In 2025, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) exists as a remnant of its past force. Despite the militant group’s territorial defeat and the assassination of its leader and founder, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2019, the group’s ideological fervor and capacity for destruction have not entirely disappeared. ISIS has adapted and shifted tactics—with the majority of its operations being carried out by sleeper cells.

With an estimated 2,500 active ISIS fighters remaining in Syria and Iraq, the threat of terrorism has increased since the downfall of the Assad regime. Last month, ISIS claimed responsibility for the first deadly attack since the transitional government took power. The terrorist group displayed dramatic escalation after reportedly carrying out a suicide bombing in the historic Greek Orthodox Mar Elias church in Damascus on June 22. The devastating attack took place during afternoon mass and left at least 28 dead and dozens more wounded. While no group has claimed responsibility as of June 23, the Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson revealed that preliminary investigations indicate the involvement of ISIS militants.   

The new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is no stranger to terrorist organizations. The rebel forces that seized Damascus last year were led by Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS)—a Sunni Islamist paramilitary group and U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Although ISIS and HTS share some ideological foundations, ISIS has deemed the transitional government under al-Sharaa to be “illegitimate” and not representative of true Islam. This transition has resulted in an undeniable escalation from ISIS and highlights the region’s enduring volatility and instability.

While ISIS has succeeded in attacking the transitional Syrian government, they pose the greatest risk to stability in northeast Syria, where our partners in the territorial defeat of ISIS, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), operate the al-Hol prison camp. This prison camp houses more than 40,000 individuals affiliated with ISIS. Primarily made up of women and children, the conditions in al-Hol are abysmal due to scarce resources and the slow progression of repatriation.

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism underscored the risks of an American withdrawal from Syria. As of May 2025, roughly 2,000 U.S. troops still remain in the region, providing critical support to the SDF in its fight against the Islamic State. American assistance includes military training, equipment, intelligence sharing, and financial support. Washington has also made intentional efforts to engage with the transitional authorities in hopes of helping to foster stability in Syria. Notably, U.S. intelligence enabled Syrian government officials to successfully prevent eight ISIS-planned attacks in the capital city of Damascus earlier this year.

Despite these accomplishments, the Trump Administration appears to be preparing for a significant withdrawal of U.S. armed forces in the region. In February, the American president asserted that the U.S. is “not getting involved in Syria,” as the nation has its “own mess” to deal with. This sentiment was further realized by the freeze on international aid, which has jeopardized the security of camps such as al-Hol. The U.S. is the largest donor to these camps, housing thousands of women and children, along with around 9,000 ISIS fighters. For an area already overwhelmed with deficits of basic resources and necessities, any withdrawal of aid has a dramatic impact.

The Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Michael Kurilla, has described al-Hol and surrounding camps as a “literal and figurative ISIS army in detention.” The lack of educational facilities and psychological aid in these camps only perpetuates the passing down of terrorist ideologies to younger generations. Al-Hol alone houses over 22,000 children—more than 60 percent of the total detained population. Reports of them throwing stones at troops, as well as crafting homemade bombs and other weapons, reveal alarming signs of indoctrination.

The most pressing danger posed by a reduction in U.S. support is the potential ability for ISIS to reconstitute its previous force, which controlled over 43,000 square miles only a decade ago. Without sustained assistance and stability, the SDF might lose control of camps such as al-Hol. If this were to occur, nearly 50,000 ISIS-affiliated individuals across more than 14 prisons and refugee camps could be set free. If the U.S. fails to provide adequate military and financial aid, a potentially catastrophic conflict between the SDF and HTS may break out. 

In a rare display of unity in March of this year, al-Sharaa reached a landmark agreement with the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), of which the SDF operates as the military wing. This agreement allows for the integration of the SDF into the Syrian transitional government, as well as grants the transitional authority jurisdiction in northeast Syria. Though these advances are promising, the alliance remains fragile. The SDF and HTS have experienced a complex and unstable relationship over the years. The former were our essential counterterrorism partner, while the latter has been a target of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Deep-seated disagreements between the organizations regarding governance models, resource distribution and the future of governance reflect the uncertainty of achieving integration. If this historic agreement between al-Sharaa and the SDF were to collapse, two destabilizing consequences may follow as a result.

First, open conflict between Damascus and the SDF could lead to disaster. The DAANES is a significant and valuable territory rich in oil and gas fields. If a conflict were to break out between Damascus and the SDF, control over camps such as al-Hol would be at risk. ISIS thrives on exploiting instability, and even the possibility of lawlessness in these prison camps is enough to cultivate a breeding ground for the group’s reemergence.

Second, the collapse of the agreement could result in HTS assuming control of al-Hol and the surrounding camps. This is alarming for two reasons. The first being that HTS has a concerning track record in the oversight of their own prison camps in Syria. The group is responsible for well over 500 civilian deaths and more than 2,300 individuals who are arbitrarily detained or forcibly displaced. Reports of using “multiple torture methods” on detainees, as well as committing gross violations of human rights against individuals under the group’s control, contribute to a culture of uncertainty and uneasiness regarding the future of al-Hol.

The second reason is the fact that HTS does not operate as a monolith. Though HTS and ISIS have engaged in intense conflict throughout the past decade, there are certainly members of HTS who are sympathetic to ISIS. As these individuals are rarely held accountable for their rogue actions and beliefs, a culture of impunity has fostered within HTS. Since many of these members support ISIS in secret, there is no way to be sure who exactly from this widely variable organization will be left in charge of al-Hol.

To prevent ISIS from establishing power in Syria, the U.S. must continue to engage with President al-Sharaa and support the SDF’s administration over camps such as al-Hol. Continued military presence, humanitarian aid and diplomatic action are essential for mitigating tensions. The protection of Syrian civilians, especially their religious minority components, after nearly 15 years of conflict rests on the critical actions carried out by both Damascus and Washington.