Nicholas Dujmovic, who directs the Catholic University of America’s program in intelligence and served at the Central Intelligence Agency for 26 years, spoke about espionage, intelligence, and Christian ethics at Providence’s Christianity and National Security Conference in November 2019. The following is a transcript of the lecture.

So I spent, say, 26 years at the CIA, and ultimately had to go to confession a couple of times that had nothing really to do with intelligence. It was my failings, nothing intelligence related. So our topic is intelligence and Christian ethics. Well how about them gnats? I’m not trying to evade the question. It’s just that I don’t think I have any particularly brilliant insights for you. 

In intelligence, we’re all about bottom lines. You know, the Bottom Line Up Front. We don’t believe in the history novel style of writing where you know, you come to the conclusion at the end. It’s very difficult to teach my students this. Generally, you start with your conclusion and then justify it. So I have a few bottom line conclusions that you can judge and then if they’re not adequate you can take a break early.  

The first is that intelligence officers whether they are Christians or people of any faith or not, all know in their gut that this is a fallen world. It’s not the way it’s supposed to be. Another bottom line is that, to the question whether a believing, practicing, professing Christian can be in U.S. intelligence to serve a career I’m pretty sure the answer is yes. I’m a deacon of the Orthodox Church and in fact I thought about wearing my cassock just to make a point. But I thought that would make people uncomfortable.  

The other bottom line is that we have to remember what intelligence is. Intelligence is the secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities. And in our intelligence studies program at Catholic University of America, we parse that pretty closely. Secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities. And there are potential ethical concerns in every part of that. Let me break it down further. 

Another bottom line. The way we teach about intelligence there is that it comprises five basic elements: Four classic ones, and one element that’s necessary because we serve a great democracy. And that’s collection, the most basic intelligence activity, in all its manifestations: Technical and HUMINT, collection. Analysis: Making sense of what is collected. Counter-Intelligence: Trying to prevent the bad guys, our adversaries, from worrying about us and U.S. national secrets. Covert Action: We’re getting more problematic as we go down the line here. Covert action, which is the implementation of foreign policy in such a way that the United States is not apparent or can be denied. And then finally the fifth one that is absolutely necessary because of our democracy, and I know your previous speaker spoke about it, of Christianity and democracy.

It’s that we need accountability. Because to do these things; to do the collection; to do the analysis; to do counter-intelligence and covert action, there are resources and there’s power at work that needs to be held accountable. Accountable to our democracy, to the Constitution, to our elected leaders through various deeds of oversight, and ultimately to the American people who are sovereign. 

Now, I… I spent my career… well, I started as an analyst and rose to be a manager of analysts. I edited the President’s Daily Brief for three stress-filled years. And so I’m going to start with analysis. 

Analysis is fairly easy to, I won’t say dispense with, but to cover in terms of what ethical challenges are there. Well there’s a normal one that you would find in any kind of work to be good at what you do and try hard. You have a moral obligation to give your employer what you’re supposed to do, right? And the worker deserves his wages. But beyond that, intelligence analysis does raise some questions because very often the analysis runs counter to what the ultimate customer policy maker wants. And so there are temptations to color the analysis to not be as objective as one ought to be to match the policy maker’s expectations. And that is it in the analytical world, I think it’s a sin. Arguably it’s a sin in the theological world as well.  

What else can I say about analysis? It’s important for analysts to know that we live in this fallen world and we are affected by it, so we have certain human shortcomings. We are fallible. I’m orthodox, I don’t believe in the infallibility of anyone. So analysts can be prey to certain cognitive mindsets that lead to a less objective product.  

We’ve studied the special issue of mirror-imaging. When we are observing a foreign entity, a potential adversary, and trying to figure out what they’re up to, mirror imaging is, as it suggests you’re looking in a mirror, there’s a great mirror back there. And you see yourself. You assume that these foreigners who come from different cultural contexts which you ought to know about, you have a moral obligation to learn about that, more or less think like we do. More or less have the same assumptions that we do. And that is deadly. That leads to famous mistakes like the CIA telling President Kennedy in September of 1962, you know the Soviets could put missiles in Cuba, but we don’t think they will because they must realize it’s not in their interest. Well that’s not how Kruschev was thinking, and a positive case of mirror image.  

Another one is confirmation bias, which is all to prevalent mostly in intelligence and journalism and in education, where you seek and cherry-pick the evidence that helps justify the conclusion you’ve already come to. That’s a grave sin. There are other mindsets like continuity bias: it’s always been this way, the Shah has always been able to handle the opposition in Iran and we think he’s going to be able to do it again. Which works until it doesn’t. 

None of these are sins, really, but we have to be aware that they exist. Again, we have a moral obligation to even within ourselves understand our own limitations. And above all, and I’ll get out of analysis, above all, there is a definite need for humility. Good old-fashioned Christian humility. It is the be-all end-all, I think, of so many things, including intelligence analysis. That ability to, you know, look at your wonderful analysis that you worked so hard at and consider the possibility that you may be wrong. You know, maybe Saddam Hussein doesn’t have Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was a lack of humility that has led the CIA, I know, to analytical failures.  

So moving along, along the elements, I tell my students that this is the periodic table of elements and my role is really fun. So we move on. I started with analysis, now we have to step back to what happens before the analysis is the collection. And this is a whole world of potential ethical challenges, technical and HUMINT. On the HUMINT side, we are… we… I keep saying “we” even though it’s been three years since I was part of CIA, okay I’m not… not employed now. Okay? Students sometimes ask. No I’m not here to recruit or to spy on people. However, if you are interested in a career, I can help.  

A CIA officer who is in charge of… his or her basic function is to recruit human sources, assets, spies if you will, or agents… That officer is a case officer. He or she is handling this specific case. And what they do is they, in the course of their work, which is undercover, and cover is a lie… we can talk about whether lying is ever justified. There are a couple of schools of thought on that. That case officer in the course of his or her work, let’s say undercover working in an embassy somewhere, is to spot interesting foreigners. Those foreigners that might have privileged access to information of national security interest to the United States.  

If they spot such an individual, then, working with headquarters, they assess that individual. They try to find out as much as possible about that individual because eventually, they want to create a relationship with that individual. The case officer may find that this interesting Iranian in the diplomatic circuit in a particular capital—I’m not going to mention any names in case I’m correct—seems to know something about their missile program. He plays tennis at the club where all the diplomats play tennis. If the case officer is not a bad tennis player, they might go and “accidentally on purpose” bump into this person, exchange cards, and develop a relationship.  

If this sounds exploitative, it is. If you have a problem with it, don’t go into intelligence because this is the reality. I tell my students that when we talk about understanding and influencing foreign entities and the things we do on behalf of U.S. national security, the only justification for much of this is that our cause is better than the other side’s. It comes down to that. If you don’t believe that, do something else.  

There’s much more to discuss about human intelligence, particularly the recruitment-acquisition cycle of spotting, assessing, and recruiting. Recruitment is when the scales fall from the eyes, and everyone understands what’s happening. A relationship has been developed and manipulated to the point where the case officer feels confident to pitch the person, expecting that they will say yes. It’s like asking someone to marry you. You spot someone interesting, learn about them, “accidentally” bump into them, develop a relationship, and when everything seems right, you pop the question. As in love, you want to know the answer before you ask. You want to be fairly certain the process will go as planned.  

Of course, being fallible, we make mistakes in both love and intelligence. HUMINT, or human intelligence, is no exception. Sometimes, the answer is, “I thought you’d never ask,” and very productive, long-lasting intelligence relationships have been established, some lasting decades at very high levels.  

U.S. intelligence excels at obtaining excellent information to inform policymakers and enable better decisions. That’s the understanding aspect of intelligence. I won’t delve into the maze of issues surrounding technical intelligence now; we can cover that in the Q&A.  

Moving on, I’ll set aside counterintelligence for now and go directly to covert action. Covert action is the implementation of a foreign policy initiative authorized by the President. Legally, the President must sign a document finding that the action is necessary for the national security of the United States, and this is transmitted to Congress. In just war doctrine, we would call this proper authority.  

Covert action can be divided into two general categories: soft covert action and hard covert action. Soft covert action involves capturing hearts and minds and influencing opinions. Hard covert action involves the implementation of violence, either directly or through proxies. There are numerous examples of both. As a CIA historian, I could talk about this endlessly, but I believe those who have thoughtfully applied just war doctrine to covert action are correct.  

From my understanding of covert action deliberations, those questions are asked: Is this being done under proper authority? Is it the last resort? If it’s risky, are other means unsuitable? For example, if a government we oppose is oppressing its people and supporting an insurgency against a neighboring government we support, we might assist the government we support in dealing with the insurgency. This is the paramilitary side of covert action. Conversely, we might support an insurgency against the government we oppose. This is precisely what happened in Central America in the 1980s with CIA support for the contras.  

In all such activities with ethical challenges, the central question is: How far do you go? How far do you go to collect information? How far do you go in implementing a covert action? Questions rooted in just war doctrine—proper authority, last resort, proportionality, and clearly articulated goals—must be addressed. The goal should not only restore peace to the area but also further social justice. These considerations should—and I believe generally are—addressed before covert action is launched. Congress is informed in nearly all cases, though there are exceptions.  

Mark, how much longer do you want me to talk? Should we move to questions? Oh, sure.

When it comes to counterintelligence, the question is how far we go in trying to find the spies among us. There is a recognized right of privacy, a desire for privacy by people, and that seems to be violated when there’s suspicion that there’s a spy among us—someone who has sworn an oath to the Constitution and is now violating it by working for a foreign entity, a government, or perhaps a foreign terrorist group. That becomes an issue.

In the recent war on terror, which is still ongoing as of this week, there was an unfortunate episode or series of episodes involving the elicitation of information from terrorist suspects in custody who weren’t talking. It was judged that they had information, and the question became how to obtain it. Enhanced interrogation techniques, or EITs, were authorized by the administration. Whatever Congress tells you, they were briefed in the main. Yes, there were abuses, and that was unfortunate.

The two questions to ask are: were they effective, and were they ethical? Intelligence professionals will tell you they worked. Despite what the Senate report said, they will tell you that they worked. Unique information was learned that led to other terrorists and plots. As far as whether they were ethical, they were certainly legal at the time. Three times, the CIA ensured they got it in writing from the Justice Department. It was still troubling to some. In fact, there was an internal complaint against it that went to the inspector general, and the whole thing unraveled as a result. But in a sense, the system worked.

The question of whether they were ethical or not—everybody has an opinion, but that doesn’t really belong to intelligence. If people have ethical concerns, they don’t have to be involved. They can raise it, as somebody did. We don’t check our ethical concerns at the door when we go to work.

Getting back to human intelligence, we run a seminar called Issues in Contemporary U.S. Intelligence, in which I pose scenarios to students. You’re a case officer, and you are working an asset who is providing great information. This asset is a North Korean scientist who is giving us the keys to the kingdom about the North Korean missile program and knows a lot about the nuclear program as well. This is great. But he wants certain things. How far do we go? Do we give him what he wants to get what we want? Will we provide him with pornography? Will we provide him with a prostitute? Will we provide him with drugs?

I’m not going to give you the answer. I’m not sure there is an answer. It depends. The practical answer is it depends. We run these scenarios that are designed to be fraught with ethical concerns, and the most important thing is to ask the right questions. Ask the right questions.

I’ll stop here. I’m happy to take questions. I think we have a little more time than I anticipated. I’m going to take my coat off because this is a warm room. Thank you.

Q&A

Question: David Johnson from Regent University. You mentioned covers, and I just wanted to get your thoughts on the ethics of lying to protect other information.**

Answer: Despite my introduction, I am not an expert on Christian ethics. I know something about intelligence, and I do know something about Christianity. It’s kind of required. In terms of my understanding of the Western intellectual tradition, there are two tools of thought regarding whether lying is permissible. Cover means presenting yourself as something you are not, and that can have many layers. It can be complex or simple.

When I was an analyst traveling abroad, I was under a nominal cover. It wasn’t backstopped much, and in this digital age, it probably wouldn’t work, but usually, it was under official cover. I was working for another U.S. government agency. Once it was commercial cover, which was very strange. I was a senior researcher at a think tank that did not exist. When you’re undercover, as I was temporarily or for some operations officers their entire careers, you are presenting yourself as something you are not.

The issue is whether that kind of lying is permissible. If you consult Immanuel Kant, Thomas Aquinas, or John Calvin, the answer seems to be no. Lying offends the Word of God, the logos. We must not lie because we’re all children of God and have this dignity. 

Another tradition, including Reinhold Niebuhr and St. John Chrysostom, would say yes. Niebuhr would say when the Nazi comes to your door, you lie to the Nazi about Jews hiding in your basement. That’s where justice is done. He doesn’t deserve the truth. He has removed himself from deserving the truth. 

St. John Chrysostom, in one of his sermons, praises the divine deception of Rahab the prostitute. When called before the king of Jericho and asked about the Hebrew spies, she lied, saying they went that way while hiding them. St. John Chrysostom said this is a divine deception if it furthers the will of God.

I’m not going to say my lie to the desk clerk about what I was doing in a particular country using my cover was doing the will of God. But there is a holistic view of cover. For us to do our jobs in U.S. intelligence, we have to accept some of these things. Otherwise, we will not be able to do what it takes to help protect the country.

Very good question about cover. It’s not for everyone, and it’s stressful. If counterintelligence officers could avoid being undercover, they’d prefer not to. It complicates everything from doctor’s appointments to getting a mortgage.

Question: Rhea Logan with Liberty University. As a government student studying intelligence and psychology, I’m interested in how intelligence agencies focus on keeping ethics and morals relevant to individuals, as well as how being undercover impacts a person’s psyche. Are there organizations in these departments addressing the psychological and ethical aspects of their work, or is that a newer focus?**

Answer: At CIA, there are many counselors. The general psychological health of the workforce is very important because unhappy people might decide to work for another foreign government, which would be bad. I mentioned a few unfortunate cases. This gets into psychology. Employees give up their financial data for monitoring. Every keystroke, print, and screen is subject to monitoring.

As a CIA historian interested in everything, I once had to talk to counterintelligence people because I was printing off too many things. They asked why I was doing it, and I explained my role. They accepted that, and I spent no time in jail. 

Regarding stress, there’s training on how to live undercover. There are training modules about workplace ethics, such as not misusing government credit cards or using the internet for pornography. For dealing with foreign assets, there are guidances. One is not alone in intelligence services. At CIA, it’s very much a community. I met my wife there, and now we’re a CIA family. That’s worked out well. When you leave, it’s traumatic, and there’s counseling for that. Three years ago, they called it leaving a monastery.

They invest in preparing people for specific challenges. There are programs for people returning from war zones, like Afghanistan and Iraq, who have seen terrible things. Counterterrorism analysts reviewing graphic videos also need counseling. For example, identifying ISIS members like Jihadi John was stressful but led to his identification and death in a drone strike in 2014. There’s an infrastructure for this.

Question: Aidan Cain from New College. Are there common ethical concerns that transcend the intelligence community? Are there passages or books, like Wisdom literature, that help Christians navigate ethical concerns or deal with the ramifications of actions they’ve taken?**

Answer: In terms of Scripture, I’ve relied on the Sermon on the Mount and the Psalms. They remind us that we are called to be perfect but live in an imperfect world and must deal with it on its own terms. Regarding common ethical concerns, the intelligence community is the object of accountability and oversight because of its resources and power.

A recent example is the intelligence community whistleblower who acted against the executive branch, concerned about the President’s abuse of authority regarding Ukraine. The whistleblower wrote an analytic memo expressing concerns, distinguishing evidence personally observed and from reliable sources. That person followed the legal process and acted out of ethical conscience, presenting the case analytically and objectively.

John McLoughlin, a former acting CIA director, addressed concerns about a so-called deep state. He joked, “If that’s a deep state, thank God for it.” The whistleblower acted ethically, knowing it was risky, following rules, and maintaining objectivity. Despite criticisms, intelligence is institutionally committed to objectivity and analysis based on facts.

I’ll tell you about the one time I had to go to confession. I don’t think I’m breaking any secrets here. It was after the Bin Laden raid. As you know, CIA and other agencies had determined there was an unusual compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. It was discovered through a variety of means, very cool means. The taxpayer was happy. But there was no direct evidence that Bin Laden was there. Everyone wanted him to be there. Analysts were thinking, “Okay, I can’t engage in confirmation bias. What else could this be?”

We never ruled out that it was something else. We never ruled out that it might be a Bin Laden hideout. Over the next few months, we continued to plan for an action, collecting more information, which never resulted in positive evidence that Bin Laden was there, but the circumstances seemed to indicate he was. People were asked to give their confidence levels. “How confident are you, given all the information and inferential data we have, that he is actually there?” People gave a range from 40% to 99%. It was an interesting exercise. Eventually, having looked at all the available courses of action, the Obama administration decided to send U.S. Special Forces via helicopter to kill Bin Laden.

That was the mission: to kill Bin Laden. As Admiral McRaven put it, “If we catch him coming out of the shower stark naked, yeah okay, we’ll arrest him. But otherwise, I’ve got to assume he’s got a suicide vest, and for force protection, we will kill him.” As you know, that happened. But it wasn’t without its problems. I was a little distressed that, in the course of it, the degree of innocence to culpability was debatable.

There were two brothers harboring Bin Laden, knowing very well who he was. They died. Their wives were there. One of the wives died. She actually threw herself in front of her husband as he was engaged in a firefight with U.S. Special Forces. She regrettably died, and they tried to save her. I was distressed about that. That’s the only intelligence-related episode that caused me to go to confession. I just wanted to talk about it.

Question: James Nyberg from Liberty University. I have a question dealing with the Fourth Amendment, where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the intersection between that and intelligence work. How do you balance privacy interests and Constitutional rights in this context?

Answer: Excellent question. I think the best answer was given by retired General Michael Hayden, former CIA and NSA director. He said, “In our world, you are either covered by the Fourth Amendment, in which case you have to go through processes, or you’re not, in which case, game on.” 

Those of you who are foreign students, sorry. The concern about collection arises when we’re talking about a U.S. person, a citizen, or someone with a green card who is here as a resident. Then there are real concerns. If there’s a foreign conversation intercepted by the intelligence community between a foreigner living in another country and an American citizen, and the content is of interest, it raises flags. It might be a warning, and we have to handle it differently. Usually, that involves getting a warrant unless there’s an unwarranted program authorized by the President. Even then, those are overhead programs. It complicates things. It’s still doable.

The intelligence community would prefer to collect more rather than less, but that’s why there’s accountability. There are oversight mechanisms: not just the executive, not just the legislative branch, but also a judicial piece. The public has a role as well.

Thank you.