Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership of the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) resembles a house
of cards. Through a delicate balancing act, al-Sharaa has succeeded in consolidating his power
while projecting a positive vision for Syria’s future. This success is unlikely to endure as al-Sharaa has seemingly committed to a path that will break the fragile unity holding this house together.
After becoming Syria’s leader, al-Sharaa transformed his public image from former al-Qaeda
leader to a moderate nationalist by discarding his nom de guerre “Abu Mohammed al-Jolani” and
donning a suit and tie. Al-Sharaa vowed to govern on behalf of all Syrians and promised a
government based on democratic and inclusive principles. This makeover was necessary to
create appeal for al-Sharaa’s leadership among the international community and Syria’s religious
and ethnic minority communities. Openly maintaining the ideology and aesthetic of the Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) administration that al-Sharaa previously led was not a viable option to
secure broad support.
This reformed image laid the foundation for the STG led by al-Sharaa, but it also sparked dissent
within his own ranks. Many of the fighters that brought al-Sharaa to power had come to Syria to
wage jihad and found this new direction to be anathema. This obvious problem triggered
immediate skepticism about whether or not al-Sharaa was truly committed to implementing this vision.
This skepticism is increasingly vindicated by the actions of the STG, which have caused the
initially euphoric support for al-Sharaa to wither into fear and disappointment. First, the
massacre of Alawite civilians perpetrated by fighters affiliated with STG provoked international
and domestic outcry, seriously damaging al-Sharaa’s credibility as a protector of Syria’s
minority communities. In response, al-Sharaa denied any responsibility for these atrocities and
vowed to hold perpetrators of violence against civilians accountable. Over six months later, there
has been no meaningful accountability amid efforts to repress independent investigation of these
attacks.
Shortly after this massacre, the formation of the STG in late March undermined the STG’s
commitments to a democratic and inclusive government due to the lack of consultation or
substantive representation of Syria’s religious and ethnic minority communities. The promised
“National Dialogue” to consult all of Syria’s component communities was performative and
rushed. The only Christian and and only woman appointed as a Minister in the new government, Hind
Kabawat, amounts to token representation as al-Sharaa handed the most powerful positions to
Islamist loyalists from HTS. The five-year term afforded to the STG also raised concerns as al-Sharaa centralized power around himself.
Next, more massacres and other human rights violations were perpetrated by the STG security
forces during a conflict that initially broke out between Druze and Bedouin armed groups in
southern Syria. Again, al-Sharaa distanced himself and the STG government from any
responsibility for the killing and abuse of civilians and vowed to hold perpetrators responsible.
Meanwhile, Druze communities remain under blockade by the STG, causing shortages of basic
goods such as food, water, fuel, and medicine. Intervention by the U.S. and its regional partners
and allies, especially Israel, halted the high intensity clashes between the STG and Druze
militias, yet conflict could easily erupt again.
Whether or not these massacres were committed on explicit orders from the STG or were a
consequence of a lack of control over the Islamist fighters dominating Syria’s security forces is
unclear. Regardless, it is a clear indication that the STG is incapable of delivering the pluralistic
premise of this government. Additionally, the recent parliamentary elections in Syria reinforced
suspicions that al-Sharaa’s commitment to democracy is even weaker. Religious and ethnic
minority enclaves were forbidden from voting and indirect voting overwhelmingly elected Sunni
men. A third of these seats are to be selected by al-Sharaa himself and will likely continue this
trend, creating a legislature that does not reflect Syria’s rich diversity nor democratic principles.
At every opportunity, al-Sharaa has sided with the Islamist factions that brought him to power
over standing by Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities.
The brief clashes between the STG security forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
underscored how fragile Syria’s peace really is. Fortunately, a wider conflict was averted after
the STG recommitted to negotiating the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (DAANES). This integration
agreement is the best path towards implementing the necessary reforms to achieve a government
capable of delivering stability to Syria. Yet there is no indication that the STG is truly committed
to achieving a compromise that will allow religious and ethnic minorities to govern and protect
their own communities, instead they appear to be gathering strength to eventually strong-arm
these communities into submission.
The outcome of these negotiations aside, continued U.S. support for the DAANES and the SDF
is critical to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and a conflict with the STG will pose significant risks
to that core U.S. priority. The failure of the STG to undertake the necessary reforms to build a
pluralistic and democratic Syria will inevitably lead to the outbreak of conflict as Syria’s
religious and ethnic minorities will not fall in line to be ruled by the jihadist groups that seek
their extinction. Another civil war in Syria would be disastrous, not only for Syrians, but the
entire Middle East as peace is shattered and instability is exported to neighboring Iraq and
Lebanon, offering Iran an opening to re-assert their presence in the Levant.
Barring a dramatic shift in course by al-Sharaa, this worst case scenario increasingly seems
likely. Despite this looming threat, al-Sharaa was welcomed warmly to the United States in
September. During his visit, al-Sharaa was feted at the U.N. General Assembly, interviewed with
Gen. David Petraeus (who served as CIA Director while al-Sharaa was imprisoned by the U.S. in
Iraq), and sat for his first U.S. television interview with 60 Minutes. While there was some
scrutiny of his leadership on many of the points raised previously, Washington appears
increasingly comfortable with sidelining Syria’s religious and ethnic minority communities in
favor of a pragmatic partner in Syria. This is a serious error as nothing binds al-Sharaa to a long
term partnership with the U.S. and an Islamist Syria could again become a safe haven for
Islamist terrorist groups given the jihadist roots of the factions dominating Syria’s political
landscape.
The U.S. government must maintain and prepare to exercise every opportunity to exert leverage
over al-Sharaa and ensure his commitments to pluralism and democracy are met. Without
holding perpetrators of religious violence accountable and implementing pluralistic and
democratic governance, al-Sharaa’s house of cards will eventually collapse. If defending human
rights and religious freedom does not justify holding al-Sharaa accountable, the serious risk to
regional stability posed by the STG’s current trajectory certainly does. Without stability, Syria
could once again host ISIS, Iranian proxies, and other threats to the security of the U.S. and our
regional partners and allies. Securing peace in the Middle East requires al-Sharaa to reform and
meet the commitments made after assuming power.
