January 3 is a day our adversaries should fear.
On January 3, 1990, Manuel Noriega, the de facto ruler of Panama from 1983 to 1989, surrendered to face U.S. drug trafficking charges. On January 3, 2020, IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in an American drone strike. And on January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela is finally preparing to face justice in the United States after years of crimes against humanity, stolen elections, extrajudicial killings, and drug trafficking. While it is likely more coincidental than contrived, January 3 is quickly coming to signify American leadership, peace through strength, and justice.
The operation itself seems to have been conducted flawlessly—a massive credit to the military planners, intelligence officers, diplomats, law enforcement officers, and most especially, service members who pulled it off. Forcing Maduro to face justice in an American court is an important victory not just for our Venezuela policy but our foreign policy more broadly. As after Operation Midnight Hammer, our allies and adversaries now understand the capability, superiority, and precision of the U.S. military. No longer is the fall of Kabul the symbol of American power. Instead, it is that of the B-2 bomber and a blindfolded Maduro, weak and handcuffed on an amphibious assault ship. The world has been reminded that when we say something, we mean it—a message likely welcomed by Kyiv as it considers the offer of long-term U.S. security guarantees.
The partners to our adversaries like Russia and China are also getting the message. The once-feared air defenses Russia provided to Venezuela proved useless against American technology. Even the presence of a Chinese diplomatic envoy was no deterrent. Faced with American might, Russia and China opted for condemnatory statements instead of tangible support for their supposed partner, recalling the aftermath of Midnight Hammer when the “Axis of Resistance” evaporated just as quickly as Iran’s nuclear facilities.
But as with all significant operations—particularly those involving someone who has illegally held power for so long—what comes next is critical. Those predicting chaos like what we saw in Libya and Iraq are missing a major distinction: We are not introducing democracy to Venezuela, only helping return it. Unlike post-Saddam Iraq, Venezuela already has a democratically-elected leader in Edmundo González, who won nearly 70% of the vote in the 2024 presidential election despite significant regime interference. And that support has only grown under his and Nobel-Prize winning María Corina Machado’s leadership.
It was María Corina Machado who single-handedly united the Venezuelan opposition into one movement, but she didn’t just influence the opposition. Unlike opposition movements in other countries that often lack influence, the Venezuelan opposition has been infiltrating the regime for years. Just as America could not have taken out Iran’s nuclear facilities without the Israelis disabling its air defenses, so too America could not have gotten Maduro without the opposition’s efforts to build popular support and turn regime insiders into partners.
Despite all this success, President Trump now runs the risk of losing the two great advantages we have in stabilizing a pro-U.S. regime in Caracas: namely, Venezuela’s democracy and Maria Corina herself. After rightly touting the operation’s success, President raised more questions than answers in his remarks to the press later that morning. His allusion to the possibility that Delcy Rodriguez, Maduro’s handpicked vice president, could serve as president and that the United States might assume a governing role inside the country stand to increase the risk of chaos which we’ve so far managed to avoid.
There can be no option where Delcy Rodriguez leads Venezuela in the long-term. She lacks both the qualifications and legitimacy to run a country, has long-standing ties with America’s adversaries, and has been implicated in crimes against humanity. Leaving her in power would allow the Maduro regime to continue its malign activities, only without the man at the top, incentivizing others to do the same. What if, seeing an opportunity, Diosdado Cabello—whom Chilean prosecutors allege has command and control over Tren de Aragua—decides he would like to lead Venezuela and offers Trump a better deal than Rodriguez? What if disgraced former oil minister Tarek el Aissami, who allegedly created passports for Hezbollah to use Venezuela as a base of operations, offers an even better one?
Allowing Rodriguez to run Venezuela will encourage the very infighting and power struggles that will bedevil our efforts and destabilize the country. Instead, we should capitalize on the regime’s current weakness by announcing that its remaining officials can negotiate a peaceful exit or go the way of Maduro. This would be a smart use of American strength and the best way to ensure our victory does not turn into a quagmire.
The same fears for stability are also there if the United States were to “run the country,” as President Trump suggests. Fortunately, Secretary Rubio clarified these remarks in a statement on January 4, explaining that certain American individuals would “run Venezuela policy,” not “run Venezuela.” This is a key distinction. The United States should provide support to Venezuela with an eye toward advancing its own interests, but refrain from heavy-handed involvement that would sow confusion and require the ongoing presence of U.S. forces. In any event, there is no need. The Venezuelan opposition has been preparing for this moment for years. María Corina and her movement have the contacts, know-how, and legitimacy to get the job done.
The United States saw a major victory this weekend that brings us closer to what seemed impossible just days earlier: a democratic future for Venezuela, and justice for her past. These achievements were historic, brave, and just. But if our goals are to stop weaponized immigration, fight drug trafficking, push our adversaries out of the hemisphere, and secure a prosperous future, the best choice is to support María Corina Machado and the opposition as it stabilizes the country. Otherwise, January 3 may prove to be not a symbol of triumph, but of tragedy.
