“No one should question the resolve of the United States of America to defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond” said Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in March. But Beijing is certainly questioning U.S. resolve as the West vacillates over how to resolve Ukraine.
Fears are growing that the second Trump presidency will disengage from NATO and Europe. Some Europeans equate the risk of U.S. withdrawal from European security commitments to a Russian nuclear strike. And even amid concerns that Trump is dismantling the U.S.-led world order, an explicitly Europe-first approach is gaining traction, contending that other U.S. national security problems “can only be dealt with effectively once the Atlantic foundation of Washington’s global strength is secure”.
Yet, the reality is that Europe’s economic interests are tied to Asia. Any serious U.S. partnership with Europe necessitates serious U.S. engagement in Asia. Europe must recognize that its own economic stability and long-term security are at stake if Asia becomes wholly dominated by the CCP.
Last week, EU President Ursula von der Leyen flaunted that Europe’s “hallmark is not only that we are the biggest market in the world but that we are reliable and predictable.” If the EU has such potential, then it should assume a corresponding leadership role. If the Europeans think themselves serious partners, then they will work with the U.S. to build much-needed deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and push back against Xi Jinping’s alternative architecture for a new global order.
Building deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is in everyone’s economic interest. Consider, for example, how China is the EU’s largest imports trading partner. While the U.S. began reducing economic dependency on China in 2018, European reliance on China has increased. Thanks to short-sighted European economic policies, the U.S. is still tied to China via Europe, negating the benefits of American divestment away from China. Europe needs must do its part and make a full, clean economic break from China.
China’s own predatory economic behavior has already re-written many of the rules for the world economy, forcing other countries into protectionist policies. Until the EU dramatically shifts away from China, revisionist powers will continue to leverage and exploit Europe economically and politically. While Europe is making new efforts to reduce reliance on China and establish alternative partners, such as India, it has a long way to go.
In the long-run, if U.S. national security strategy remains fixated on Europe, the EU economy will suffer serious consequences.The Indo-Pacific region accounts for two-thirds of global economic growth, indicating that Asian regional stability is vital to the economic security of our European allies.
At the same time, the Trump Administration should cooperate with European tariff negotiation efforts and carefully calibrate trade polices to ensure the EU does not find financial solace in Beijing’s embrace. Otherwise, the whole deterrence project could backfire.
There is no real danger of “losing” Europe if the NATO alliance remains a convincing deterrent and the US maintains nuclear power parity with Russia. Russia annexation of parts of Ukraine, though tragic, does not mean U.S. “eviction” from Europe as strong Europe-first advocates contend. While there are good reasons to be alarmed that Trump’s desired peace plan makes a dangerous moral equivalency between Ukraine and Russia, that does not mean an imperfect peace in Eastern Europe would lead to a geostrategic collapse. In contrast, the risks associated with Beijing’s aims to re-shape the international world order are far more defined and pressing.
Compared to a Europe with greater accommodations of Russian interests, a Taiwanese crisis is far more threatening to both the U.S. and Europe. Breaking through the first island chain would give Beijing critical control over the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) advanced chip making capabilities. Though TSMC is moving some capacity abroad, CCP control over Taiwan would still heavily impact Europe and jeopardize critical global trade routes in the South China Sea.
Europeans are already beginning to take on more of their own defense responsibilities, but more must be done. While the United States receives great benefits from facilitating the flow of goods and services around the globe, it also incurs great expense in doing so, expenses that would be more fairly shouldered if Europe stepped up. For example, the U.S. recently conducted strikes against the Houthis in Yemen for attacking shipping chokepoints in the Red Sea traversed by only a small fraction of U.S. goods. “There’s a real risk that the public doesn’t understand this”, Vice President Vance texted a few weeks ago in the infamous Signal gate chat. Trump should frame a fair bargain with Europe with these examples in mind.
Europe-firsters have one thing right – a deep concern that the U.S. is has no desire to engage in multiple theatres. But prudent national security policy means finding a way to synchronize efforts to meet all threats. It means leveraging NATO in a way that reduces tensions with Russia coupled with open intent to break the “no limits” Russia-China alliance. Simultaneously, the U.S. must swiftly secure the main ingredients needed to build comprehensive deterrence by securing global supply chains.
New hemispheric defense efforts, if handled correctly, can shelter Mexico and Canada, America’s largest trading partners,from corrosive Beijing-backed infiltrations and advance national security objectives in multiple regions. But already-failed policy approaches towards China cannot continue without serious economic repercussions to the United States and Europe.
The Europe-first versus Asia-first dichotomy is not helpful because the core problem is not which region to prioritize. The problem is lack of deterrence capabilities predicated on actualized capacity to win in multiple theaters. A fixed focus on Europe gambles away the economic stability needed for both the U.S. and Europe to build credible deterrence.
The notion that preservation of a past legacy in Europe should serve as a cornerstone of America’s strategic decisions today is perhaps the most concerning piece of Europe-centric policies. Americans know their main adversary is not in Europe, as it was in the Second World War. How the U.S. and Europe respond to Beijing’s drive for global dominance is what will define legacies in this century.
