In the summer of 1963, Iranian dissident and religious scholar Ruhollah Khomeini, later to be known as Ayatollah Khomeini, was arrested and detained for drawing a parallel between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Yazid I, a figure reviled in Shia Islam. Many of the Shah’s close advisors favored execution, but Hassan Pakravan, leader of Iran’s secret police, believed executing Khomeini would only further exacerbate tensions, perhaps even leading to a revolution.

In order to save Khomeini, Pakravan convinced Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari to publicly recognize Khomeini as a Marja’, or source of emulation—the highest rank in Shia clerical hierarchy. While this was not a legal shield per se, the religious and social authority of a Marja’ made execution politically untenable, especially for a regime struggling to maintain its legitimacy. The government instead chose to exile Khomeini.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari was born in Tabriz in 1906 to Azeri parents. He grew up to be one of the most influential and senior Shia clerics of his time. He adhered to political quietism, the traditional approach of the Maraji’. This precedent goes back to the very beginnings of Shia Islamic tradition. Shia Muslims believe in 12 Imams as the legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad. After the 3rd Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, was martyred by Yazid I in 680 at the Battle of Karbala, the succeeding Imams adopted political quietism to protect themselves and their followers from persecution. Starting in the 19th century, the increasing exercise of religious authority in the political arena by some Maraji’ would inspire a new theory regarding clerical involvement in politics.

The modern theory of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) was developed by Khomeini in 1970 while in exile. He argued that until the reappearance of the Messiah, the state should be under the absolute control of Shia jurists. This totalitarian model of governance was largely opposed by the Shia establishment, especially by Khomeini’s erstwhile protector Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who believed Khomeini’s theory of government was unjust and tyrannical.

In 1979 Khomeini returned to a revolutionary Iran, further inflaming the situation and bringing the divergence between Velayat-e Faqih and Shariatmadari’s more traditionally Shia quietism into direct conflict. Shariatmadari’s supporters in the Azerbaijan region of Iran, with his blessing, formed the Muslim People’s Republic Party (MPRP) to oppose Khomeini and his Islamic Republican Party (IRP). Shariatmadari continued to advocate against Khomeini, arguing that the direct merging of religion and government would be corrupting to both. Though not a political secularist, Shariatmadari envisioned a democratic constitutional system in which clerics served as advisors, not rulers. He condemned the taking hostage of Americans at the US embassy and spoke out against Khomeini’s arbitrary arrests and property confiscations. Unfortunately, while Shariatmadari still had a measure of support, by the end of 1979 the country was squarely in Khomeini’s hands.

Khomeini pushed a referendum to enshrine Velayat-e Faqih and an Islamic system of government in the constitution. The referendum passed overwhelmingly, though some regions such as Azerbaijan and Balochistan experienced low turnout or boycotts. The referendum’s aftermath was marked by riots in cities like Qom and Tabriz between Shariatmadari’s MPRP and Khomeini’s IRP. After weeks of violence, Shariatmadari gave up opposing Khomeini, removing the final major obstacle for Khomeini to seize complete power.

The country shifted towards a near-totalitarian system of government and Khomeini was elevated to a near-infallible status within the Islamic Republic’s ideological structure. Ayatollah Shariatmadari was put under house arrest for alleged involvement in a plot to overthrow the regime, though the charges were unsubstantiated. His institutions were shut down and his supporters eliminated. He later died in 1986, still under house arrest; access to medical care was limited, though the exact cause and conditions of his death remain debated. His supporters were prohibited from even conducting a public funeral, so he was instead buried in secret in the dead of night.

The original sermon Khomeini gave in 1963 against Shah Reza Pahlavi that led to his exile was on Ashura, the day Shia Muslims mourn the martyrdom of Husayn by Yazid I in 680 at the Battle of Karbala. The irony is that Khomeini’s accusations against the Shah of being a despot like Yazid I were more accurately mirrored by his own rule. The rise of Ayatollah Khomenei was precipitated by a comparison between the Shah and Yazid I as the embodiment of tyranny in Shi’ism, and yet Khomenei himself would come to embody the injustice against which he inspired a revolution.

Disconcertingly, the story of Khomeini’s relationship to Shariatmadari and their contrasting perspectives on Shia political theology is largely unknown in the West. Khomeini is primarily seen as a figure of political resistance in the Islamic world, both for his revolution against the Shah and for the Islamic Republic’s later support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Khomeini rose to such messianic status that, when he arrived in Tehran after decades of exile, Ayatollah Shariatmadari sarcastically quipped that no one would have expected the Mahdi (the Messiah) to return on a jumbo jet. Yet nowadays, many contemporary Shia Muslims refer to Khomeini as “Imam,” a title only reserved for the established 12 successors of the Prophet. While a rivalry exists between the pro-Velayat-e Faqih seminaries in Iran and the anti-Velayat-e Faqih seminaries in Iraq, the Islamic Republic has a monopoly over the political direction of the Shia world, to the detriment of Shia principles and ethics.

A more fitting parallel to Khomeini’s original sermon is the story of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Shias believe her house was attacked by Caliph Umar Al-Khattab, a revered figure in Sunni Islam but viewed in Shia tradition as having usurped Ali’s place as Muhammad’s rightful successor. She was stabbed by the house door’s nail when Umar broke in, later succumbing to her wounds. Before passing away, she requested to be buried in secret and at night. In a tragically similar pattern, Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s house was besieged by pro-Khomeini rioters, he died in isolation after years of house arrest, and he was ultimately buried without fanfare or public mourning. It is a tragic irony that the early history of Shia Islam should match so well its contemporary struggles.