the need to reconsider American-led globalization and take a more protectionist stand in foreign markets.

Perhaps the only thing more surprising in the primaries and general election than Trump and Clinton's convergence on their opposition to trade was that the issue was a talking point at all. International trade, after all, has generally been among the least important issues in recent U.S. elections.¹ Trade was once a very contentious issue in electoral debates. In fact, one Pennsylvania legislator in 1833 quipped that the definition of man ought to be changed to "an animal that makes tariff speeches".² It would seem then that trade policy has once again become a relevant issue in American politics. The reemergence of trade, however, is noteworthy in the simultaneous dissolution of the left-right partisan split on the issue.

Throughout the developed world, the United States included, political parties tend to diverge on trade policy. Indeed, a left-right divide on trade policy



has generally existed since the end of the Second World War.³ However, the partisan division over foreign trade is seemingly at an end. Not only in the United States, but many in other advanced democracies are increasingly pulling back from foreign markets.

Representing the interests of labor, left-leaning parties approach trade liberalization with reservation and oftentimes advocate for protectionist policies. Building barriers to trade, the Democratic Party, for example, protects domestic manufacturing and accumulates support amongst trade union allies.

Right-leaning parties tend to advocate for the expansion of a free trade order. Allying with business leaders and owners of capital, Republican politicians regularly vote vigorously in favor of free trade agreements. It is from the right, however, that we see a sudden shift in trade preferences. While right-leaning

parties still represent the interests of capital owners in the domestic economy, nationalism has led toward a rejection of the old regime in favor of protection.⁴

THE POLITICIZATION OF TRADE POLICY

The attack on trade from the right is not only new, but represents a shift from the general apathy with which politicians and voters have regarded trade policy during national elections. For the greater part of the last century, foreign trade has rarely been controversial in United States presidential elections. The 2016 presidential election, however, stands in stark contrast in the attention given to international trade agreements.

Before 2016, trade rhetoric was unusual in American elections.

While candidates may have occasionally trumpeted one trade agreement or vilified a country for devaluing its currency to gain an unfair trade advantage, presidential candidates have seldom focused upon foreign trade in their national campaign strategies. Despite some agreements such as NAFTA garnering public interest, American voters are typically apathetic and ignorant with respect to foreign trade.⁵

In the past decade, political discussions of trade policy were all but unknown to American voters while foreign citizens responded with vehement polarization to trade agreements signed with the United States. Consider, for example, the passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Costa Rican voters, on the one hand, demanded that the agreement only be ratified through a

national referendum where voters narrowly approved CAFTA by a margin of 51-48. On the other hand, the U.S. Senate debated the agreement for less than four hours, and most American voters were unaware the trade agreement even existed.⁶ Foreign legislatures have even devolved to violence over trade agreements. Such was the case in South Korea when a politician released a canister of tear gas in a vain effort to disrupt the vote to ratify the Korea-United States (KORUS) trade agreement.⁷

The 2016 election marked a notable departure from recent public opinion apathy over American trade policy. The prominence of foreign trade was on display beginning with the primary campaigns. Bernie Sanders rallied voters to trade protection through calls to



Liberal Party poster displays differences between an economy based on free trade and one based on protectionism. The free trade shop is full to the brim with customers due to its low prices while the shop based upon protectionism suffers from high prices. Circa 1905 – 1910. By unknown artist, printed by Nathaniel Lloyd and Company, and published by the Liberal Publication Department in London. Source: Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science, via Flickr.



Lithograph depicting a free trade shop selling imported goods, with an unemployed British workman discussing how he cannot afford the cheaper goods if he does not have money. Circa 1905 – 1910. By unknown artist, printed by Percival Jones Ltd, and published by Imperial Tariff Committee in Birmingham. Source: Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science, via Flickr.

“dump TPP” (Trans-Pacific Partnership),⁸ and Trump vigorously criticized US trading relationships,⁹ including when he called the TPP a “horrible deal” in one GOP debate.¹⁰ Through boycotting Oreo cookies, Trump further politicized American trade deals as firms outsourced operations to foreign markets.¹¹

This protectionist politicization continued into the general election campaigns as Trump used historic trade agreements to put Clinton on the defensive. Despite Clinton’s voting record against trade agreements, Trump used her marriage with Bill Clinton to associate her with the passage of NAFTA.¹² Clinton continued to affirm her opposition to unfair trade deals across the debates.¹³ Meanwhile, Trump maintained his protectionist positions through calling NAFTA “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere”.¹⁴

Since coming to office, President Trump has confirmed his commitment to protectionism. One of his first executive orders was to withdraw the U.S. from the TPP trade agreement.¹⁵ Additionally, the president has called for the renegotiation of NAFTA and has pledged to pay for a Mexican wall using revenue from a proposed border-adjusted corporate tax scheme.¹⁶ Surprisingly, even Canada has been criticized for benefiting from a “one-sided deal against the United States” when President Trump remarked that what Canada has “done to our dairy farm workers is a disgrace”.¹⁷ Such protectionist rhetoric is even more uncanny given it is fueled by a Republican, the party that has tended to champion trade liberalization.

What can Trump and Clinton teach us about Americans’ trade attitudes? The 2016 election

suggests that voter preferences have largely converged toward protectionism. In a political landscape increasingly characterized by polarization and partisan bubbles, it is all the more marvelous that an electorate would agree on anything, let alone foreign trade policy.¹⁸ However, this change in voter trade attitudes seemingly conflicts with prevailing economic expectations.

OLD PARTIES & OLD DIVISIONS

For decades Democrats in Congress have generally blocked new trade agreements while Republicans have supported such legislation. Meanwhile, presidents from both parties have consistently supported free trade since the end of WWII. Because presidents must appeal to voters across all districts, they tend to pursue general welfare


and consumer interests over varied industry interests.¹⁹ Some industries like those in Silicon Valley are clear beneficiaries from globalization while others are vulnerable to increased foreign competition.

The recent congressional fight over the Trans-Pacific Partnership exemplifies the old partisan divisions on trade policy. Despite being promoted by President Obama, most Republicans supported the agreement. Even while holding their nose at joining hands with the president, constituent interests once again led right-leaning politicians to vote for trade expansions. Ironically, it was the Democratic Party that critically resisted the administration and vocally opposed TPP ratification.

OLD PARTIES & NEW ALLIANCES

Because *both* Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump politicized the dangers of foreign trade, voters are reacting uniquely to trade policy vis-à-vis other economic policy areas. Clinton's protectionist rhetoric is easily predicted by classic trade divisions; after all, the Democratic Party has long championed the causes of labor.²⁰ Trump's fervent demands to increase trade protection, however, is peculiar given the Republican Party, like other right-leaning parties, tends to represent the interests of capital.²¹

If citizens from the left and right vary in how they benefit from free trade, then the protectionist rhetoric adopted by Trump and Clinton seemingly indicates that some voters are rallying in spite of their self-interest. Perhaps citizens were never too mindful of their self-interest when it came to trade, but we could not



tell because trade had not been a salient electoral issue.²²

Does economic self-interest no longer determine voter trade preferences? In short, not necessarily. Donald Trump may have spurned the Republican Party's traditional stance on trade, but his tax proposals did not stray from typical Republican fare.²³ While this may seem perplexing to some, it serves as further evidence that Trump strategically pivoted on trade to electorally gain from the new determinant of trade attitudes: national populism.

Unlike the nationalism that wrought conflict throughout the 20th century, national populism is not adventurous, but

it is inward looking. Voters are increasingly divided, therefore, along a new cleavage of open vs. closed. Elections across the world have seen this new form of nationalism run rampant in right-leaning parties. Like other foreign policies such as immigration, trade is now regarded more through the lens of national populism and less on its welfare effects upon the economy.

National populism and trade protection went hand-in-hand in European elections as British and French voters flexed their collective and reactionary strength against their countries seemingly immutable integration into global markets. Brexit took the world unawares as British voters cast aside their nation's role in the European project. Without precedent, the Communist and National Front candidates, both outspoken in their condemnation of globalism, combined for 41 percent of the French vote share in the first round of the presidential election.²⁴

Even before Donald Trump's victory, some political scientists argued that out-group fear and nationalism may drive preferences for trade protection.²⁵ Donald Trump may simply have vilified trade agreements to evoke nationalism and out-group anxiety. Attitudes on trade, like those on immigration, may be more determined by perceptions of cultural consequences than by material well-being.²⁶

As elections around the world experience a rise of nationalism, we may no longer see a left-right divide on trade. Left-leaning parties that have historically opposed trade in the interest of labor may unite with rightist parties on this one issue. Even

parties with a track record of trade liberalization may abruptly shift and adopt protectionist rhetoric so as to benefit from the tide of national populism.

Donald Trump has taught us that, at least for the time being, American trade attitudes are driven less by material self-interest and more by national populism and global anxiety. With the post-election realignment of politics in Europe and the United States, parties are entrenching themselves for upcoming electoral battles. In the midst of this stark polarization, parties on the left and right may find all too much agreement in their willingness to construct new walls to global trade.

If the United States is to return to its position of promoter and guarantor of free trade, a political champion of global integration must emerge. Future electoral battles, however, may not necessarily be fought along the traditional left-right divide. Instead, a new open vs. closed electoral cleavage in national politics may develop, where integrationists compete against protectionists in casting their visions for American growth and strength. P

Timothy W. Taylor is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations at Wheaton College.

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INSURANCE AGAINST MISTAKES, MISCALCULATION, & MADMEN

ALAN DOWD

Three decades ago, there were nine countries that fielded ballistic missiles. Today, there are 31. Not coincidentally, the world has seen an increase of more than 1,200 ballistic missiles since 2010.¹

Several of these missile-wielding countries are unfriendly (Iran and North Korea) or unstable (Pakistan and Egypt) or under internal threat (Saudi Arabia) or all of the above (Syria). Some missile threats aren't even countries: Hezbollah has a massive arsenal of rockets and missiles, and an Australian man was nabbed for assisting ISIS with advanced missile technology.²

Because of the nature of their regimes—adjectives like paranoid and terrorist come to mind—North Korea and Iran are perhaps the most worrisome of the world's missile threats. To be sure, other regimes have larger, more lethal arsenals (China and Russia), but those other regimes are rational and relatively stable, which means the old rules of deterrence apply. That may not be the case with Iran and North Korea, which is why the advancement and deployment of missile defenses must become a centerpiece of American foreign policy and national security strategy.

THREATENING SKIES

In mid-2017, North Korea test-fired what appears to be

a full-fledged ICBM, leading some missile experts to conclude Pyongyang's missilery could reach Los Angeles or even Chicago. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assesses North Korea could have a "reliable, nuclear-capable ICBM"³ program in 2018.


In March 2017, North Korea test-launched four medium-range ballistic missiles on a single day. According to weapons experts, the regime's earlier September 2016 nuclear-weapons test indicated "progress towards developing a miniaturized nuclear warhead."⁴ Back in 2015, we learned that North Korea had produced enough nuclear material for 20 nuclear warheads. But by mid-2017, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Pyongyang has produced as many as 60 nuclear warheads. All of this raises the specter of nuclear blackmail, widespread nuclear proliferation, EMP attack, and of course nuclear war.⁵

Since 2006, Pyongyang has conducted five nuclear tests and multiple short-range and medium-range missile tests.⁶ It has tested an intermediate-range

missile that brings Guam and the westernmost parts of the Alaska island chain in range, along with "space launch vehicles," which are poorly disguised ICBMs.⁷ Equally worrisome, North Korea has tested submarine-launched missiles, making the missile's range irrelevant.

North Korea is intent on mating its nuclear capability with long-range missilery. "We have long assessed that the North Koreans have the capability to fit a nuclear weapon in a warhead on a missile," then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper reported in 2016.⁸ DIA reported in July 2017 that Pyongyang may have mastered the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. Pentagon officials assess North Korea's nuclear-capable KN-08 ICBM to be operational.⁹ That brings all of Alaska, Hawaii, and the western part of the continental U.S. in range.¹⁰ This is a regime, it pays to recall, that warned in 2013 it was prepared to launch "a preemptive nuclear attack" against the U.S. and South Korea.

"They're approaching their missile development in a very pragmatic way," satellite-imagery



The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD), and U.S. Navy sailors aboard USS John Paul Jones successfully conduct a flight test on February 3, 2017, resulting in the first intercept of a ballistic missile target using the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA off the west coast of Hawaii. Source: Missile Defense Agency photo by Leah Garton.

analyst Joseph Bermudez told the *Washington Post*. “They are testing, and they are testing often,” he explains. “This is the way you really learn how to develop a ballistic missile, and that’s what worries me.”¹¹ Indeed, under Kim Jong Un, North Korea has detonated more nuclear devices and test-launched more missilery in six years than it did under his father’s 14-year regime.¹²

In January 2017, Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile. In 2015 and again in 2016, the Islamic Republic tested missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Iran appears to be focusing on precision-guided missiles with a range of 1,250 miles—within striking distance of U.S. allies and bases from Southwest Asia to Southeast Europe. In addition, Iran is modifying missiles to extend its missile reach up to 1,860 miles, bringing much of Western Europe within range.¹³ Plus, Iran has demonstrated the capacity to loft a rocket into orbit, highlighting technologies that are applicable to ICBMs. In July 2017, Iran launched a rocket capable of delivering satellites into orbit, prompting the United States, Britain, France, and Germany to issue a joint report declaring that such rockets “are closely related to those of ballistic missiles, in particular to those of an intercontinental ballistic missile... This launch therefore represents a threatening and provocative step by Iran.”¹⁴

Iran’s missile reach is not limited to land-based assets. In 2004, senior Pentagon officials confirmed that Iran secretly test-fired a ballistic missile from a cargo ship: “They had taken a short-range, probably Scud missile, put it on a



The Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) of the Directorate of Defense Research and Development (DDR&D) and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully complete a series of tests of the David's Sling Weapon System on December 21, 2015. This test series was the final milestone before declaring delivery of an operational system to the Israeli Air Force in 2016. Source: Missile Defense Agency photo by Leah Garton.

transporter-erector launcher, lowered it in, taken the vessel out into the water, peeled back the top, erected it, fired it, lowered it, covered it up.”¹⁵ Again, having the ability to move the launch pad makes a missile’s range irrelevant. (Related, what if the next cargo ship to fire off a missile is owned by a stateless terrorist rather than a government? Deterrence, which critics of missile defense claim is the best answer to the missile threat, only works if the enemy a) fears retaliation and/or b) has a return address.)

The Iranian regime normalizes terrorism into a basic government function, threatens to wipe neighboring countries off the face of the earth, and is a serial violator of international nuclear agreements. The list is staggeringly long: Following Pyongyang’s road map to the nuclear club, Iran was developing its nuclear capabilities surreptitiously until 2002, when dissident groups exposed Iran’s outlaw nuclear-weapons activities in Natanz and Arak. In 2009, a secret nuclear facility

was discovered in the mountains near Qom. In 2010, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed evidence of Iranian military attempts to develop a nuclear warhead. In 2011, the IAEA concluded that Iran “carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device.” When it was suspected in 2013 that Iran conducted tests for nuclear-bomb triggers in Parchin, the issue was not just papered over, but quite literally paved over. In 2014, U.S. agencies accused Iran of illegally acquiring components to aid in the production of weapons-grade plutonium.¹⁶

Given their records and plans, the odds are high that Pyongyang and Tehran will have added to this list of missile tests, provocations, and worries by the time you read this.

A NEW COALITION

If proliferation gives us reason to worry, two other realities offer reason for hope. The first is the record of missile defense in testing and in battle.

In testing, this system of systems has scored successes on 76 of 93 hit-to-kill intercept attempts since 2001 (an 81.7-percent success rate). The Aegis sea-based system has achieved 35 successful intercepts in 42 attempts (an 83.3-percent success rate). The ground-based interceptor (which targets inbound threats near their highest point) has hit 10 of 18 intercept attempts. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD, which targets threats near the end of their flight trajectories) has scored a perfect 13 out of 13 in testing.¹⁷ The implications of these aggregate tests are that the United States’ missile interception systems are advanced and increasing in accuracy every day.

While it would be unwise to deploy a Potemkin missile defense, it would be irresponsible to delay deployment until the system can guarantee 100-percent success—a standard so high that “failure” is inevitable. As the missile threat metastasizes, we must not allow perfection to be the enemy of the possible.

Weapons systems are often deployed before they are perfected or fully tested. Consider the JSTARS planes and bunker-penetrating bombs rushed to the Gulf before Operation Desert Storm, the much-maligned stealth technology that has proved its worth repeatedly in the post-Cold War era, or the unmanned aerial vehicles that were retrofitted with weapons and transformed into unmanned *combat* aerial vehicles after 9/11.

Of course, the true value of missile defense is gauged by how it performs in battle. In 2003, in the early stages of the Iraq War, U.S. missile-defense assets intercepted nine inbound Iraqi missiles, shielding the coalition's headquarters in Kuwait from a decapitation strike.¹⁸ In 2014, during the most recent war with Hamas, Israel's Iron Dome rocket-defense system—relying on the same principles as longer-range missile defense—intercepted 735 inbound threats and registered a kill rate of nearly 90 percent.¹⁹ In 2016, Saudi Patriot missile-defense batteries knocked down missiles fired by Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen. Also last year, Aegis missile defenses detected and destroyed an inbound cruise missile fired at the USS *Mason* operating off the coast of Yemen.²⁰ In 2017, Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile system tallied its first real-world intercept, hitting an inbound threat from Syria.²¹

The second reason for hope is the growing international acceptance—and consequent expanding international network—of missile defenses. The operative word here is “international.” Twenty countries, plus the NATO alliance, are part of what might be called an international missile defense (IMD) coalition. Although the missile defenses

fielded today by the U.S. trace their roots from Army concepts during World War II, through early anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems like the Nike Zeus and Sentinel, to President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the internationalization of missile defense arguably didn't take off until the early 2000s.

After President George W. Bush notified Russia that the U.S. planned to withdraw from the ABM Treaty—a Cold War

will extend “coverage to all Allied territory and populations.”²² The U.S., Poland, and the Czech Republic—NATO allies all—agreed that year to the deployment of a bed of permanent ground-based interceptor missiles in Poland and supporting radar elements in Czech territory.²³ In 2010, NATO leaders declared missile defense “a core element of our collective defense” and pledged to “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack.”²⁴



A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched from the Pacific Spaceport Complex Alaska in Kodiak, Alaska, on July 30, 2017. During the test, the THAAD weapon system successfully intercepted an air-launched, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target. Source: Missile Defense Agency photo by Leah Garton.

anachronism that prevented the broad deployment of missile defenses and, in effect, codified the madness of mutually assured destruction—he began building a global shield to offer some semblance of protection against rogue or accidental missile launches. Britain agreed in 2003 to upgrades of ground-based radar stations at RAF Fylingdales. Denmark approved similar upgrades to satellite-tracking stations in Greenland.

By 2008, NATO had endorsed U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe, calling for a “NATO-wide missile defense architecture” that

Toward that end, U.S. sailors recently took their posts in Romania to man a so-called “Aegis Ashore” facility—a modified land-based variant of the ship-based Aegis anti-missile system.²⁵ Another Aegis Ashore facility will be activated in Poland in 2018. A flotilla of four Aegis missile-defense warships is now based in Rota, Spain.²⁶ Germany hosts a missile-defense operations center. Turkey hosts a powerful U.S. missile-defense radar system known as the AN/TPY-2.

With a wary eye on North Korea, Japan is deeply involved in testing, producing, and deploying of missile-defense assets. For

instance, the U.S. and Japan co-developed the SM-3 Block 2A interceptor missile. Japan also hosts two powerful AN/TPY-2 missile-defense radars, which are networked with other U.S. missile-defense assets, including ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska and California. And Japan deploys its own fleet of six Aegis warships (eight by 2020).

South Korea fields Patriot batteries and Aegis warships. In 2016, South Korea joined the U.S. and Japan for the trio's first joint missile-defense exercise off the coast of Hawaii. And after years of deliberation, Seoul allowed the U.S. to deploy a THAAD system in South Korea in 2017.²⁷

Australia's IMD contribution includes early-warning radar as well as plans to acquire two Aegis-equipped warships. The Congressional Research Service reports, "Allied countries that now operate, are building or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain and Norway."²⁸

In the Middle East, Israel hosts AN/TPY-2 radar systems and, with U.S. financial and technological assistance, fields concentric rings of missile defenses: the long-range Arrow, the medium-range David's Sling and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), and the short-range Iron Dome.

The United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council—a defense alliance enfolding Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, and Oman—agreed in 2015 to "a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability," with Washington promising technical assistance.²⁹ The UAE was the first foreign government

to purchase a THAAD battery. Qatar and Saudi Arabia announced plans in 2015 to purchase THAAD systems.³⁰ Saudi Arabia, which already deploys a number of PAC-3 batteries, is considering purchasing Aegis missile defense systems. Kuwait deploys a number of PAC-3 batteries.

This global acceptance of missile defense—enfolding dozens of nations—is nothing short of remarkable. After all, not long ago, missile defense was considered too internationally destabilizing, too politically divisive, and too financially expensive. But today, Reagan's vision of a missile shield—once derided as "Star Wars"—is shared by leaders on four continents. In short, missile defense has gone mainstream.

COSTS

The reason for this transformation: The technology is catching up to Reagan's vision, and the world's most terrifying regimes—regimes that boast about erasing their neighbors, regimes that want to upend the liberal international order, regimes that believe there is no God to hold them to account, regimes that believe they are acting on God's behalf—are catching up in the race for long-range missilery and nuclear weaponry. Thus, missile defenses are no longer a theoretical possibility or a costly luxury or a bargaining chip at the summit table. They are a moral imperative. Given today's and tomorrow's missile threats, failing to fully fund and broadly deploy a shield against the likes of Iran and North Korea—and a hedge against human error and cyber-mischief—is shortsighted and reckless.

To be sure, missile defenses should not and cannot be the

only means of trying to protect people of goodwill from the mushrooming missile threat. Diplomacy and treaty enforcement, nonproliferation regimes, military deterrence, "left of launch" strategies, hardening of vulnerabilities, counter-proliferation capabilities, and cyber-weapons and other non-kinetic tools all must be brought to bear as well.

However, since treaties are only as good as the character of the governments that sign them, since irrational regimes may very well be immune from deterrence, since counterproliferation via preemptive military action is a high-risk proposition (as the Bush 43 administration learned in Iraq), and since counterproliferation via third parties leaves much to chance and mischief (as the Obama administration learned in Syria), robust and ready missile defenses must be part of the answer to the missile threat.

Like an insurance policy for home or health, nations need to invest in missile defense in order to prepare for—and survive—the worst. In a sense, this is a way nation-states can apply the lessons of the parable about the wise and foolish builders. The given of the parable is that in this broken world, disaster tends to affect us all. But when disaster strikes, only the house constructed by the wise builder, "who dug down deep and laid the foundation on rock," survives the storm.³¹ The wise builder invests more time and more money into constructing his home than does the foolish, shortsighted builder—and that makes all the difference.

Without question, defending against missile attack costs money. Critics always latch on to the system's costs as reason



An Aegis Ashore Weapon System facility in Kauai, Hawaii, 2014. Source: Missile Defense Agency. photo by Chris Szkybalo.

to downgrade or kill missile defense. However, protecting the U.S. from accidental missile launches and missile-armed madmen is not the cause of our fiscal woes. The U.S. has invested a *total* of \$189.7 billion on missile-defense development at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) since FY1985. Spread over 33 years, missile defense has cost \$5.7 billion annually. In comparison to the Pentagon's budget, or the size of big-ticket social programs, or the overall federal budget, the amount invested in missile defense is a rounding error: Between FY1985 and FY2016, annual Social Security outlays grew from \$188.6 billion to \$910 billion, annual Medicare outlays from \$65.8 billion to \$588 billion, the federal budget from \$946.3 billion to \$3.9 trillion.³²

The return on investment is difficult to quantify, but this much we know: Missile defenses have successfully protected troops in battle (see above) and influenced our adversaries' "perception of the economic and political cost they must incur to pursue ballistic missile technologies," as Gen. James Cartwright observed during his stint leading Strategic Command. "While missile defense as a defensive

shield is important, its value as a dissuasive force or deterrent is proving far greater."³³

"We want potential adversaries to know that not only is there a price for attacking us or our friends," Adm. James Winnefeld, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explains, "but the attack may not succeed in the first place, resulting in pain, but no gain."³⁴

In other words, missile defense could change an adversary's calculus. If the odds of a missile getting through are reduced by missile defenses, even an erratic adversary may resist the temptation to take a shot at the United States and its allies. There's enormous value in something that causes the Kim Dynasty and Iran's theocracy to second-guess and/or restrain themselves.

Given the mounting threats, it's distressing that annual investments on missile defense fell under President Barack Obama—from \$9 billion when he entered office to as low as \$7.6 billion in FY2013, before rebounding a bit, to \$8.3 billion in FY2016. By way of comparison, missile-defense spending climbed from \$2.8 billion to

\$4.8 billion during the Clinton administration (a 71-percent increase), and it jumped from \$4.8 billion to as high as \$9.4 billion during the Bush 43 administration (a 95-percent increase).

The Obama-era cuts had real consequences. The Navy deploys 33 ships equipped with Aegis missile defenses but needs 77 to meet combatant commanders' requests.³⁵ The MDA has nowhere near the resources to meet that. Obama capped the number of ground-based interceptors at 30 instead of the planned 44, which left his administration scrambling when North Korea's unpredictable new leader started rattling nuclear sabers in 2013.³⁶ Those 14 interceptors would have been operational if Obama had simply followed the bipartisan plans put in place before his presidency. Instead, the interceptors won't be activated before the end of 2017.

It was President Bill Clinton who signed legislation paving the way for deployment of a missile-defense system, reflecting the emergence of a new national consensus on the issue. Thanks to that consensus, Bush 43 was able to begin deploying a layered system of missile defenses.

In this regard, Clinton and Bush 43 were following the trail blazed by two giants of the 20th century. "The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout," Winston Churchill observed. To foil the plans of rabid regimes and death-wish dictators, Churchill called for a "defensive shield." He wasn't talking specifically about missile defense, but there can be no doubt that he would have been an ardent supporter of it. After

all, he ordered the RAF to intercept incoming rockets, and he saw the devastation caused by those rockets that got through.

Likewise, Reagan advocated for a shield against missile threats. “What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?” he asked. “This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves.”

Note the sequence: Reagan would not lower America’s nuclear sword until the shield was up. He knew robust missile defenses had to be in place *before* nuclear disarmament. With his simultaneous cuts to America’s nuclear deterrent and missile defenses, Obama tried to do the very opposite.

Unlike his predecessors, Obama seemed to view missile defense not as an investment or an insurance policy, but as a bargaining chip. To mollify Moscow, Obama unilaterally scrapped the Bush administration’s missile-defense plans for Europe—plans endorsed by NATO. Instead of planting permanent ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Poland and IMD radars in the Czech Republic, Obama opted for missile-defense warships in the Mediterranean and the impermanent Aegis Ashore system. An important benefit of the GBI missile is that it has a much longer range than the missile deployed with the Aegis Ashore system.

Obama’s missile-defense reversal gained nothing from Moscow. Instead, Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime



The U.S. Missile Defense Agency successfully intercepts an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target during a test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system on May 30, 2017. Here, a ground-based interceptor is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Source: Missile Defense Agency photo by Senior Airman Ian Dudley.

Minister of Russia, declared, “The Americans have simply corrected their own mistake. And we are not duty-bound to pay someone for putting their own mistakes right.”³⁷ Worse, Obama’s approach fractured relations within NATO.³⁸ The Czech Republic rejected Obama’s scaled-back plans as “a consolation prize.” A Polish defense official called Obama’s retreat “catastrophic.”

In short, the technical successes and global advances of missile defense occurred in spite of—rather than because of—Obama’s policies.

CONSEQUENCES

President Donald Trump’s zig-zagging views on national security have drawn concern from

scores of foreign policy and national security practitioners, as well as many of us who write about these issues.³⁹ One area where he has left little room for concern is missile defense.

Noting that “our ballistic missile defense capability has been degraded at the very moment the U.S. and its allies are facing a heightened missile threat from states like Iran and North Korea,” Trump has vowed “to develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system” and “rebuild the key tools of missile defense.”⁴⁰

Trump’s commitments to end sequestration and increase the defense budget suggest he will follow through on this promise. However, a caveat is in order. Although Trump promised “historic” increases in defense spending, his budget proposal only nudges defense spending from 3.1 percent of GDP to 3.2 percent of GDP.⁴¹ To be sure, that translates into more resources for the Pentagon. But it’s hardly a historic increase. (One budget specialist says it’s only the eighth-biggest increase since 1977.)⁴² Moreover, while the administration’s proposal for the MDA budget was “more than the budget submitted by the Obama administration in FY2017...the requested amount is \$334 million less than was appropriated by Congress last year.”⁴³

If Trump ultimately invests big in missile defense, he will face resistance from Moscow and Beijing, just as Reagan faced when he unveiled SDI. While critics at home dismissed it as technologically infeasible, the Soviets opposed SDI for precisely the opposite reason: They knew it could work, and they knew that a Soviet equivalent was something their bankrupt

empire could not produce. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made this clear during the 1986 summit in Reykjavik, where he put everything on the negotiating table in exchange for just one concession: SDI. Fast-forward three decades, and Beijing is pressuring the U.S. and South Korea to reverse their THAAD decision. “We firmly oppose the deployment of THAAD,” China’s Foreign Ministry declared after the system arrived at Osan Air Base, warning that “[a]ll consequences entailed from this will be borne by the U.S. and the Republic of Korea.”⁴⁴

Moscow lists “the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems” among “the main external military dangers” facing Russia.⁴⁵ That’s a far cry from how Moscow responded when Washington notified the Russian government of U.S. intentions to build a defense against rogue missile threats. At the time, Vladimir Putin said Washington’s decision “does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”⁴⁶

Yet by 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov described the basing of missile-defense assets in Poland as “a threat to Russia’s security.”⁴⁷ After the Aegis Ashore site in Romania came online, the Kremlin said the “system poses a certain threat to the Russian Federation.”⁴⁸ In 2016, the Russian Foreign Ministry called U.S. and NATO missile-defense deployments “destructive actions.”⁴⁹ Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top general, recently warned that “[n]onuclear powers where missile-defense installations are being installed have become the objects of priority response.”⁵⁰ Thus, Russian war

games feature simulated nuclear strikes against Poland.

To cut through Moscow’s bluster, just ask yourself: Is it the cop wearing a bullet-proof vest who is provocative and aggressive—or the gunman loading his weapon? And to extend the metaphor, if Russia has no intention of unloading on Europe or North America, why is it bothered by the bullet-proof vest?

The Cold War-era argument that missile defenses—by rendering offensive missiles useless—could have the effect of allowing those protected by the missile shield to wage war with impunity doesn’t apply today. The limited IMD elements in Europe could never defend against Russia’s massive arsenal—due to both the placement of the system and the number of Russian missiles. “Russia’s large strategic offensive force could overwhelm the U.S. system’s limited number of deployed interceptors,” an MDA report explains, noting that a) “there would not be sufficient time to detect, track and intercept” the thousands of warheads Russia is capable of launching, and b) the system’s elements in Europe are designed to protect “NATO allies at risk from long-range ballistic missile attack from the Middle East.”⁵¹ Putin knows this, but old habits—and decades of distrust—die hard.

That word “protect” is important in the missile-defense debate. As people of faith, Christians should keep in mind that government exists to protect innocents and preserve order. Missile defense contributes to both of these legitimate functions of government. Because we live in a world teeming with threats and bending toward disorder, governments must take steps to shield and protect

innocents, to promote stability, to deter those who can be deterred, and to neutralize those who cannot.

As *Providence* editors and other signatories argued in the thoughtful statement⁵² on faith and foreign policy, “Christians have erred by holding the state to the same standard as the church or the individual, resulting in pacifism.” Governments are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. A government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered, exposing its people to harm. A government that puts away the sword—and the shield—would invite aggression, thus leaving innocents defenseless.

Given that missile defense, by definition, is a tool of self-defense, it should not raise the moral quandaries that other weapons systems raise for some people of faith. After all, this is not a weapon of destruction; it is not used against people; it is not even used against places people live. Rather, it is designed to protect people and where they live—their homes and places of worship and schools and businesses—from weapons designed to kill and destroy.

CHANCES

President John Kennedy warned that “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles...capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness.” As the number of missile-wielding states grows and as the nuclear club expands, the likelihood of a missile being unleashed against the American people or their allies—whether by mistake, miscalculation, or

a madman—also grows. Missile defense doesn't eliminate the danger, but it does give us a fighting chance to confront it.

The question critics of missile defense must answer is this: If—when—an American or allied city is in the path of an Iranian, North Korean, terrorist-acquired, or accidentally-launched missile, would they prefer an 80-percent chance or even a 50-50 chance of intercepting the killer rocket, or a zero-percent chance—something guaranteed by not fully funding, not testing, and not deploying a missile shield? **P**

Alan W. Dowd is a contributing editor with *Providence* and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose (<http://www.sagamore-institute.org/cap>).

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NEVER SURRENDER

Review by Marc LiVecche

DUNKIRK (WARNER BROS. PICTURES 2017) RATED PG-13

DIRECTED & WRITTEN BY CHRISTOPHER NOLAN; **PRODUCED BY** EMMA THOMAS & CHRISTOPHER NOLAN

STARRING: FIONN WHITEHEAD, TOM GLYNN-CARNEY, JACK LOWDEN, HARRY STYLES, ANEURIN BARNARD, JAMES D'ARCY, BARRY KEOGHAN, KENNETH BRANAGH, CILLIAN MURPHY, MARK RYLANCE, TOM HARDY

The historic event grounding Christopher Nolan's *Dunkirk* involved a military crisis that was, in its beginning, as dark, desperate, and seemingly hopeless as it was extraordinary, full of heroism, and even miraculous in its conclusion. Whether his film captures any of that sufficiently is an open question.

On the 10th of May, 1940, *blitzkrieg* kicked its way into the global lexicon as German paratroopers, infantry, and armor punched through the Low Countries of the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Belgium. Five days later, they broke through French defenses and swarmed into the country, outpacing and overwhelming any effective counter-offensive. Quickly reaching the northwest coast of France, the German spearhead severed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), the French First Army, and the Belgian Army from the majority of the French troops south of the German line. Beginning to sweep north, the German penetration was poised to capture the remaining French ports and to trap the seemingly surrounded British and French troops.

But they were not, of course, surrounded. Yes, on all land-sides they had the Germans, but to their backs they had the sea. And out of this sea would come a miracle of deliverance. Who



better than Winston Churchill to deliver the narrative?

The Royal Navy, with the willing help of countless merchant seamen, strained every nerve to embark the British and Allied troops; 220 light warships and 650 other vessels were engaged. They had to operate upon the difficult coast, often in adverse weather, under an almost ceaseless hail of bombs and an increasing concentration of artillery fire. Nor were the seas...themselves free from mines and torpedoes. It was in conditions such as these that our men carried on, with little or no rest, for days and nights on end, making trip after trip

across the dangerous waters, bringing with them always men whom they had rescued. The numbers they have brought back are the measure of their devotion and their courage.

In this July 4th speech to the House of Commons, Churchill admitted that a week earlier he feared that his next statement to the House would be to announce the “greatest military disaster” in his nation’s history. When the crisis at Dunkirk first began, Churchill didn’t dare hope that any more than 20,000 or 30,000 troops might successfully be re-embarked. In the end, almost 340,000 troops made it home.

As he alluded, the “difficult coast” of Dunkirk was a singularly poor place to attempt any such evacuation. Among the primary challenges was the absence of a deep-water port. Extremely shallow, the beach gently shelved a good distance from the waterline. Those ships capable of taking aboard large numbers of evacuees, including commercial ferries and naval destroyers, were necessarily deep-drafted, requiring upwards of 15 feet to float. Hence the need for those 650 “other vessels”—“small boats” as they’d affectionately come to be known—able to ferry men from shore to the larger ships at

deeper anchorage. As the film's tag line insists, home came for those who couldn't get home.

Churchill's oratorical gaze spanned the domains of battle, lifting from sea to sky. He stressed the role of the Royal Air Force, whose contributions over the course of the rescue were often unseen by those on the beach and water, leading many to "underrate its achievements." Not so, said Churchill: the miracle at Dunkirk "was gained by the air force." In every dimension, he insisted, Dunkirk was "a miracle of deliverance, achieved by valor, by perseverance, by perfect discipline, by faultless service, by resource, by skill, by unconquerable fidelity."

It is in comparison to the incandescence of history's Dunkirk that Nolan's *Dunkirk* falls short. A common complaint about the film points not to an oversight but to something surely intentional. Many viewers insist the film's characters are, every one, grossly underdeveloped. There's no backstory, nothing really to even mark them as individuals. In fact, at the risk of being outed as some kind of Anglo-racist, I confess that all the English troops simply looked alike to me; I couldn't tell them apart.

In much the same way, while the identity of the eponymous battle being depicted is clear, *Dunkirk* seems insistent that one not focus exclusively on Dunkirk. In terms of adversary, I don't think we ever hear the word "German." We certainly never see them—except in war-planes and, briefly, at the very end when they apprehend a downed RAF pilot—though even then they are gauzy forms outside the depth of field. We get, instead, only the generic locution "enemy." Yes, yes, Dunkirk is what's obviously unfolding

onscreen—but, really, especially in light of what seem to be certain continuity problems (is that *modern* Dunkirk beneath the descending Spitfire in the end?) and certain factual inaccuracies (I can find no record of small boats evacuating from Dunkirk going past the Cliffs of *Dorset*), Nolan seems to suggest all this could be about *any* threat, *any* enemy. This has led some reviewers to see the film as equally about the historic evacuation as it is about Islamist terror or even Brexit.

So I'm left to assume that Nolan wasn't specifically concerned about the particular Englishmen around whom the film is ostensibly centered. Rather, his concern was the types: the foot soldier, the pilot, the civilian sailor. Indeed, the main character, if there is one, is a British soldier named Tommy, which is both a name and a generic term for, well, a British soldier.

But why? If not *about* Dunkirk or particular men involved with the evacuation, what is *Dunkirk* about? An interpretive key can be found in what appears to be a framing device, found at the beginning and the end of the film, that offers contrasting comments on the notion of "survival."

In the opening scene, Tommy is moving through the town of Dunkirk toward the evacuation beach. He catches a propaganda leaflet dropped from an enemy plane and featuring a map of the besieged BEF position. In the bottom margin is a warning: "We surround you! Surrender [and] survive!"

Fast forward to the conclusion. Tommy is safely aboard a London-bound train and reads aloud an excerpt from Churchill's House of Commons

speech. He delivers the final lines of the peroration, "We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall *never surrender*." In classic rhetoric, the peroration is the summary conclusion of a speech typically delivered at a higher emotional pitch. Through it, one can find the meaning of the preceding text.

I need to retract, somewhat, my earlier suggestion that none of the characters are developed. There is a modest exception. Mr. Dawson (Mark Rylance), the owner of a small pleasure boat who pilots it to Dunkirk, is the film's moral core. About him we know little, save that he's already lost a son in the RAF. He saves a shipwrecked soldier from the water who pleads for the boat to head immediately back to England. Mr. Dawson will have none of it. He says simply, "There's no avoiding this, son; we have a job to do."

Seen through Churchill's peroration, Mr. Dawson's admonition suggests that the theme of *Dunkirk* is, quite simply, that modest, obstinate, British determination to carry on—a phrase that appears more than once in Churchill's speech. In fact, just before Tommy reads Churchill's words, there is an exchange between another British Tommy and an old man handing out blankets.

"All we did was survive," the Tommy complains.

"Sometimes," says the old man, "that's enough."

In between these framing moments, *Dunkirk* shows us men trying to survive. At times, it isn't pretty. We see cowardice,



deception, opportunism, panic, men abandoning other men to face their fate alone. But we also see heroism, self-sacrifice, and mutuality—men (and women) at their best. Most times, we see men who will do much—but not everything—to live. On the one hand, the Germans offer survival at the cost of subjugation. On the other, Churchill calls a nation to survival for the purpose of being able to fight another day:

I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny.

That the British did, in fact, survive, that their unwillingness to bow their knees to totalitarianism did, in fact, help lead to the final liberation of Europe, is a testament to the power of simply carrying on, one steady step at a time.

Of course, it ought not to have been this way. Churchill is the

first to point out that wars are not won by evacuations. Among the takeaways for any modern viewer is the simple fact that, in war especially, defeat sucks. The British lost 30,000 men in the days leading up to Dunkirk. They lost near-crippling resources in military armaments and other material. Total defeat was always a possibility.

The military disaster of Dunkirk reminds us that the time to prepare for war is not the moment before you learn what *blitzkrieg* is. We must have the men and equipment necessary, in times of deepest peace, to be ready to fight and win the next conflict. More than this, a portion of the just war commitment to “last resort” includes not presenting an inviting target to those adversarial nations with malevolent intent. A strong and ready military helps prevent conflict by presenting a deterrent—nations that know they will bleed if they pick a fight with us might, in the end, not pick a fight with us or with those friendly nations whose interests we might protect.

Finally, Dunkirk reminds us of the necessary spirit of co-belligerence that ought to exist in a

free nation between the professional military and the civilian population. Binding these two spheres together is an implicit contract that each will care for the other. The military has our six, we must have their backs. That may mean that journals like this exist to help provide the moral intelligence necessary to help warfighters know their duty or to navigate the morally bruising theatre of combat without becoming morally injured. It may mean providing deployed warfighters stable communities worth their coming home to—places in which they can reintegrate, tell their stories, be heard, be taken seriously, be commended, be thanked, and to which they can contribute.

At its best, *Dunkirk* captures a bit of all of these most Dunkirkian of sentiments. But too seldom. The story of Dunkirk is a story very much worth telling. But *Dunkirk* doesn't quite manage to tell it. As a film, it doesn't flourish—it merely survives. P

Marc LiVecche (PhD, University of Chicago) is managing editor of *Providence*.

GRIM HARVEST

Review by Herbert Schlossberg

WAY OF THE REAPER: MY GREATEST UNTOLD MISSIONS AND THE ART OF BEING A SNIPER.


NICHOLAS IRVING, with GARY BROZEK, St. Martin's Pres, 2016, 304 pages.

On the surface Nicholas Irving's *Way of the Reaper* seems to be a typical shoot-'em-up memoir designed for men vicariously seeking adventure. But by the end of the book, Irving has turned reflective. To his evident surprise, experience on the battlefield finally sinks into his consciousness, enabling him to break through the studied callousness of the combat soldier and to turn himself into a case study on the role of battle in causing moral injury.

An African-American soldier, Irving (called "Irv" by his comrades) served his platoon in the 75th Ranger Regiment in various capacities, with the occupational specialty of sniper. So successful was he in the course of killing 33 armed militants that he gladly claimed the title of "reaper." Much of this is told in greater detail in his similarly titled previous memoir, *The Reaper*.

Irving practiced his specialty as a direct action sniper in support of Ranger night missions, typically tasked with the capture of high-value individuals. He also assisted interdiction missions that targeted weapons caches or illicit drug ventures used to support Taliban operations. Irving usually provided surveillance for his team using elevated terrain or rooftops, seeking out threats up to about 300 meters away. His ambition was to improve his skills so that he might qualify for further training toward the long-range version of the sniper profession.

For most of his time in Afghanistan, Irving did not depart from the



macho attitudes typical of elite combat soldiers. He writes of his "excitement of taking out a few more guys that night," or in other words, killing them. It would be unrealistic to expect a young infantryman to reflect much on the ethics of sniping or even to know that "sharpshooters" as far back as the American Civil War were actually held in abhorrence even by their own comrades in adjacent infantry units. Irving does know that there were critics of the ethics of sniping, and he emphatically, glibly, rejects those sentiments. Indeed, while the sentiments he attributes to the critics are superficial, so too are his own responses to them. Both are likely to be dismissed out of hand by any reader with a modicum of interest in the moral dilemmas that both sides ought to be considering.

Yet, there is another side to this hard young man who volunteered for, and succeeded in qualifying for, the hard duty of special operations missions. For instance, he acknowledges his fear of heights and hatred of parachuting. While

there is no way of knowing how widespread these feelings are in airborne units, this reviewer has known hundreds of paratroopers, but has no recollections of ever hearing one of them express similar fears. And yet Irving drops his macho tough talk and tells the world of his weakness. The reader can only admire the honesty of his self-revelation.

Toward the end of his tour of duty in Afghanistan, Irving and his platoon embarked on a typical night mission during which he killed several Taliban fighters. With a quick snap shot, he wounded one man who suddenly sprung up again unexpectedly and seemed, simply, to sit there lost in thought after the 7.62mm bullet struck him in the leg. Irving recollects:

He was an older guy, judging by the folds and wrinkles around his eyes. I swear he was looking at me and thinking, "So, okay, are you going to shoot me or what?"... I'd done all that training... and without warning or regret, something passed through me that had never before factored into my life as a sniper or soldier. I had this creeping belief that this was a variation on suicide by cop. All along this guy had been hoping that we'd end his life. He'd given us every opportunity, had wanted to make it difficult for us so that we wouldn't feel so bad.

Early in the book Irving tells us of the sniper's motto, undoubtedly intended to help avoid such thoughts as he was now having at this moment in the end of his combat career. "When I first heard the words 'Without warning; without remorse,' I didn't realize that remorse could ambush me without warning." The crisis of conscience that now overtook him was apparently the cause of his leaving the Army at the end of his enlistment rather than following through on his earlier intention to reenlist. "I had one question

that I pushed out of my mind until after I'd decided to leave the Army and begun finding comfort and courage in the bottom of too many bottles of booze: Was I a good man or a bad man?"

Such existentially desperate questions have been addressed in the pages of *Providence* before, including in essays by the managing editor Marc LiVecche and contributing editor Chaplain Timothy Mallard, US Army. These are good places to start for those wanting to

know something more about spiritual injuries in war. Irving's dependence on alcohol was followed by a suicide attempt, each being means borne of his attempt to answer that question about his own moral character. Like too many of our combat veterans, Irv was never wounded in the conventional sense, but he became a living example in the library of moral injury. P

Herbert Schlossberg is a retired historian. He is a former infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division, United States Army.

BOOK REVIEW


REVISING OR APPLYING THE JUST WAR TRADITION?

Review by J. Daryl Charles

JUST WAR RECONSIDERED: STRATEGY, ETHICS AND THEORY.

JAMES M. DUBIK, University Press of Kentucky, 2016, 225 pages.

Surely it was not a coincidence that my exposure to James M. Dubik's *Just War Reconsidered* coincided with my reading of a memoir by one of now retired Lt. General Dubik's esteemed U.S. Army colleagues. As Dubik informs the reader, General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded special operations forces in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, took the responsibilities for that command with utmost seriousness. During the dark period of the Iraq conflict in the mid-2000s, McChrystal agonized over the loss of life—to both Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians who were being murdered and mutilated by al-Qaeda and insurgent forces.



Amidst the stress of months-long, close-quarter combat, McChrystal called together his leaders, many of whom he had known for years. His plea was

emotional but straightforward. "Listen," he told them, "this really hurts. But let me tell you what would make these [losses of life] hurt even more: if it is all in vain."¹ Dubik, who at the time was serving as the commanding general of the Multi-National Security and Transition Command in Iraq, as well as a special advisor to several commanding generals,² has this to say: "What McChrystal's comments reveal...is that how these lives are used does matter."³ *How those lives are used, how their commanders use them, really matters.* This responsibility, Dubik concludes, derives from the fact that "soldiers, at least American soldiers, remain citizens and that the

democracy for which they fight retains its obligation to provide adequate care for its citizens.”⁴

These comments express the heart of Dubik’s burden in *Just War Reconsidered*. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to describe his basic thesis as a “burden.” While “America may be tired of war,” he observes in the prologue, “war does not seem to be tired of America.”⁵ And, as Dubik is acutely aware, the evidence overwhelms—from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to Libya and Syria to the Islamic State in its manifold expressions. None of which, Dubik rightly concludes, will end *by itself*. And these developments, which extend throughout Africa and Asia, are fully aside from the belligerence of Russia’s intervention in the Baltic region, North Korea’s interminable bellicosity, the menace of China, the seemingly endless bloodletting in Africa, and the growing threats associated with “cyber-warfare.” In multiple forms, most of which are non-conventional in nature, war remains “a condition of our contemporary strategic environment for the foreseeable future.”⁶

Dubik’s argument is straightforward: current just war theorizing is insufficient insofar as it “omits a major part of the conduct of war.”⁷ A “new addition” to *jus in bello* theory is urgently needed.⁸ The reason for this, in Dubik’s view, is patent:

The conduct of war...involves more than fighting. War is also conducted at the strategic level, the level at which senior political and military leaders set war aims, identify strategies and policies, approve the military and nonmilitary campaigns necessary to achieve those war aims,

and establish the coordinative bodies necessary to translate plans into action and adapt as the vagaries of war unfold.⁹

Dubik worries that “few—if any—accounts of *jus in bello*” address the responsibilities of senior political and military leaders at the strategic level, what he refers to as “war-waging.”¹⁰ Developing a rationale for this “missing link” constitutes the burden of chapter one.¹¹ Chapter two expands the contours of this “war-waging” task, setting it apart from—though not in opposition to—“war-fighting” dimensions of *jus in bello*. Chapters three and four attempt to analyze two “alternative accounts” of how senior military and political leaders interact at the strategic level. One of these, the “principal-agent” account, is based on obedience, compliance, and control as motivation for enforcement. The second model, what Dubik calls “unequal dialogue,” has the advantage of acknowledging particular responsibilities specific to both the political and the military sectors. At the same time, it too is deficient to the extent that it does not adequately translate “dialogue” into execution of aims.

Chapters five and six provide a fuller account of “war-waging” responsibilities within the *jus in bello* context. Dubik argues that to wage war justly, various “cross-disciplinary” dialogues must occur and then be melded to a “performance-oriented” execution. Five principles embody this important strategic process as Dubik understands it: (1) the principle of “continuous dialogue” between civilians and military senior leadership; (2) the principle of “final decision authority,” by which military subordination to civil authority

in a democracy is recognized following continual military-civilian dialogue; (3) the principle of “managerial competence,” by which senior military and political leaders ensure that their respective bureaucracies support war aims and strategies; (4) the principle of maintaining “war legitimacy,” i.e., cultivating ongoing support of the war effort throughout the population by senior military and political leaders; and (5) the principle of “resignation,” which acknowledges that, because we are moral agents, political and military leaders are conscience- rather than task-bound.

Because war, in terms of practical morality, is an extraordinarily complex human activity, and because mistakes, misjudgments, and misunderstandings abound at both the strategic and tactical levels, Dubik is concerned to emphasize the importance and necessary inclusion of “war-waging” in *jus in bello* considerations. This is as it should be. Dubik believes, moreover, that the “war-waging” principles he has set forth in the volume are not only “useful” in “the training, education, and selection of political and military leaders” who are confronted with the matter of war but are “requirements” for “war-waging leadership.”¹² But they are important for the general citizenry as well insofar as they provide “a way to judge what is done on their behalf, whether in combat or in capitals.”¹³

Just War Reconsidered is an important work. It deserves the widest readership for a variety of reasons. It is written by someone who not only has invested a career serving militarily “in the trenches” but who has also wrestled with the matter of moral leadership at multiple levels. In addition

to his experience during the “Surge” of 2007-08 serving as the commanding general of the Multi-National Security and Transition Command, his 37 years of service in the U.S. Army have included teaching ethics and just war doctrine at West Point and applied military force at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thus, as a former infantryman, paratrooper, and Ranger, and as a senior military leader, Dubik is well placed to argue for the inclusion of “war-waging” alongside “war-making” in discussions and treatments of *jus in bello*.

Additionally, Dubik’s commitment to the fundamental belief that soldiers and statesmen, civilian leaders and military leaders, are all moral agents and hence accountable for war aims and intentions and not merely war’s execution is to be applauded. Relatedly, the recurring accent throughout the book on the need for *dialogue*—between and among military leaders at various levels of authority, between military and civilian leaders, and even between senior political and military leaders and the general public—is to be welcomed. The spectacular failure or absence of such dialogue, from Vietnam to the present, surely affords us the opportunity early in the 21st century to reflect on this urgent need. Lt. Gen. James Dubik, to his great credit, is convinced that any theory of ethics that is applied to justify and guide war-waging and war-fighting must take into consideration the actual conditions in which moral agents must reflect, decide, and act. The difficulty or ambiguity of conditions “may mitigate responsibility,” but it “does not erase it.”¹⁴

At the same time, one senses not only in this timely, well-argued volume but also among military leaders in general a reticence to acknowledge the religious sources of morality. As one Major recently lamented to me at the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth following my address on justice, charity, and right intention,¹⁵ “the Army wants you to be good and do good, but it doesn’t tell you *how* or *why*.” The words of this mid-level officer have stayed with me.

What is it that we seem to fear in terms of the moral training offered to our soldiers and to military leadership as a whole?¹⁶ Quite helpfully, Dubik uses Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* as both a model of moral reasoning and a foil. Quite correctly, he points out the inadequacy of Walzer’s separation of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.¹⁷ As one who was responsible for both war-making and war-waging, Dubik knows from experience the danger—indeed the moral schizophrenia—of divorcing the two realms.

And yet it is telling that no single just war theorist of note who interacts with the classic Christian moral tradition appears in Dubik’s bibliography.¹⁸ To illustrate, *the most distinguished just war historian alive*, James Turner Johnson, whose books on the history and applicability of just war reasoning have rivaled Walzer’s influence, is not cited even once in the volume. Nor do any of Johnson’s important works—several of which are already classic texts—appear in the bibliography. This is truly remarkable since, with the notable exception of Walzer and perhaps the Canadian philosopher Brian Orend, most theorists operating within the

just war tradition do so with a keen awareness of its debt to the Christian moral tradition.¹⁹ From Ambrose, Augustine, Gratian, Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Vitoria, Suárez, Grotius, and Locke, to John Courtney Murray, Paul Ramsey, William V. O’Brien, James Turner Johnson, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, the most significant just war theorists, past and present, “secular” or religious,²⁰ have done their work—and their “policy analysis”—with a conspicuous debt to the Christian moral tradition. And they have been important architects of our own cultural heritage.

British ethicist Nigel Biggar, whose important work well illustrates my point,²¹ has expressed the truth with precision: “So with due respect to just war Habermasians, the search for a universally acceptable ‘secular’ language [for just war] is a narcissistic illusion. The same applies, *pace* just war Rawlsians, to the search for an overlapping consensus that transcends controversy.”²² My own hunch is that even Lt. Gen. Dubik would agree with me at this point: moral principle is not some hermetically-sealed entity waiting to be lassoed by Rawlsian “neutralists” or well-meaning secularists. Such, in truth, does not exist. Moral principle, rather, is incubated in a religious matrix, which is why we find the just war idea developed and refined chiefly within the classic Christian moral tradition. P

J. Daryl Charles serves as a contributing editor to *Providence*. An affiliated scholar of the John Jay Institute, Charles is author most recently (with Mark David Hall) of *America’s Wars: A Just War Perspective* (University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming), *Natural Law and Religious*

Freedom (Routledge, forthcoming), and (with David D. Corey) *The Just War Tradition: An Introduction* (ISI Books, 2012).

(Endnotes)

1 General Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 185, reproduced in James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 53.

2 Dubik, 2.

3 *Ibid.*, 53.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*, 1.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*, 3.

8 Classic renditions of just war doctrine typically identify two principal moral criteria under the *in bello* rubric: discrimination or non-combatant immunity and proportionality. Dubik adds to these the principle of double effect and double intent and the principle of due care and due risk (following Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* [4th ed.; New York: Basic Books, 2006], 44, 137, 156). Most theorists subsume double effect and due risk under the criterion of discrimination/non-combatant immunity. See, for example, "Part II: Right Conduct in the Use of Military Force" of James Turner Johnson and Eric D. Patterson, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics* (Surrey, UK, and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 115-328.

9 Dubik, 3.

10 *Ibid.*, 4.

11 One might respond that this is less a "missing link" than it is a matter of prudence—that is, a matter of *applying* the existing *in bello* criteria in an integrated and holistic manner from top to bottom. In addition, the dialogue

and mutual accountability which Dubik advances apply to *democracies*—which are a fairly recent development—and would be difficult to conceive of in traditional monarchies. See, however, Gregory M. Reichberg, "Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence," *Journal of Military Ethics* 9, no. 3 (2010): 261-74, and *idem*, "The Decision to Use Military Force in Classical Just War Thinking," in James Turner Johnson and Eric D. Patterson, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics* (Surrey, UK, and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015): 13-23, esp. the section "Aquinas and the Moral Virtues of Military Command."

12 Dubik, 168.

13 *Ibid.*, 170.

14 *Ibid.*, 25.

15 J. Daryl Charles, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention and the Just War Tradition: Rethinking the Implications of Neighbor Love in the 21st Century," *The Ethics of Humanitarian Military Operations and Intervention*, April 18-21, 2016, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Accessible at <http://www.cgscfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Charles-EthicsofHlandJWT.pdf>.

16 At the very least, this would seem a contradiction of the idea and function of military chaplaincy. On the other hand, to its credit, the U.S. Army a decade ago instituted an annual ethics symposium, which has been integrated into the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Mid-level officers—i.e., Majors and Lt. Colonels—spend ca. eleven months at the College in a rich and much needed environment of reflection and personal study.

17 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 21, 228-32, 251-55.

18 Notwithstanding the acknowledgment by Dubik on p. 13 that "the update to traditional just war theory is an active field for moral philosophers" and that

"the discussion is far from finished," he writes: "My purpose in this book... is not to enter any of these debates, for these are being thoroughly examined by others" (*ibid.*). I would argue that in the very spirit of the dialogue Dubik is so concerned to stimulate, military leadership should be entering these debates and dialoguing in significant ways. More than likely, civilian-military relations would benefit therefrom.

19 Walzer, it needs emphasizing, is an anomaly. The secularist and metaphysical materialist, by sheer definition, deny a transcendent source of morality. While a massive amount of literature has appeared in the last fifteen years on the just war idea, much of this has been critical of the tradition or of various aspects of the tradition. Most just war exponents are not "secularists," since to give an account of the just war tradition requires a perspective that is willing to acknowledge its incubation and refinement as coming chiefly from within the Christian moral tradition of the last two millennia. On the great value and contribution of religious conviction in the public sphere, see Nigel Biggar, *Religious Voices in Public Places* (Oxford and New York: Oxford university Press, 2009).

20 Hereon see, for example, James Turner Johnson, "The Beginnings of a Secular Just War Doctrine," chapter 3, and "Secularized Just War Doctrine: Grotius, Locke, and Vattel," chapter 4, in *idem*, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 150-207 and 208-56.

21 See especially his *In Defence of War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

22 Nigel Biggar, "Natural Flourishing as the Normative Grounds of Just War," in A.F. Lang, Jr., Cian O'Driscoll, and John Williams, eds., *Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 50.

THE QUARTERMASTER'S BOOKSHELF:



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER READING & A SURVEY OF NEWLY AVAILABLE BOOKS



DEEP DIVES:

THE ETHICS OF SEX, OF ESPIONAGE, & OF SEX & ESPIONAGE




Just War and the Ethics of Espionage, Darrell Cole, 2014. Is spying bound by moral limits? The War on Terror requires we determine what are acceptable practices in defense of our liberties and the local and global common good. In many cases, clandestine networks increasingly perform activities inappropriate for military forces. These actions sometimes contravene both international law and, arguably, commonly held moral norms. Harnessing the resources of the just war tradition, Cole helps us sort through the complexity. See the longer review by David Shedd in *Providence's* Winter 2016 issue, which is available at ProvidenceMag.com.

Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, Sissela Bok, 1978. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Bok addresses questions about the ethics of interpersonal communication through reflecting on deception in multiple spheres of public and private life from government to medicine, law, academia, journalism, and the military.





The Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life, Dennis P. Hollinger, 2009. In a time when confusion about the nature of sex and sexuality seems to be at a destructive all-time high, Hollinger offers clarity that moves beyond the often simplistic answers found in our churches. This book offers detailed insight on a range of subjects including pre-marital sex, sex within marriage, homosexuality, and reproductive technologies. By arguing for a God-given *meaning* to sex, he makes plain why the classic Christian tradition has been so unified on the ethics of sex.



***Cast No Shadow: The Life of the American Spy Who Changed the Course of World War II*, Mary S. Lovell, 1992.** A biography of one of the most successful spies in World War II, codenamed “Cynthia,” is engagingly told by Lovell. A guaranteed page-turner, this account tells of the sacrifice and peril that a few select women (and men) lay bare to help secure the freedoms that we cherish today.

SGT. YORK



***Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne*, Douglas V. Mastriano, 2014.** Alvin York remains the most celebrated American Soldier from the First World War. In this groundbreaking new biography, Mastriano, an Army War College professor and historian, uses German and American primary sources, battlefield archeology, and forensic ballistic analysis to, for the first time ever, tell the full and complete story of Sergeant York. Comprehensive, compelling, and accessible, this is military history at its very best.



***Sergeant York (1941)*.** Howard Hawks’ classic biopic of the WWI hero, based on York’s own diary, was the highest grossing film of the year. York had refused on several occasions to authorize a film version of his life but finally relented in order to finance the building of an interdenominational bible school. Gary Cooper, playing the titular role, won an Oscar for his performance. The film was still in theatres when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred and is said to have had a profound effect on recruitment—with many men going straight from the film to enlistment offices.


HUMAN RIGHTS & RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

***They Say We Are Infidels: On the Run from ISIS with Persecuted Christians in the Middle East*, Mindy Belz, 2016.** Belz offers a gripping look into the suffering of Christians and other minorities in Syria and Iraq. Detailing the conflict, the efforts made to give aid, and the hope that remains amid the disturbing horrors of persecution and exile, this book is a testament to both the human capacity for unmitigated evil as well as extraordinary physical and moral courage. The Institute on Religion & Democracy’s Faith McDonnell wrote a compelling review in *Providence’s* Summer 2016 issue, available at ProvidenceMag.com.



***Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Giorgio Agamben, 1998.** Undoubtedly Agamben’s best-known work and probably the most controversial, this book is a mentally challenging yet fulfilling read concerning human dignity. Agamben delves into the belief that there is connection between sovereign power and bio-politics, forged in the extraordinary foundation of State authority. Dive in deep, if you dare!



DETERRENCE



The Guns of August, Barbara W. Tuchman, 1962. This 45-year-old book deserves renewed attention during this centenary of World War I. The fact that its treatment of the Great War is rather more artistic than scientific may, in reality, be its strength, since war itself is in many ways more of an artistic enterprise than a scientific one. A 21st-century reader may profitably approach this text with the question: “Why did deterrence fail, and what could have been done to make deterrence work?” Clearly, the scientific answer to the question failed in the case of World War I.

GLOBAL ECONOMY



Globalization and Its Discontents, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2012. Reflecting upon his experience as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (1995-1997) and chief economist of the World Bank (1997-2000), Stiglitz examines the impact of global economic institutions upon impoverished countries. He critiques the International Monetary Fund and World Bank among others as employing one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions where customized solutions were needed for unique contexts. This work provides context for why many citizens are distrustful and discontented with the global economic system.



Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson attempt to answer one of the most eluding political questions of our time: why are some countries wealthy while others are poor? Focusing upon the importance of institutions, the authors analyze how political and economic institutions, if done correctly, can lead to economic growth and political stability. In a political climate of skepticism and protectionism, this book meaningfully demonstrates the importance and efficacy of sound institutions.

AUGUSTINE


Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, Peter Brown, 1967. This classic work, published 50 years ago, has become the standard account of the life and teaching of the Bishop of Hippo. Following Augustine’s life and connecting it to his written works done along the way, this newer addition accounts for previously unknown letters and sermons by Augustine. Brown updates his own scholarship and reviews the field.



Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, R.A. Markus, 1970. Another classic work on Augustine’s teaching, Markus addresses questions concerning Augustine’s thought regarding the purpose of human society, with some particular emphasis on the intersection of history, society, and the church. It is an important book to have in hand as you read recent scholarship on Augustine.



NEWLY DEPLOYED:

RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON THE CENTENNIAL OF THE GREAT WAR



***Forty-Seven Days: How Pershing's Warriors Came of Age to Defeat the German Army in World War I*, Mitchell Yockelson, 2016.** The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne was the deadliest clash in American history and the unlikeliest of American victories. With a focus on the personalities that helped turn the tide of the war against a better trained and more experienced adversary, Yockelson explores a cast of characters that includes commanding General John Pershing, General Hunter Liggett, fighter ace Eddie Rickenbacker, Corporal Alvin York—the pacifist who would single-handedly killed more than 20 Germans and capture 130 more—then artillery officer Harry Truman, tank commander George Patton, and Douglas MacArthur, the most decorated soldier of the Great War. *Forty-Seven Days* is the extraordinary story of a military coming-of-age.

***Back Over There*, Richard Rubin, 2017.** In addition to the longest sub-title ever, Rubin offers a considerate, emotive, engaging, and meaningful journey into the rich and sometimes forgotten history of World War I. A successor volume to his celebrated *The Last of the Dough Boys*, Rubin follows in the wake of the American Expeditionary Forces, finding battlefields, trenches, bunkers, and the embattled villages of France. He also found an abiding gratitude toward America among the French people for whom, living in the land where the struggle's din still echoes, the Great War remains a living thing. While bringing this bit of American history alive, Rubin manages to never quite abandon the present, and thereby makes past and present a bit more seamless for Americans as well.



***With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon*, Gene Fax, 2017.** One more standout in the Meuse-Argonne publishing flood, Fax's work chronicles the providence of the US 79th Division men, drafted off the streets of Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, from their training camp in Maryland through the final years of World War I. Primarily concentrating on their assault on Montfaucon, the most heavily fortified part of the German Line, during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in 1918, Fax offers readers insight into the mistakes and triumphs of the offensive, as well as the tactics of General Pershing. Importantly, he also demonstrates how the lessons learned from this engagement particularly, and World War I generally, would prove vital in World War II.

The second obstacle is the lack of political pragmatism. The Jews have always accepted something over nothing (Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann famously declared his willingness to accept a Jewish state “even if it’s the size of a tablecloth”); Palestinians have consistently preferred nothing over something. From Haj Amin al-Husseini and Izz ad-Din al-Qassam to Yasser Arafat and Ismail Haniyeh, the basic Palestinian position has been to sacrifice oneself and one’s people in a blaze of glory before conceding one point of the political program. Palestinian culture gives the word *shahid* mythical power, making gritty compromises like the 1947 Partition Plan and other peace deals impossible to contemplate. Far better to die in purity.

If martyrdom is the greatest Palestinian virtue, *tatbi’a*, or normalization, is the greatest Palestinian sin. A normalizer is a Palestinian who accepts Israel, cooperates with Israel, or suggests that Palestinians should get used to a Jewish state living next door. Professor Mohammad Dajani of Al-Quds University was accused of *tatbi’a* in 2014 when he brought his Palestinian students on a study trip to Auschwitz. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was accused of *tatbi’a* that same year when he dared to lament the Arabs’ rejection of the 1947 Partition Plan.

This basic inability to cope with the fact of Israel is a major obstacle that needs to be overcome. “[Y]esteryear’s conventional nationalism and ‘national liberation’ are no longer the best currency for political mobilization and expression in today’s world,” explain Agha and Khalidi. Palestinians must “adapt their struggle and aspirations to new global realities.

“Nationalism itself has changed,” they continue. “Palestinians need to search for new means of expressing their political identity and hopes in ways that do not and cannot replicate the past.”

AND YET, I SAY, the liberation of Palestine is still possible.

President Abbas raises an eyebrow: “How so?”

Admit mistakes. The starkest difference between Israeli and Palestinian political culture is self-criticism. Israelis never stop criticizing each other and their policies; Palestinians almost never do, at least in public. As someone who leads study tours on both sides of the Green Line, I can vouch for the glaring contrast between the two.

Forget Greater Palestine. It’s over. Israel is not going anywhere and is getting stronger.

That doesn’t mean a new political entity called Palestine cannot emerge: that is, a smaller state of the Palestinian people in some part of historic Palestine, just as Israel is a state of the Jewish people in some part of historic Israel. Accept that, and get your people to accept it.

Forget the refugees. Or rather, forget the idea that the 800,000 refugees from 1948 and their millions-strong progeny will ever return to the State of Israel. You can throw those old keys away. The refugees belong in their country of residence or in the new State of Palestine. Accept that.

Be pragmatic. You’re not going to get what you want. So start asking yourself what is a “something” Palestine, a Palestine the size of a tablecloth. Create a state that you can be proud of for the sake of your children and grandchildren. The Jews have accepted less than they wanted. You should too.

Punish violence and incitement to violence. This is simple enough.

Embrace tatbi’a. You must deal with the Jews; you must befriend them. Terrorizing their civilians won’t scare them away; it will do the opposite. If independence and coexistence are your goal, they are not your enemy. Normalize. Concede. Compromise. Live.

Accept Jewish citizens. The current position of the Palestinian Authority is that the future State of Palestine will be free of Jews—*Judenrein*, as der Führer used to say. This is a position that Christians like me cannot endorse. Jews are an ancient people who belong there as much as you do. Just as 20 percent of Israelis are Arab, there is no reason that 20 percent of Palestinians shouldn’t be Jewish. Settlers should be able to stay if they want to become citizens. Embrace their love of the land.

The real Palestinian martyr will be the one who stands up and delivers this bold message to his people, even if he is killed immediately afterward. The death of this prophet, unlike the death of the Jabareens who threw their lives away for nothing, will ignite a new spirit of truth among right-thinking Palestinians that, God-willing, they will fan and use to raze the old empires of the mind and to build anew. P

Robert Nicholson is the executive director of the Philos Project, and co-publisher of *Providence*.



ROBERT NICHOLSON

EMPIRES OF FEELING & FANTASY

In an August 2017 edition of *The New Yorker*, Hussein Agha and Ahmad Samih Khalidi offer a grim eulogy for the Palestinian national movement. “Palestinians are sliding toward the unknown,” they write. “The contemporary Palestinian national movement—founded and led by Yasser Arafat and embodied by the P.A., Fatah, and the P.L.O. over the past half century—is reaching its end.”

This is hard reading for someone who still hopes for a healthy Palestinian state as a means to end the conflict. But I speak with Palestinians often, so I know that Agha and Khalidi are right.

The basic *telos* of Palestinian identity is the liberation of Greater Palestine (not the just the West Bank and Gaza but all the land that comprises modern-day Israel) and the return of its refugees. But what happens when Palestinians realize that neither goal is achievable? They will either deny the fact, stagnate, and fall deeper into desperation; or they will accept it, move on, and rebuild their movement from the ground up. Fearing the first, Agha and Khalidi call for the second. So do I.

The Lebanese philosopher Charles Malik believed that Arab states would never be as prosperous as Western states until they embraced a more scientific and objective approach to reality. He admitted that the encounter with empiricism would cause “whole empires of feeling and fantasy and prejudice and poetry...to crash down,” but believed it was necessary for the long-term well-being of the Arabs.

The Palestinian national movement is one such illusory empire. Constructed on poetry and prejudice and generations of fantasy, it too must come crashing down so that it can be rebuilt, this time on a more solid basis.

THE THREE YOUNG MEN who slipped into the Old City of Jerusalem before dawn on July 14, 2017, were all members of the same Arab clan

and citizens of the State of Israel. Their name was Mohammed Jabareen—all three of them—and they brought two rifles and a pistol in a bag from their homes in the northern Israeli city of Umm al-Fahm. Their plan was to kill Jews and kick off a regional conflagration that would advance the liberation of Palestine.

Just before 8 am, they gunned down two Israeli police officers near the entrance to the Temple Mount complex. The officers were Druze, not Jews, but wore the uniform of the Jewish state, and that was enough. Pursued by Israeli security forces, the Jabareens fled into the complex, where they died in a hail of bullets as *shahids*, martyrs for their people.

How could the Jabareens have possibly thought killing Israeli police officers would advance their cause? Didn't they realize these senseless murders would make Israelis even more vigilant? Didn't they understand that Palestinian violence has never worked since the time of the British Mandate?

Apparently not. But the Jabareens aren't alone. And it isn't just self-defeating violence that hinders the Palestinian cause. Agha and Khalidi point out two more defects.

The first is the weakness of Palestinian identity. Currently there is no “unifying Palestinian bond” that can “forge a truly *national* enterprise out of highly localized components.” As the 1948 generation dies off, young Palestinians are wondering what the cause is all about. Is it about resistance? Negotiations? Religion? Real estate? There isn't a clear answer. “Without ‘armed struggle,’” Agha and Khalidi write, “the national movement had no clear ideology, no specific discourse, no distinctive experience or character.”

The PLO formally abandoned the armed struggle and the liberation of Greater Palestine in the 1990s for the establishment of a smaller state inside the West Bank and Gaza. But the spectacular failure to achieve even that more limited goal has pushed many young Palestinians back to the original vision. “The conflict may be dragged back to its historical origins as a struggle over and across the entire Holy Land,” suggest Agha and Khalidi, “reopening old wounds, inflicting new ones, and redefining how and if the conflict will be resolved.” The Jabareen attack, committed by Israel citizens who grew up speaking Hebrew, might be indicative of such a blurring of the 1948/1967 narratives.

(Continues on page 83)

Michael Cromartie

1950-2017



Mike at the launch of *Providence*, November 2015

“We need to adopt a form of Christian realism that recognizes that, because of the Fall, we live in a world that will remain sinful and broken until the end of time. While living in a broken world, our task, if it’s political, is to help the state curb that brokenness and that sinfulness in a way that aims toward justice. I use the phrase ‘Augustinian sensibility’ to lean against a Utopian temptation for people on the Right or the Left who give the political realm more significance than it should be given.”

We mourn the loss of *Providence* founding contributing editor, colleague, and friend Mike Cromartie. The tributes to Mike that have been shared by a wide diversity of people of all faiths and political persuasions testify to his extraordinary decency, wisdom, generosity, moral courage, fidelity to Christ, and curmudgeonly good cheer, in all he did, wrote, and said. He *lived* the Augustinian sensibility, proving the continued value of ancient truth for modern times. Be at peace, Mike. See you at the resurrection.



A JUST WAR LEXICON:
ON THE PROPER *JUS* OF WORDS:

bellum: /'bɛləm/ From Latin: a war
duellum: /'dju:ələm/'dʒu:ələm/ From Latin: a duel

Bellum refers to any deployment of martial force by a sovereign authority, whether applied internally within the ruler's own society or externally against foreign adversaries. *Bellum* is the use of force for public ends by public authorities—over whom there is no one higher charged with the maintenance of order, justice, and peace within the political community—or their delegates.

Antithetically, *duellum* is the use of force for private ends. While force used by private authority for private purposes is always *duellum*, a sovereign authority can also deploy force for private purposes, and when they do so they are dueling.

According to the *jus ad bellum* guidelines of the just war tradition, *bellum* can be moral or immoral depending on the circumstances. *Duellum* can only be immoral. This is because the pursuit of private purposes at the unjustified expense of others is, in the Augustinian typology of love, *cupiditas*—wrongly directed, self-centered love. On the other hand, the use of force by a proper authority, for a just cause, and in the pursuit of peace is an act of rightly directed love—or *caritas*, charity. This is almost certainly why the discussions by Thomas Aquinas on just war and by the Apostle Paul on the sword of ruling authority are placed within their disquisitions on love, in the *Summa Theologica* and Romans, respectively.
