What we can gain from the origins of the Great War is that strategic ambiguity played a role in bringing on that cataclysm.

George Marshall’s attempt to create peace between the Chinese nationalists and communists failed. Christian realists in 1947 considered why.

Xi understands well that if Putin’s regime falls, China will lose an important bulwark.

The New Right cannot be bothered with foreign threats because they are rationing political capital for an ideological fight at home. That’s bad enough. Even worse, they seem less interested in transcending tyranny and more interested in learning from it.

Just war thinking is moral analysis of military action, not a framework for foreign policy. Acknowledging these limitations helps us to become better just war casuists, and it highlights the need for values-driven strategic thinking in the foreign policy sphere.

Here is the bad news for Beijing, and the good news for the West. Despite genuine concerns over how an increasingly multipolar world will erode the human rights consensus, the agenda still remains a major obstacle to ideological competitors—both at home and abroad.

“Strategic ambiguity” does not accurately describe the US policy on Taiwan that has been executed by successive Republican and Democratic administrations over the past 40-some years. A better description would be “strategic tacitness.”

Early on, President Joe Biden’s rhetoric promised a rejection of isolationism and a return to engagement. But his actions in Afghanistan speak volumes.

As part of a series of reports from different countries in the fall of 1946, Christianity and Crisis published articles by M. Searle Bates and Henry P. Van Dusen on China. These reveal the situation of Christianity in the country and America’s foreign policy challenge in East Asia.