Years from now, the final week of July 2024 will be marked by historians as a moment of significant escalation in the on-going conflict in the Middle East.
On the 30th July, Israel assassinated senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in the south suburbs of the Lebanese capital, Beirut. The attack was a direct retaliation for the killing of twelve young people in the Israeli-administered Golan Heights region. According to the UN, the Golan Heights is recognized as part of Syria and has been under Israeli occupation since 1967 when it was annexed following the Six-Day War. Regardless, the attack was viewed by Israel as a violation, directly attributable to the Shia Iran proxy group Hezbollah.
Soon thereafter, Israel launched a second successful assassination, terminating Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. Significantly, Haniyeh was killed in Tehran – marking not only an attack on Hamas, but also, in the eyes of the Iranian state, as an attack on Iran. Haniyeh’s death has been met with public mourning in the streets of the Tehran and Iranian officials have vowed to revenge the killing with a “harsh punishment.”
The double assassination marks the continuation of Israel’s longstanding policy of escalation dominance. The attack on two locations also heightens concerns that Israel may find its one-front war in Gaza expanded to a three-front war against Hezbollah to the north and Iran to the east.
The double attack may have been a result of fresh intelligence, or a quick-fire response to the deaths in the Golan Heights. However, it is more than likely that these attacks were pre-planned, and partly in response to the Iranian attack on Israel earlier this year.
On April 13th 2024, Iran launched a substantial attack on Israeli territory; amounting to 170 drones and 110 ballistic and cruise missiles. The attack was a calculated retaliation to the Israeli air strike on the Syrian Consulate in Damascus, which killed Brig Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander of the Iranian Quds force. In the short term, Israel responded by opting for a ‘retaliation light option’ by launching a missile in Isfahan, Iran.
Essentially, Iran and Israel find themselves in a yo-yo situation of provocation and retaliation with the stakes growing higher with each exchange. As a result, the odds of détente are growing slimmer and slimmer while at any moment the situation could escalate dramatically. Ultimately, both states feel obliged to retaliate appropriately while avoiding an all-out conflict.
In the current political atmosphere, Iran and Israel face a number of strategic difficulties. Both sides must uphold their own domestic image while not alienating their international partners.
To understand the culture of Israeli foreign policy and the predicament Prime Minister Netanyahu finds himself in, one must first understand the history of Israeli reliance on escalation dominance as a form of self-defense. Israeli political scientist Zeev Maoz noted that the Sinai War of 1956 demonstrated that Israel had both the will and the capacity to aggressively strike first if pushed. Most importantly, Israel’s victory in 1956 cemented the idea within Israeli foreign policy circles that escalation dominance is the key to survival in the Middle East. The purpose of Israel’s historic use of escalation dominance has been to convince rival states of Israel’s willingness to utilize any measures necessary to win. While the use of escalation dominance may have been a mostly successful strategy in the 20th century, the current political climate, with Iran’s growing capabilities, has made this strategy riskier than ever. Even so, the double assassination on two separate locations suggests that Israel will continue to out-escalate their Middle Eastern adversaries.
When deciding how to respond to the Iranian attack in April of this year, Netanyahu was first obliged to consider his own domestic political position. His government is held together by a fragile coalition of those who advocate for a much more aggressive foreign policy; from this position, Netanyahu must supply political crumbs to those on the right of his own government and thus a muted response was always unlikely. For this reason alone, a retaliation of some variety in response to the April 13th attack was inevitable.
Despite this, Netanyahu still had to consider what the international reaction would be. On-going pro-Palestinian demonstrations in North America and Europe have placed increasing pressure on President Biden and other world leaders to push the Israelis toward a less aggressive strategy. Likewise, exacerbated fighting between Israel and Iran poses further concerns for the White House, which may see a potential Israel-Iran conflict as a costly distraction from Israel’s operation in Gaza. Most potently, American officials have become increasingly weary that the United States could be dragged into a Middle Eastern conflict if escalation dominance in the region continues; news outlet Axios reported that Biden urged Netanyahu not to retaliate following the April 13th attack and instead “take the win’’ of having avoided major damage.
While the Iranian attack on Israel was substantial considering the number of drones and missiles used, the attack was ultimately just an Iranian show of force. The attack was launched on a region which Iran knew was protected by the Iron Dome and other defense systems. Israel and its allies also had several hours to prepare. In total, 99% of missiles and drones launched were shot down. Such an attack may have been intended to primarily inflict psychological suffering on Israelis, yet in the end may have fostered even stronger unity in Israel against undeniably prevalent outside threats.
In response to the April attack, Netanyahu opted for a relatively mild response. According to US officials, a missile was launched at Isfahan, home to Iran’s nuclear hub. The attack on Isfahan was in many ways a retaliation in name only, with no substantial damage reported. By taking the less aggressive option, Netanyahu was able to present himself as standing up to Iranian aggression while also keeping American support on side and not plunging Israel into a full-scale war with Iran when Israeli’s priority is in Gaza.
Even so, the international environment has changed since April. With over three months of stalemate between Israel and Iran, the powers that be in Jerusalem has chosen to escalate the situation. It is therefore apparent that the Israeli missile attack on Isfahan was not a one-off strike but instead the first in a much larger retaliation against Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. The likely outcome is that the assassinated individuals will simply be replaced and Hezbollah and Iran will certainly make some variety of counter attack while a ceasefire in Gaza seems ever less likely.
For the international community, the significance of Israel and Iran’s quest for escalation dominance is of the upmost significance. An all-out conflict in the region would be the moment ‘Cold War 2.0’’ turns hot, as one can anticipate a scenario where Russia comes to the aid of its natural ally Iran while America supports Israel. Such a conflict between four nations, of which three are nuclear armed could, although unlikely, have devastating consequences.
