As the Russia-Ukraine War continues its attritional stalemate, the Korean War armistice has sometimes been presented as a model for the eventual war settlement. Ukraine has initially rejected comparison to the Korean War, advocating instead for a successful counteroffensive to expel Russian aggression. Today, with the diminished prospects for regaining its lost territories through military means, Ukraine’s proposed terms are similar to those of the Korean War armistice: a ceasefire line without formal recognition of Russia’s territorial occupation, robust security reassurance from the West to deter Russia’s future aggression.
Ukraine, however, faces challenges in achieving a Korean War-style settlement. Russia has continued its military offensive in pursuit of its maximalist aims. The Trump administration has opposed Ukraine’s NATO membership and is unlikely to offer a formal bilateral defense pact similar to the US-South Korea mutual defense treaty. The Trump administration has also displayed reluctance to provide military aid or deploy troops to support Ukraine’s post-war security. Ukraine continues to be threatened by the prospect that the Trump administration, impatient for a quick war settlement, would concede to most of Russia’s demands, pressuring Ukraine to either accept an adverse war settlement or risk US abandonment.
During the Korean War armistice talks, South Korean President Syngman Rhee used two bargaining “cards” to achieve security reassurances from the US Eisenhower administration. Rhee’s first card was the US containment strategy. US policymakers considered the Korean Peninsula as one of the early tests of the containment strategy to deter communist expansion in the Asia-Pacific. Threatening to persist in his hardline stance that risked South Korea’s abandonment, but could also result in a defeat of the US containment strategy, Rhee imposed strategic burdens on US policymakers. With US forces fighting in Korea under the multinational UN Command, South Korea’s fall to communism was also perceived as forfeiting US military sacrifices in Korea.
Rhee’s second card was the POW exchanges between the UN Command and the communist forces. Rhee threatened (and eventually implemented) to release unilaterally North Korean prisoners who refused repatriation. The US policymakers feared Rhee’s POW release could result in the suspension of the armistice talks and jeopardize the release of US prisoners kept by communists. Weighing the alternatives of either removing Rhee from power or placating him with more reassurances, the Eisenhower administration chose the latter, calculating that keeping a stable, cooperative South Korean regime would be more beneficial to maintaining geostrategic balance in the Korean Peninsula (to mitigate risks of Rhee’s militant actions, the US kept operational control of South Korean military as a condition for mutual defense pact).
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, lacks similar bargaining leverage in his negotiations with the Trump administration. The US troops are not fighting in Ukraine, reducing the US policymakers’ burden to avoid a perception of military defeat (a dilemma that contributed to prolonged US military intervention in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan). As the Trump administration’s strategy is to reduce US security commitment abroad, emphasizing Ukraine’s vulnerability could backfire, reinforcing Trump’s aversion to costly intervention in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Zelensky, however, has alternative bargaining cards. The first card is Ukraine’s military capability. Militarily unprepared for North Korea’s invasion, South Korea nearly fell before the arrival of the UN Command repulsed the North Korean forces mostly back to the pre-war border. Though the South Korean military eventually performed proactive roles in maintaining the battlefront, it remained militarily dependent on the UN Command. In contrast, Ukraine’s military successfully defended its capital, Kyiv, during the early days of the war. While the West refrained from direct military involvement (supporting Ukraine mainly through military aid, intelligence support, and economic sanctions on Russia), Ukraine’s military generally maintained resilient defenses against Russia’s continued offensives and has enhanced its domestic military capability as the war progressed.
Zelensky’s second card is his partnership with neighboring European countries. Rhee’s South Korea had no reliable ally other than the United States. Due to South Korea’s history of colonization by Japan, Rhee rejected the possibility of a security alliance with the latter. Though European countries contributed troops to the UN Command, concerns that a prolonged war in East Asia could weaken US security commitment in Europe motivated their support for an armistice. Subsequently, Rhee distrusted multilateral security guarantees involving Europe, pursuing instead a bilateral pact with the United States.
In contrast, many European governments have perceived the Russia-Ukraine War as posing a mutual threat to Europe’s security. Multiple European leaders have continued to affirm their diplomatic solidarity with Ukraine, urging the Trump administration to protect Ukraine’s security interests in the prospective Russia-Ukraine War settlement. The Trump administration’s threat to reduce US involvement in Europe’s collective security has incentivized increased attempts by European governments to expand their military capability. European governments have also endeavored to provide solutions for the Trump administration’s reluctance to continue direct aid to Ukraine. For example, France and the UK have proposed deploying European peacekeepers to maintain the future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. As well as continuing to send their aid to Ukraine, European countries have also explored arrangements in which they could pay for the continued delivery of US arms to Ukraine.
Zelensky’s third card is Ukraine’s economic resources. South Korea, lacking substantive natural resources and its economy devastated by the war, had little post-war economic value to offer the United States. Ukraine, geographically the largest country in Europe (excluding Russia), has extensive agricultural and industrial capacity that has remained intact despite the destruction from the war. Ukraine’s rare earth resources have also led to the signing of the bilateral mineral resources agreement with the Trump administration.
With these cards, Zelensky can engage in a different bargaining strategy. Rhee’s brinkmanship diplomacy paid off in persuading the Eisenhower administration to expand security commitment in the Korean Peninsula. Zelensky could instead engage in transactional diplomacy that mitigates the Trump administration’s wariness toward the cost of supporting Ukraine. Emphasizing Ukraine’s military capability and Europe’s cooperation, Zelensky could bargain for limited, “manageable” US security contributions (such as arms export to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia). US support would be reciprocated by promises of benefits from Ukraine’s economic recovery and development of mineral resources. Through mitigating the cost of support and promoting the returned benefits, Zelensky could be successful in unlocking Trump’s endorsement of a war settlement that is closer to Ukraine’s preferred terms.
Zelensky’s cards have limitations. The prolonged war has inflicted substantive losses on Ukraine’s society and military. Ukraine struggles with a shortage of troops, and its domestic military capability is not yet sufficient to fill the gaps that would result from the suspension of the US military support. The expansion of European military capacity will likely take time, constraining Europe’s capacity to support Ukraine. Ukraine’s economic opportunities may be undercut by the difficulty in implementing its economic development while the conflict with Russia continues. Subsequently, Ukraine’s path to a negotiated war settlement is riddled with risks and challenges.
Zelensky’s advantage, however, may be that his cards are more appropriate in bargaining with the Trump administration. While Rhee’s bargaining strategy relied on a threat, “United States must provide more support or else will lose South Korea”, Zelensky’s strategy can be based more on reassurance, “United States only needs to help Ukraine and Europe just enough and will be rewarded.” It is the second strategy that is more likely to be successful with Trump’s “transactional” foreign policy. With Trump’s recent shift toward support for Ukraine, there’s an opportunity for Zelensky to bargain for a war settlement that could safeguard Ukraine’s security even with a more limited, transactional US security commitment.
