As Israel launched strikes against Iran’s nuclear and military sites, talk of “regime change” is back on the table. Predictably, critics warn of another Iraq—chaos, quagmire, and endless war. But that comparison is structurally flawed. Iran is not Iraq. What made post-Saddam Iraq a disaster was not regime change itself, but the Islamic Republic’s calculated decision to make it one—by flooding Iraq with militias, hijacking its politics, and turning it into a proxy battlefield to expel U.S. forces and further dominate the region. The idea that the same scenario would unfold in Iran ignores two important facts: first, the country’s vastly different societal dynamics, and second, the lack of any external power capable of doing to Iran what Iran did to Iraq. Regime change in Iran would eliminate the source of the chaos, not unleash it.
Prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, proponents of regime change argued that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a growing threat to international security. They claimed he possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and could use or transfer those weapons to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Many also believed that removing Saddam would not only liberate Iraqis from tyranny but also spark a wave of democratization across the Middle East.
Instead, the opposite occurred. In the aftermath of the invasion, Iraq descended into chaos, terrorism, and sectarian violence. This fueled the belief that regime change inevitably leads to disaster and cast the supporters of the Iraq intervention as mere “warmongers.”
But the truth is that the instability in post-invasion Iraq was not simply spontaneous or the inevitable consequence of regime change. It was largely driven by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which swiftly seized the “God-given opportunity” to expand its influence—something it had long aspired to do but had been prevented from doing by Saddam Hussein’s tightly controlled regime.
Right after the U.S. invasion, the Iranian regime allocated an additional $26 million to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to arm Iraqi Shia militias and infiltrate Iraqi politics, aiming to turn Iraq into a key front in its regional agenda. Qassem Soleimani, then a little-known commander of the IRGC-Quds Force responsible for these complex operations, later noted that his mission was to incorporate Iraq into Iran’s broader “Shia Empire” project and to undermine and demoralize the United States through an extensive network of proxies.
Soleimani turned Iraq into a battleground for proxy wars, civil unrest, and foreign interference, costing thousands of American and Iraqi lives. Under his supervision, the IRGC-Quds Force established weapons-smuggling routes along the Iran–Iraq border and launched a calculated insurgency against American forces. Recognizing that the U.S. lacked both the manpower and political will to secure Iraq, the IRGC-QF mobilized and armed Shia militias—including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigade—to wage a proxy war. These groups received advanced training and lethal weapons, including EFPs responsible for up to half of U.S. casualties. Beyond targeting Americans, Iran’s proxies unleashed a brutal sectarian campaign of killings, kidnappings, and ethnic cleansing against Iraqi Sunnis and Christians. Sectarian war allowed Iran to formulate policies that maximized its interests while minimizing the influence of the U.S. and potential regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia. The sectarian strife eventually turned into a virtual civil war, which cost thousands of lives, both Iraqi and American.
Yet Iran’s destructive influence alone does not explain the unraveling of Iraq. The failure of the mission was also rooted in the lack of coherent planning and flawed execution by the U.S. and its allies. The catastrophic mistakes made by the U.S. government, along with intelligence failures, reflected a profound misjudgment of post-war realities. The misguided dismantling of Iraq’s institutions, combined with sweeping de-Baathification, the removal of state capacity, and the prioritization of short-term political gains over genuine institution-building, created a vacuum that paved the way for post-war chaos and contributed to long-term instability, including the rise of ISIS.
Simply put, the mistakes made in the past were the result of flawed execution, not because the goals themselves were illegitimate. As one observer noted, “if we allow those errors to harden into doctrine, we risk effectively surrendering the field to regimes like Iran’s.”
Moreover, drawing parallels between Iraq and Iran overlooks fundamental differences in political culture, societal cohesion, and ethnic integration between the two countries. Unlike Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion, contemporary Iran has witnessed the flourishing of civic groups, as evidenced by significant protest movements such as the Green Movement in 2009, the environmentalist movement, and ongoing human rights and women’s rights activism.
Public and intellectual discourse on critical social and political issues—such as the relationship between religion and state, the role of civil society, and Iran’s future ideological orientation—has also proliferated.
Furthermore, while there are separatist elements among Iran’s minorities (Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Azeris), they are not sufficiently organized or popular to pose a serious threat to national cohesion. Despite this, the regime persistently portrays them as separatists threatening the country’s territorial integrity. Given the civic maturation of Iranian society and the non-secessionist outlook of non-Persian communities, widespread chaos following any potential regime change appears highly unlikely.
Using the failed example of regime change in Iraq as proof that regime change must never again be attempted is a dangerous mistake—one that only emboldens the regime in Tehran, allowing it to continue its brutal repression at home and destabilizing policies in the region. Regime change in Iran is an urgent necessity, and the West should not shy away from supporting the Iranian people in their pursuit of it.
