In 2024, Gallup reported results from a survey carried out across 34 countries. Fifty-four percent of respondents had a “favorable” view of the US, against only 31 percent with an “unfavorable” one. Opinions were mostly positive in six of the nine Asian states included, seven of the ten European ones (plus a draw in the Netherlands), all four of the African ones, and all six of the Latin American ones. Only among the three Middle Eastern nations was the picture reversed: attitudes were overwhelmingly negative in Tunisia and Turkey, overwhelmingly positive in Israel.
One may also be cautiously optimistic that the US’ approval rating will improve in the future, since millennials and gen-z tend to be more sympathetic than older respondents―although, naturally, this is no justification for complacency. Furthermore, respondents professed significantly more trust in both Joe Biden and Donald Trump than in Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.
Though the Middle East breaks the pattern of worldwide American popularity, in recent years the US has made gains there, too. One team of pollsters explains that the Arab world’s opinions of the United States were growing more positive, and its attitudes towards China more negative, before the war between Israel and Hamas reversed that trend. That issue has driven US favorability down again, to China’s benefit. Still, as the authors note, this shift
does not translate into a desire to see the United States adopt neutrality or exit the Middle East. Despite their anger at the United States’ policies toward Gaza, Arab publics made it clear that they want the United States to be involved in solving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.
Especially striking are the views which Vietnamese hold of the US. Given the Vietnam War, one might expect widespread antipathy. Yet the opposite is true. According to a 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center, 76 percent of Vietnamese viewed the United States favorably. Even “those ages 50 and older,” old enough to remember the Vietnam War, expressed favorable attitudes by over 60 percent. The high overall approval appeared due to Vietnamese enthusiasm for capitalism as well as the perception that the US was “a dependable ally.” Although the Gallup data cited above indicate that Joe Biden is more popular worldwide than Donald Trump, Vietnamese strongly preferred Trump over Kamala Harris prior to the 2024 presidential election.
Other states in the region likewise put great stock in strategic relations with the United States. A 2023 report found that “experts and opinion-makers” in Southeast Asian countries exhibited “a growing preference to align with the US” when presented with a binary choice between the United States and China. Notably, however, “respondents from the three Muslim-majority states – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – picked China over the US.” The report also concluded that “many ASEAN countries” likely wished for Washington to show “stronger leadership” and balance growing Chinese power. Unfortunately, doubts about whether it would do so had brought about a certain amount of “disillusionment.”
In sum, people around the world tend to be sympathetic towards the United States. This impressive popularity should hardly be surprising since, on the whole, American foreign policy is well suited to win other countries’ approval. According to political scientist Lawrence Mead, “Anglo” societies, including the United States, generally act on the world stage in ways which others appreciate. Consequently, “[t]raditional realists would expect that a nation as dominant as the United States is today should provoke counter-alliances. But Anglo power is used mostly for ends others perceive as disinterested, so it is tolerated.” Clearly, this is less true now than when Mead wrote it in 2005. An anti-American alliance has emerged, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Yet even this is hardly a straightforward expression of popular will. Freedom of expression is tightly constrained in these countries, and in Iran the population is unequivocally hostile to the regime.
As Mead explains, Anglo states do not merely pursue their own interests, but tend to use military force against “widely recognized threats” and to “defend the international order.” Furthermore, their actions arouse relatively little international suspicion because outsiders can observe and understand how Anglo countries arrive at their policies. By contrast, the Chinese government’s aversion to “open debate” constrains “its capacities to lead and to build support.”
This assessment sheds light on the role of morality in foreign policy. As James Diddams rightly argues, nations are “defined by shared moral concerns that propel them in ways that cannot be explained by material necessity.” Accordingly, there is more to foreign policy than material self-interest. Idealism and morality also play a role, and can be a sufficient reason for pursuing a goal. Examples like the American efforts “to fight human trafficking and eradicate diseases abroad do not accord with appeals to pragmatism.” This is surely true. And yet, in the long run, acting idealistically can serve the nation’s pragmatic interests, too.
Moreover, Mead’s analysis is a reminder that it is in US foreign-policy interests to keep American political institutions functioning smoothly, not least because democratic accountability is good for foreign relations. Sadly, the Gallup study indicates that foreigners have come to see American democracy as much less deserving of emulation over the past few years. While international politics is endlessly complex, it seems clear that the US can be globally popular provided that American power be exercised idealistically, considerately, and comprehensibly.
